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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis aims to describe and analyse at once the sociotechnical logics that give 
essence to the mechanics of value-creation in a start-up in Paris’s ‘Silicon Sentier’. 
It is for this reason composed of two texts of deliberately disparate styles and 
statuses. The first essay pursues a threefold objective. The first is to provide detailed 
ethnographical data, produced by direct, participant observation, on a social world 
which is largely unknown, even more so as the received ideas which start-ups are 
subject to are widespread. On this basis, I then draw some of the governing 
principles of this entrepreneurial activity as it is carried out nowadays in the French 
start-up ecosystem, through this antagonistic relationship which links the start-up 
to the ‘large firm’. Finally I sketch an analysis of value creation in which the 
organisation is at once the space, the instrument, and the target. The second essay 
revisits the ‘performativity of economics’ through the specific case of PriceMatch. 
I point out, firstly, how neoliberal policies of deregulation and the advent of 
information technology, made it possible the rise of an industry of revenue 
management technologies, of which PriceMatch is one of the most recent 
manifestations. Then, I indicate how the scientific literature on revenue 
management constitutes a reservoir of techniques and arguments in which the 
engineers of the start-up can draw on. Finally, I show how certain economic 
representations can emerge in a practical context, but how these can only be 
imposed through some ruses and artifices used by the start-up members. 
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Letter to the Examiners 
 
 
Dear Ebba Sjögren and Al Bhimani,  
The text that I submit for your examination has been subjected to significant 
changes, which I propose to get back to, one-by-one, following the final report that 
has been conjointly drafted by you (dated 7 September 2017). 
Concerning, first of all, form or organisation of the thesis: The introduction 
(Chapter 1 in the first version of the thesis) has been rewritten from scratch to 
indicate the hybrid nature of my object of study; Chapter 2, about the emergence of 
the techniques and the science of revenue management, has been revised and 
completed with the data of the inquiry conducted in the start-up to show how the 
logic of politics intervenes in the determination of prices in a practical case (this 
issue is the subject of Part 2 of this document); Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 has been 
edited and gathered together in Part 1 to try to shed light on the mechanics of value-
creation that come into play in the start-up; Chapter 5 on pricing practices in a large 
hotel group has borne the cost of this reorganisation and has been removed, for the 
sake of consistency, to allow me to quasi-exclusively direct my attention to the case 
of the start-up; likewise the deletion of conclusive Chapter 6, which the main 
lessons can be found in the last section of Part 2. Next, the substance. 
The aim of the study should be stated within the first five pages of the thesis. 
 The introduction of the thesis, as I said, has been started again to come to 
terms with your first comment. Contrary the previous version that presented the 
thesis in the light of the issue of price formation, I point out the substantive duality 
of my research, by retracing the staggered and wavering thought process that led 
me to make the start-up as an object of study in its own right, rather than only as a 
context in which certain pricing talks and practices take place. To know more about 
my objectives, I invite the reader to refer in particular to the first paragraphs in 
pages 20 and 25 (respectively p. 1 and p. 5 of the introduction), in which I come 
back to the fundamentals of the sociological project, as defined by Max Weber.  
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Include in the opening chapter a short review of the accounting/economics 
literature on pricing to make clear the void this study seek to address. 
In chapter 1, clarify which specific questions within the sociology of prices 
literature this study addresses. 
 The issue of price formation is addressed in Part 2 of the thesis, which seeks 
to contribute, through the case of revenue management, to the long debate about 
‘embeddedness’ initiated by Karl Polanyi. It is for this reason focused on the issue 
of economic representations, and in particular on what American anthropologist 
David Graeber has called the ‘paradox of performativity.’2 However, this is at the 
expense of the process and variables involved in price formation, of which I will 
only provide here limited information. Finally, please note that a literature review 
of sociology of prices is available at the end of the first section of Part 2.  
Identify in chapter 1 or 3 the methodology adopted, why an ‘eclectic’ 
approach is appropriate, what is at stake ontologically and 
epistemologically in coupling positivistic and constructivist research 
paradigms. Is there an element of ‘action research’ or is part of the 
investigation pure ethnography? Also explain the rationale for considering 
two cases. 
The methodological approach I have adopted in this thesis is resolutely 
‘qualitative’. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the regression model on price 
determinants, presented in Chapter 5 of the previous version, had no interest other 
than its illustrative value. It raised a problem (that in the case of revenue 
management it is not so much regularities in prices but irregularities that matter) 
and paved the way to the study of pricing, instead of that of prices, which, at least 
to my mind, would be best addressed through the ethnography of price-setting 
practices. If it is true that observing and participating are never neutral acts, the 
materials thus collected are not the product of a deliberate action to transform the 
                                                     
2 David Graeber, ‘The Sword, the Sponge, and the Paradox of Performativity: Some 
Observations on Fate, Luck, Financial Chicanery, and the Limits of Human Knowledge,’ 
Social Analysis, 56 (1), 2012, p. 25-42.  
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knowledge and practices of the members in the organisation studied, as in 
traditional action research.3 Thus, my intention was not to make a claim about 
‘reality’, nor to argue in favour or against a particular approach. (I am myself 
sympathetic with a critical realist approach, such as developed by Andrew Collier, 
where value does exist in nature and would exist even in the absence of humans, 
but, like freedom, exists in higher degrees in each emergent level of reality4). 
Chapter 3 contents should be linked more directly to the research question 
and conclusion/findings. There is room possibly for shortening this section 
of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 arguments and findings and their links to performativity issues 
need to be clarified. Provide a more developed discussion of where ideas 
are enacted, or not―and how ideas are mediate. Consider the more in-
depth use of a select number of analytical concepts to distinguish between 
different versions of price and discuss their interrelationship. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have been brought together to form Part I. Part I is 
an ethnographic study of a French start-up specialising in hotel revenue and pricing 
management, and traced the company’s trajectory from inception to exit to 
elucidate how value is being negotiated and constituted politically and materially 
in the present digital moment. The new version of this text retains its deliberately 
descriptive style, while trying to link it with theoretical work in the anthropology 
of value, to restore to the heart of my study the mechanics of value-creation that 
characterise the start-up as such, that is, as an instrument of creativity and 
innovation as well as a commodity liable to financial valuation. A discussion of the 
                                                     
3 This is of course rather simplifying. The boundary between research action and 
ethnography is much more porous than usually perceived, as attested by Willian Foote 
Whyte’s Street Corner Society (subtitled The Social Structure of an Italian Slum, Chicago, 
IL: Chicago University Press, 1943) that is considered as a reference work for both 
ethnographers and action researchers.  
4 Andrew Collier, Being and Worth, New York, NY and London: Routledge, 1999. 
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findings can be found at end of section 2 (p. 87 onwards) and section 4 (p. 144 
onwards) of this essay. 
Some other minor amendments have been made to the text within the part, 
to add some more details and to ensure consistency: The start-up is not simply the 
space of intense work but also the support of a form of ‘sociability’ (see p. 56-7); 
most start-up members are men and the management is fundamentally a masculine 
space (see p. 81-2); the typical day of the skilled workers of the so-called ‘new 
economy’ (p. 96 onwards); finally, a few boxes have been dragged and dropped 
from one section to another, as it is the case of ‘The Promises of the New economy’ 
(p. 88 onwards), the portraits of Baptiste and Léo, two of the cofounders (p. 89 
onwards), as well as that of one of their clients (p. 108 onwards), and the account 
of one of the ‘Monday meetings’ (p. 103 onwards). 
Chapter 5 presents part of pre-doctoral research data. Explain why this 
data is seen to have direct links to the doctoral thesis’ aims and broad 
concerns particularly in relation to the performativity arguments advanced 
in the conclusion. 
Chapter 5 has been removed from the thesis.5 The reader may wish to refer 
to Part II to know my views on the debate of the ‘performativity of economics’. 
Chapter 6 needs developing and more ample delineation and argumentation 
of the thesis findings. The chapter should address the more general claims 
which the study makes about the characteristics of the “price factory”, 
where it is located and how it operates, so that such a calculable space 
might be identified and understood in other settings. There is room for more 
lucidly identifying the conceptual advances the thesis makes, and how the 
                                                     
5 The text has been divided in two papers that are available online, see Vassily Pigounidès, 
‘Note on the Determinants of Prices,’ working paper, 2017 [online]. 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qGRxdrvEhC9UJOLvgRxHxLHCBHz4qv-P/view 
[Accessed: 30 March 2018]; Vassily Pigounidès, ‘The Work of Setting Prices in a Large 
Hotel Resort,’ working paper, 2017 [online]. 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gMyVsk2hmdyoizUmVj6o1RVuvLg62s_r/view 
[Accessed: 30 March 2018]. 
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conclusions further the prior literature (as outlined in a revised version of 
chapter 1, see above). 
 My doctoral research has allowed me―in my eyes at least, but the readers 
can judge for themselves―to know more about what a start-up is in general, and 
about the structure and functioning of a start-up in the internet economy in France 
at the end of the 2010s in particular, as well as to better appreciate what 
distinguishes this start-up from the large firm. I recused the wrong idea, deeply 
entrenched in popular consciousness, that the new economy is a ‘nihilistic’ world, 
characterised by greed, money, and success. The start-up enabled me to connect 
theoretical analysis with empirical description and thus to challenge the 
‘moralising’ vision the new economy and its participants, and to put back centre 
stage the value-creation mechanisms that defines the start-up as it is, that is, as the 
space and the tool of the creative and innovative work of its occupants and the target 
of investors and other business angels.  
Finally, I would like to conclude by thanking you for the open, precise, in-
depth discussion, as tense (at least from my point of view) as useful and 
constructive, that we had at the viva, and for the comments and the suggestions that 
you have forwarded to me, which have served as a starting point for my 
revisions―it is not everyday that one is given the chance to discuss his research 
work with attentive and informed readers, and I certainly appreciate this 
opportunity. 
London, March 2018 
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A Hybrid Object 
 
 
This thesis is both a kind of ethnographic description recounting my personal 
experience in an innovative company in a neighbourhood in the 2nd arrondissement 
of Paris, otherwise known as ‘Silicon Sentier’ for its role as a hothouse of internet 
start-up entrepreneurship, and a sociological analysis of price formation. It aims to 
suggest the fruitfulness of an approach that looks at ‘value’, as David Graeber 
contends, as ‘a way people’s own actions become meaningful to them, how they 
take on importance by becoming incorporated into some larger system of 
meaning’.6 Sociology must seek to grasp and contain this essential dimension of 
existence―which is particularly notable in the case of the start-up that is at once 
the subject and the object of valuation processes, as a space for creativity and 
innovation for its members and a commodity for investors―through in-depth 
investigation, in the field, to try to understand and explain ‘what is important, 
meaningful, desirable or worthwhile’ in people’s world.7  
I landed in PriceMatch by default and by accident. At the time, I was seeking 
an observation point from which to scrutinise the actors, tools, and know-how 
involved in revenue and pricing management practices, which I had undertook to 
study during my master studies in France.8 From the outset it seemed to me 
meaningless, both for epistemological reasons and by personal taste, to write about 
price formation without getting first-hand experience in the workplace, considering 
                                                     
6 David Graeber, ‘Value: Anthropological Theories of Value,’ in James Carrier (ed.), A 
Handbook of Economic Anthropology, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005, p. 439-54, p. 
453 (quote). 
7 David Graeber, ‘Value’, ibid., p. 439.  
8 Philippe Steiner and Pierre-Paul Zalio gave both the initial impetus for looking into the 
issue of price formation, while I attended as part of my master degree a research seminar 
they held on the ‘economic sociology of prices,’ and their supervision and guidance for my 
master’s thesis on The Work of Pricing in a Large Hotel Resort (Master Thesis, Paris: Paris-
Sorbonne University and Cachan: Ecole normale supérieure of Cachan, 2011). 
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the many and various market forms as well as processes and variables that come 
into play in price-setting practices (a plurality, incidentally, that a four-month 
internship carried out in the summer 2011 in a large hotel group had offered me a 
glimpse of, and that I decided to place centre stage in the study I conducted at the 
time, as part of my master thesis, which aimed at identifying and defining distinct 
logics of valuation that existed simultaneously within the same organisation). And 
because the normal economics of the mechanisms of price formation seemed to me 
riddled with mathematical models that oversimplify the reality of the economy by 
projecting onto it the abstract and normative construct of the perfect market, 
beginning with the tale of ‘supply and demand,’ an alleged law of markets that 
conveniently allows scholars to dismiss the concrete procedures whereby prices are 
actually calculated by focusing attention on the search for equilibria, partial or 
general, and the admitted ‘imperfections’ of the markets.9 
After months spent in a vain quest for a placement where I could insert 
myself to observe the work of revenue managers or yield managers10, a friend who 
                                                     
9 Bernard Guerrien and Emmanuelle Bénicourt, La Théorie économique néoclassique. 
Microéconomie, macroéconomie et théorie des jeux, Paris: La Découverte, Collection 
« Grands repères Manuels », 2008.  
10 Finding a sympathetic manager proved extremely difficult. I approached airlines 
(American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, British Airways, EasyJet, Air France-KLM), railways 
(SNCF, Thalys, Eurostar, East Coast, Amtrak, Via Rail) hotel chains (Accor Hotels, 
Marriott International), and even tried my luck with manufacturers like Coca-Cola that had 
experimented with revenue management techniques for its orange juice operations (see 
Duane Stanford, ‘Coke Engineers Its Orange Juice—With an Algorithm,’ Bloomberg, 1 
February 2013 [online]. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-31/coke-
engineers-its-orange-juice-with-an-algorithm [Last consulted on 3 March 2018]), all to no 
effect. Part of the reason for these setbacks was the often politically sensitive nature of 
revenue management. Revenue management is irritating for the general public as for 
example the success of this petition that reached 100,000 signatures, that is, the threshold 
for being considered for a parliamentary debate, urging British Members of Parliament to 
‘stop holiday companies charging extra in school holidays’ indicates (see 
https://petition.parliament.uk/archived/petitions/46455 [Last consulted on 3 March 2018]) 
– I have elaborated on this example elsewhere, Vassily Pigounidès, ‘The UK’s Holiday 
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studied economics put me in touch with Baptiste, a former classmate from Sciences 
Po and one of the cofounders of a French start-up, specialising in hotel revenue 
management. I contacted him immediately, out of curiosity, and because I found 
myself pressed for time, with then only two years left until the submission date. 
And right after my first visit I started an ethnographic journal. Here is the first entry:  
5 June 2014. I contacted Baptiste, he quickly replied, and we agreed to meet in his 
office in Paris. I visited them at the beginning of June 2014, on a hot spring 
afternoon. Baptiste was around my age, perhaps a little younger, unshaved and 
tousled, wearing a dark, corporate branded tee-shirt, which made him very likeable 
to me from the outset. He offered me a coffee and led me to the meeting room, 
which appeared to serve as his own private office. He presented me PriceMatch, 
without a break in his clear-toned and confident voice, exactly as if I was one of 
his potential clients—in business jargon, he pitched to me. First he briefly 
introduced himself and his partners, emphasising the prestigious institutions they 
went to; then, he gave me a demonstration of the platform and its main features; he 
concluded with the price—on average, their clients would be charged 200 euros 
per month, but it depended on the number of rooms in the property. But I was not 
a hotelier, and when I kept going on about the algorithms behind the platform (I 
believe he got tired of answering my questions), he got Charlie and Maxime, two 
developers who were in charge of these issues at PriceMatch, in order to satisfy my 
curiosity and give himself a break. We talked for some time. Although they were 
not exactly chatterboxes, I remember being quite amazed by how indiscreet they 
were about what they considered to be shortcomings of the algorithm—manifestly, 
they had received no orders from their boss to keep quiet. Such an openness stood 
out nicely from my previous experiences with the profession and gave me courage 
to tell Baptiste about my intention of doing a participant observation at PriceMatch. 
‘You can start whenever you want,’ he said. (Field notes, 5 June 2014) 
                                                     
Prices,’ Risk&Regulation, spring 2014, p. 14-5. Another reason is the fact that pricing has 
traditionally been seen as a trade secret in these industries, which is reflected, among other 
things, in the lengthy legal battle, starting in the early 1990s, between American Airlines 
and their competitor Northwest Airlines and its European partner KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines, the former accusing the latters for allegedly stealing proprietary information and 
trade secrets related to American’s revenue management capacities.  
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For once I had entered the start-up, I found myself confronted with a thorny 
problem, that of my original project: Should I confine myself to consider the start-
up as a context in which to set prices? My long immersion in the start-up and my 
direct participation to the activities it hosts have encouraged me—rather in spite of 
myself—to temporarily look away, to deepen my understanding of what a start-up 
is in general, and my analysis of the structure and functioning of a Parisian start-up 
in the so-called ‘new economy’ in France at the end of the 2010s in particular, as 
well as to better appreciate what distinguishes this ‘innovative entrepreneurship’11 
from the rest of the corporate world.  
For four months, I worked alongside the members of PriceMatch, at the 
frantic rate of twelve hours a day, applying myself to the conditions of an 
effervescent, highly flexible working environment. Following in their wake, I 
performed various and many tasks, from cold calling prospective clients to 
responding to calls to tender, or even contributed to overhauling their accounting 
information system. The friendship and trust accorded to me by the members of the 
PriceMatch team were such that I was able not only to blend in among them in the 
start-up but also to accompany them in their everyday peregrinations outside of it, 
in their meetings with hoteliers, hunting for clients and partners at commercial 
events and cocktail receptions, on the rooftop of the Hotel Raphael for a glass of 
champagne, in search for sponsors at the tourism office of the City of Paris, as well 
as at the Quai d’Orsay to meet with the principal private Secretary of the Minister 
of Tourism. My start-up colleagues allowed me to share in their joys—when a juicy 
contract was signed with a hotel chain—and sorrows—when a member of the team 
was laid off—, their after-work drinks, pinball and table football games, and house 
parties. I saw no less than seventeen people coming and nine people going during 
the summer of 2014 and I witnessed, at their side, the closing of the start-up, bought 
by Booking.com in May 2015 and a month later the departure for Amsterdam of 
the bulk of the team.   
                                                     
11 Philippe Mustar, ‘Innovative Entrepreneurship in France,’ in OECD Reviews of 
Innovation Policy: France 2014, Paris: Editions OCDE, 2014, p. 225-63. 
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From August 2014, and taking advantage of the relative lull in activities, I 
started conducted a series of over thirty in-depth interviews12 with members then 
active in the start-up to know more about their motivations to join the company and 
their expectations as well as their actual work—be they engineers, account 
managers, salespeople, or IT technicians. Together with the notes, observations and 
recordings made day-to-day in and around the start-up, these interviews provide the 
materials for the essays that follow.13  
From the beginning it was clear that, to avoid common sense preconceptions 
(as Emile Durkheim would say), a sociology of start-ups has to resist the 
sensationalist discourse quickly adopted by the media in their characterisation of 
the so-called ‘new economy’ as a whole—the resounding exits, by acquisitions or 
IPOs14, the heroism of the social ascent of the outcasts (‘Facebook's Mark 
Zuckerberg: from Harvard hijinks to hoodie billionaire,’ eloquently claim a reporter 
of The Guardian15), the exceptional lives and careers of the ‘self-made’ 
entrepreneurs. It must instead apprehend the start-up through its less well-known 
and least dramatic side: the drab and dreary routine of the office, of the long hours 
                                                     
12 See Appendix A for more details. 
13 These ethnographic observations were complemented and triangulated with the results 
of a questionnaire survey (nearly seventy people of PriceMatch replied to the online form, 
that is, a participation of 75 per cent; see Appendix B), and at the end of the research 
journey by a number of interviews with hoteliers who used as well as with one of their 
business angels (the second investor of PriceMatch not having wished to answer to my 
questions) and by the dissection of the native literature (specialised magazines and 
brochures, technical publications) and its scholarly derivatives (legal and managerial 
writings). After the acquisition of PriceMatch, I also collaborated with another hotel 
revenue management start-up, which I visited on several occasions at the company’s head 
office in New York City and in the technical team’s premises in Sunnyvale in California.  
14 Initial Public Offerings. 
15 Josh Halliday, ‘Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg: from Harvard hijinks to hoodie 
billionaire,’ The Guardian, 18 May 2012 [online]. 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/may/18/mark-zuckerberg-facebook [Last 
consulted 3 March 2018] 
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of intense work, inherently scientific and business-oriented, which preludes the all-
too-brief appearances at some prize-giving ceremonies; the daily and seemingly 
trivial rituals of the start-up life, which produce and reproduce the belief nourishing 
this very peculiar technological and moral economy that the digital world is. In 
short, to avoid the sweeping judgements that the mention of wildly overvalued firms 
never fails to conjure, one must temporarily look away from the entrepreneurial 
‘success stories,’ that conceal the sweat and toil of the many, and get lumbered with 
the thankless jobs alongside anonymous workers of the new economy in their 
ordinary setting of the start-up. 
The other edge of an approach based on participant observation in an 
average start-up is that the materials thus collected is not affected by the ‘fallacy of 
the single cause’ of which suffer most available studies and accounts on the new 
economy. Thus all the statements reported here, as well as the behaviours described 
of the start-up members, were systematically collated and triangulated to enhance 
validity, and to make it possible to render more precise and complete depictions of 
life inside the start-up, as well as more nuanced analyses. 
This thesis seeks to suggest how the start-up actually makes sense as soon 
as one immerses oneself in its members’ everyday work and engages with them on 
their own terms. It is with this aim in mind composed of two texts of deliberately 
disparate styles and statuses, which place next to each other ethnographic 
description and sociological analysis, in order to express simultaneously some kind 
of symbolic system that define the start-up world in terms of what is important and 
meaningful, and pricing practices. In short, the thesis aims to describe and analyse 
at the same time the technical and political logic that gives essence to the mechanics 
of value-creation—including the creation of human beings—in an organisation of 
the French ‘start-up ecosystem’. 
The first essay contributes to an understanding of the complex relations that 
link the ‘large firm’ to the start-up, and examines the activity within the start-up as 
a work of technical, economic, social, and moral valorisation, performed in a 
pragmatic and rhetorical mode, on the basis of a hybrid and mutable organisation, 
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that, progressively, brings this digital universe into being.16 It was in writing this 
text that I understood to what extent the start-up constitutes a research project in 
itself and decided to make the work in the start-up a second object of study, parallel 
to my investigations of price formation. This essay pursues a threefold objective. 
The first is to provide detailed ethnographical data, produced by direct, participant 
observation, on a social world which is largely unknown, even more so as the 
received ideas which start-ups are subject to are widespread. On this basis, I then 
draw some of the governing principles of this entrepreneurial activity as it is carried 
out nowadays in the French start-up ecosystem, through this antagonistic 
relationship which links the start-up to the large firm. Finally I sketch an analysis 
of value creation in which the organisation is at once the space, the instrument, and 
the target. This is to say that my intent is neither to denounce nor to defend this 
industry reputed as the most ‘cutting-edge’ of them all, so often praised and blamed, 
but rather to suggest what its specific mechanisms can teach us about the 
mechanisms of any value-creation. 
The second essay, first drafted in 2013 and then revised and completed four 
years later with the material collected during my participant observation at 
PriceMatch, feeds into the long debate about ‘embeddedness’, which has gained 
renewed interest in recent years with the announcement by French sociologist 
Michel Callon that economics performs the economy instead of simply describing 
it.17 This essay revisits this effect through its relationship with a certain rhetorical 
and ‘political logic’, which acts on the determination of the prices suggested by the 
start-up. I point out, firstly, how neoliberal policies of open to competition, and 
especially the deregulation of the American sky that took place at the end of the 
1970s, but also the advent of information and communications technology (ICT), 
                                                     
16 David Graeber, ‘It Is Value that Brings Universes into Being,’ HAU: Journal of 
Ethnographic Theory, 3 (2), 2013, p. 219-43. 
17 A long debate initiated, as it is well known, by Karl Polanyi. See Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press, 2001 [1944]; Michel Callon, ‘Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic 
Markets in Economics,’ in Michel Callon (ed.), The Laws of the Markets, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998, p. 1-57.  
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made it possible the rise of an industry of revenue management technologies, of 
which PriceMatch is in fact only one of the most recent manifestations. Then, I 
indicate, resting on some published work in operational research on the issue of 
inventory management and pricing, how this literature will constitute a reservoir of 
both pragmatic techniques and rhetorical arguments in which the engineers of the 
start-up can draw on. Finally, I show how a model close to that formulated by 
neoclassical economists like Jules Dupuit can emerge in a practical context, but 
above all how these theoretical arguments can only be imposed through the ruses 
and the artifices which the start-up members use, even going so far as to incorporate 
these tricks into their algorithms. 
To close this introduction, it is important to point out the main factors that 
made this research possible. The most decisive was no doubt the ‘opportunistic’ 
character of my insertion. Indeed, I did not enter the start-up with the express aim 
of analysing the new economy. My original intention was to use the organisation as 
a ‘case study’ onto the revenue management industry so as to observe the pricing 
strategies of a range of actors in the hotel industry—my initial object of study—and 
it was not until after four months of assiduous attendance, and after having looked 
at the material I had collected every which way, that I decided to make the work in 
the start-up an object of study in its own right. The hazards of economic life also 
determined that I would enrol in a ‘successful’ start-up, enjoying enviable growth 
since its inception in 2012 and acquired three years later by the travel website 
Booking.com for over twenty million euros, such that I was able to observe the 
milestones that have marked the short but turbulent history of the start-up.  
The often politically sensitive nature of revenue management and the fact 
that pricing has traditionally been seen as a trade secret in business could have 
hindered my integration and thus diminished my capacity to grasp the social world 
of the start-up, if not the conjugated action of three compensating factors. First of 
all, the ethos of project management and network capitalism18 and pronounced anti-
bureaucratic affect of start-up culture is such that everyone is accepted into it so 
                                                     
18 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, Gregory Elliott (trans.), 
New York, NY and London: Verso, 2005 [1999]. 
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long as she contributes to the achievement of the common objective—namely 
growth—, and is able to ‘make oneself useful’ for the company. Elias, cofounder 
and technical director at PriceMatch, explains: 
Elias: Many people came at PriceMatch, and worked along us for most of them 
voluntarily or for some 436 euros as interns. … And it is also in this context that 
you yourself are here, without being employed but bringing… 
Vassily: I try to contribute as much as I can… 
Elias: Let’s say you bring your added-value. But this is very much how we went 
about it. We didn’t say to ourselves: ‘Well, we’re going to take a PhD student and 
that’s going to be great because it will do this and that.’ It’s just opportunities that 
come. Like, someone says: ‘I’d like to come.’ ‘OK, come. Any ideas of what you 
want to do?’ ‘Yes, I want to do that.’ ‘Fine.’ And we gives him a project. Then, 
little by little, as he gets more familiar with the company, he has another idea and 
we have another idea. Anyway, that was just a little digression about our state of 
mind at PriceMatch, where we basically let people do their thing, come up with 
their own ideas, etc. And either it works for us and we keep going, or it doesn’t 
work and one way or another we bring it to a close (in general the person tells us: 
‘Well, I’m not going to stay’). (Interview, 20 August 2014) 
Next, my age, and also the fact that we attended the same places of study, 
contributed to my integration into the company, which was made all the more easier 
because its population forms a relatively homogeneous group from an educational 
and socioeconomic point of view. I benefited from the social homophily which 
prevails in the start-up (‘he was cut from the same cloth as us,’ explains Julien as 
he talks about Elias, the last member to join the founding team) and which is the 
support of the sociability relationships between its members. Finally, my total 
commitment to the requirements of the field, and in particular the fact that I 
accepted to do without reservations all the tasks―even the least rewarding―I was 
assigned to, earned me the confidence of my work colleagues, as attested by the job 
that Adil, cofounder and sales director of PriceMatch, offered to me―and, of 
course, that I had to decline―when I left the start-up for the first time at the end of 
the summer 2014.
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1. The Start-Up and the ‘Large Firm’ 
 
The universe of start-ups cannot be understood outside of the ecological context in 
which it exists and without considering the social possibilities this context has to 
offer. Indeed we will see that the start-up can be defined in terms of its opposition 
to what the indigenous perception calls the ‘large firm.’ To study the entrepreneurial 
activity demands an understanding of the structure of career opportunities offered 
to those who embark on business ventures, as well as their position in the social 
space—namely, the privileged situations of young graduates of the most prestigious 
French grandes écoles, fully integrated in the high-skilled labour market and in 
activities and networks related to a certain ‘state nobility.’1 Therefore it may be 
helpful, before stepping into the start-up, to provide the reader with a succinct 
portrayal of the so-called ‘new economy’ in France and its recent historical 
evolution. There is no comparison in terms of size and maturity between this ‘start-
up ecosystem’ and what is going on in the United States, in particular in Silicon 
Valley where thousands of start-up companies are currently based. Nevertheless, it 
demonstrates a startling dynamism, at least compared to other industries of the 
French economy, following almost fifteen years of uninterrupted growth and 
increased public and private investments. 
 
The Start-Up Ecosystem  
In the aftermath of the dot-com collapse, the French new economy was a deserted 
and devastated battleground, bereft of funding sources, in which dozens of start-up 
companies had fallen.2 The drop of the NASDAQ index on 13 March 2000 in New 
York, soon followed by that of the CAC 40 in September in Paris, triggered a 
cascading series of bankruptcies and forced mergers. Ten years later, the new 
economy had risen up from the ashes, establishing itself as one of the most dynamic 
sectors of the French economy. Between 2005 and 2011, start-up creation increased 
                                                     
1 Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, Lauretta C. 
Clough (trans.) Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996 [1989]. 
2 Laure Belot, « Internet, pourquoi tant d’échecs », Le Monde, 15 January 2001. 
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by more than 500 annually, equating at the end of the period to about 10,000 
technologically innovative enterprises,3 which employed 740,000 people and 
achieved revenue of approximately 200 billion euros.4 In 2010, amounts invested 
by French venture capital companies represented 0.042 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in France whilst investments received by French enterprises was 
0.038 percent—France being well above the European average, with 0.029 and 
0.027 percent of GDP in Europe respectively. Also in 2010, total budgets raised by 
venture capital teams in France came to 916 million euros—31 percent of which, 
i.e. more than 284 million euros, coming from government agencies. In 2012, 
France Angels, the French association of business angel networks, had some 4,100 
angels,5 spread throughout more than 80 association networks, which invested 
nearly 40 million in a little more than 350 companies (a third of this amount being 
used to refinance ventures that had already been financed), that is an average 
investment of 114,000 euros for each company financed.6 In an environment deeply 
                                                     
3 The French national statistics bureau (INSEE) does not provide any specific information 
on innovative companies with high growth potential. Furthermore, INSEE has a very 
restrictive definition of the digital economy as the group of producers of information and 
communication technologies. Therefore, it is necessary to look at ad hoc studies to gain a 
clearer idea of the number of start-ups created in France. The limitation of these studies, 
however, is that they do not allow for international comparability. In a note of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Philippe Mustar 
proposes to integrate the findings of three of these studies and estimates at 225 to 700 the 
number of annual creations of technologically innovative companies in the period 1995-
2011. 3 Philippe Mustar, ‘Innovative Entrepreneurship in France,’ in OECD Reviews of 
Innovation Policy: France 2014, Paris: Editions OCDE, 2014, p. 225-63. 
4 OSEO, PME 2012, Rapport sur l’évolution des PME, Paris, La Documentation française, 
2013, p. 198-204. 
5 Business angels are affluent individuals who provide capital for a business start-up, and 
advise its creators, usually in exchange for convertible debt or ownership equity.  
6 Information obtained from the French National Business Angels Federation, 
FranceAngels [online]. 
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affected by a major economic crisis and relocations, drawing its inspiration from 
similar developments on the other side of the Atlantic and its European neighbours, 
the French government has taken numerous measures to ensure the emergence of 
an increasingly favourable climate for innovative entrepreneurship, enabling a 
resounding renewal of the new economy in France.  
A brief overview of the many and various schemes set in place from the end 
of the 1990s give a measure of state voluntarism to renew the governance and 
ecosystem of start-ups in France.7 In 1999, imitating the American model of spin-
offs from public research, the Innovation and Research Act was designed to foster 
links between public research and business. Between 1999 and 2008, the net 
balance was 2,060 companies created, over 950 of which stemmed from public 
research projects or researchers—i.e. a hundred companies per year. In 2008, the 
Finance Law radically reformed the research tax credit (CIR), making of this 
measure, which enables companies to deduct their expenditure on research and 
development (R&D) from their tax, the main instrument of public support for 
business R&D. Between 2007 and 2011, the cost of the CIR to the state rose from 
1.7 billion euros to 5.1 billion euros. In 2011, Oséo agency, responsible for 
implementing policy on innovation and growth for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), had financed, essentially through support schemes for 
investment, treasury and aid for creation, more than 68,000 companies, 51,000 of 
which being young and small innovative companies, for a volume of activity of 14 
billion euros.8 Oséo was established in 2005 following the merger of the French 
Innovation Agency (ANVAR), the Bank for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise 
Development (BDPME) and the Sofaris fund. In 2013, Bpifrance was created from 
the merger of Oséo, CDC Enterprises (a branch of the Deposits and Consignments 
                                                     
https://www.franceangels.org/images/stories/Newsletter/News_mars_13/Prsentation_chif
fres_rseaux_de_BA_2012.pdf [Last consulted on 15 February 2017] 
7 For a detailed account of the various schemes implemented in France to support 
innovative entrepreneurship and their assessment, see Philippe Mustar, ‘Innovative 
Entrepreneurship’, art. cit. 
8 OSEO, PME 2012, op. cit. 
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Fund [CDC]) and the Strategic Investment Fund (FSI). With the creation of the FSI 
in 2008, endowed with 20 billion euros, this direct intervention in companies grew 
substantially. In 2004, the Young innovative enterprise (JEI) status offered 
exemptions from social security contributions for all employees engaged in 
research and from corporation tax for the first three years of operation, with a 50 
percent reduction over the following two years (then, starting from 1st January 2012, 
a reduction of 100 percent in the first year and 50 percent in the second year) and 
an exemption from property taxes for eight years. Between 2004 and 2011, 5,200 
companies benefitted from this scheme; 2,800 of these had this status in 2011. The 
1999 Innovation Act, the focus of the CIR and Oséo aid on young technologically 
innovative companies and the creation of the JEI status, helped construct an 
innovation policy focusing on the creation and growth of young technology 
companies.  
Like many French engineering or management colleges, which have devised 
since the 1990s training programmes which—more than in the past—include 
entrepreneurship and innovation in their curricula, the public authorities have also 
sought to diffuse in universities the ‘spirit of enterprise.’9 The establishment in 2001 
of an Observatory of Teaching Practices in Entrepreneurship, the setting up by 2004 
of Maisons de l’Entrepreneuriat (‘Entrepreneurship centres’) in several 
universities, and the launching in 2009 of a plan to develop entrepreneurship in 
higher education institutions are among the many awareness actions supported by 
the government.  
As with other European metropolises, the City of Paris has, in recent years, 
launched a series of schemes in favour of innovative entrepreneurship. Between 
2002 and 2012, the surface area of business incubators and business centres 
available for start-ups climbed from 5,000 to 78,000 square metres, and a further 
25 000 square metres were being developed. Thus, 17 incubators were managed by 
Paris Incubateurs in 2012. This property policy, amplified by the contribution of 
large private corporations which financed it, has provided business creators with 
                                                     
9 Pascale Krémer, « Contre le chômage, l'université veut "diffuser l'esprit d'entreprendre" 
», Le Monde, 10 September 2014. 
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high-quality premises at competitive prices. As well as premises, start-up creators 
have been able to rely on logistical services, help with developing their market and 
fundraising, and contacts with the Parisian innovation ecosystem. Other schemes 
helped prolong the financial support policy of the government, via the creation, in 
partnership with Oséo, of the Paris Seed Innovation Fund in 2009, as well as 
enhance the visibility of Parisian start-ups: creation of the Innovation Grands Prix 
of the City of Paris, the launch of an Open Innovation Club by Paris Région Lab, 
and so on.  
Most OECD countries have introduced policies to support the development 
of the venture capital industry. In France, since the end of the 1990s, the CDC and 
its subsidiary CDC Enterprises and then the FSI, both of which have now come 
under the umbrella of Bpifrance, have established various funds of funds in order 
to increase the availability of venture capital: Public Venture Capital Fund in 1998, 
Venture Capital Promotion Fund in 2000, Technology Fund of Funds in 2005, each 
with a budget of 150 million euros, France Investissement in 2006, with over 300 
million euros per year (but a portion of this amount contributes to direct financing 
for innovative companies), and finally National Seed Fund (FNA), as part of the 
Future Investment Programme (PIA), endowed with 600 million euros.10 The 
various tax concessions granted to taxpayers subject to the wealth tax (ISF), under 
the 2007 Law in favour of Labour, Employment and Purchasing Power (TEPA), 
made it possible to raise over 1.2 billion euros in 2008. But the tax losses caused by 
these measures are significant—in the order of 500 million euros. This number 
demonstrates more than any the central position occupied by the new economy in 
French industrial and innovation policy.11 
                                                     
10 For a recent assessment of public intervention in the risk-capital industry in France, see 
Marie Ekeland, Augustin Landier, and Jean Tirole, « Renforcer le capital-risque français », 
Les notes du conseil d’analyse économique, July 2016, n° 33. 
11 Inspection générale des finances, Les Frais prélevés sur les produits financiers 
bénéficiant d’un avantage fiscal pour favoriser l’investissement dans les PME, Paris, 
Inspection générale des finances, October 2009. On this matter, see also Cour des comptes, 
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Founded in April 2012, PriceMatch was a French start-up specialising in 
hotel revenue management. According to the Trade and Companies Register (RCS), 
PriceMatch was incorporated on 20 April 2012 at the Tribunal de commerce of 
Bobigny, in the form of a Simplified Joint-stock Company (SAS),12 starting with a 
capital of 12,000 euros, financed equally by its four founders, Adil, Timothée, 
Baptiste and Léo. One year later, on 2nd April 2013, a change in share capital—
increased to 84,000 euros—is recorded, as well as the arrivals of two new 
representatives, Julien and Elias, and the departure of Timothée—who eventually 
decided to leave the organisation to prepare the entrance examination for the 
National School of Administration (ENA), ceding part of his shares to his partners. 
The start-up was born into a historical context of support for innovative companies’ 
creation and development, which Baptiste, president and cofounder of PriceMatch, 
has paid tribute to, in a note published in the corporate blog: ‘Contrary to popular 
belief, the state supports innovative start-ups, and many ongoing projects give 
evidence of the progress being made in this respect over the past several years. As 
a young entrepreneur, I can only stress the key role played by public policies for 
innovation and business development. If perfectible, they have clearly helped us 
experience sustained growth. At a time when the public debate focuses on the 
obstacles to entrepreneurship in France and to the development of incubators in 
Europe, I wanted to stress that France supports innovative entrepreneurship in order 
for national champions to emerge.’ (Blog note, 2 June 2013). 
Indeed, the start-up has benefited from numerous aids from public 
authorities in order to develop its activity. When created, it was accepted at the 
Science Po Incubator, where three of the founders were studying at the time; then, 
after a one-year rental in the Sentier area, it joined the Shaker from September 2014, 
a newly created incubator situated a stone’s throw away from the previous premises 
                                                     
Les dispositifs de soutien à la création d’entreprises, Paris, Cour des comptes, December 
2012. 
12 A SAS (literally a ‘simplified joint-stock company’) is similar to a limited company in 
British law. This status is very much appreciated by start-up companies, as it permits a 
dissociation between power and capital: a partner can be granted prerogatives independent 
of his or her capital share, which is of particular interest when investors show up. 
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and established by Partech Venture, which took a stake in the capital of PriceMatch 
one year earlier. Under the PIA programme, financed by the City of Paris and Oséo, 
PriceMatch received a subsidy of 30,000 euros in 2012 and was granted, in January 
2013, a loan on trust of 100,000 euros. In 2012, the start-up won the California 
Ecole Polytechnique Alumni for the Master in Entrepreneurship (CEPAME) grant 
of 20,000 dollars. This was financed by Ecole Polytechnique Alumni, of which one 
and then three cofounders—two of them joining the team from the summer of 
2012—are graduates. In 2013, it won the Young French Economic Chamber’s 
(JCEF) special prize at the Innovact Campus Award, as well as the first prize of the 
National Contest of Business Creation (CNCE). In 2012, the company obtained JEI 
status, enabling it to benefit from an exemption from social security contributions 
for the engineers employed by the enterprise and from property taxes (although it 
did not take advantage of the exemption from corporation tax provided for in this 
status as no net income was earned for the period). The start-up also received 
income tax reductions under the CIR on account of expenses incurred in R&D, and 
in 2013 received 90,000 euros from the French State in accordance with the CIR. 
In November of the same year, the company received 500,000 euros of financing 
from Partech Venture, through its seed fund, Partech Entrepreneur, which is at least 
partly financed by Bpifrance—the rest of the fund is financed by private 
corporations including BNP Paribas and Econocom. Another 500,000 euros from 
Hotelim, a business angel and hotel management and investment company whose 
properties subsequently paid for the revenue management services provided by 
PriceMatch, brought this fundraising to a total of one million euros.  
 
Getting a ‘Real’ Job 
In this economic and industrial context which ‘gets better and better’13 according 
to Eric Carreel, president and cofounder of Withings, and where ‘it is infinitely 
                                                     
13 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu n°79, Commission des affaires économiques, Round 
table bringing together founders and/or CEOs of French companies of the digital economy, 
with Mr. Éric Carreel, cofounder and CEO of Withings, Mrs. Céline Lazorthes, founder 
and CEO of Leetchi, Mr. Frédéric Mazzella, founder and CEO of Blablacar, Mr. Ludovic 
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easier to be an entrepreneur today than twenty years ago,’ the start-up appears as a 
possible option compared to other more classic career patterns, of which salaried 
worker within a large firm constituted a sort of implicit counter-model for part of 
the French youth. ‘Administrative procedures are easier,’ Carreel continues, ‘and 
young engineers are happy to come and work in start-ups. Twenty years ago, they 
preferred to enter a big group.’ Thus, some young graduates of grandes écoles turn 
away from the conventional paths of success, as described by Pierre Bourdieu in 
the 1980s,14 in order to start their own business or to throw themselves into the start-
up of another one, as illustrated in the columns of Le Monde by the case of one of 
them: ‘Gautier Dreyfus is a Polytechnique graduate. But the well-marked career 
path towards high-ranked public office is of little interest to him. ‘Repetitive 
positions, slow decisions,’ remarks decisively the young man, dressed like a 
student. He wanted to ‘continue to learn rather than work,’ so he created a start-up 
with a colleague: Forssea Robotics, which develops underwater robotics systems 
for industry. Over ten of his classmates have done the same thing, for the same 
reasons. Ten years ago making those choices would have been unthinkable.’15  
Like this young entrepreneur, the founders of PriceMatch are graduates of 
the most prestigious French grandes écoles, namely Ecole Polytechnique and Paris 
Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po). Like him, they cut their teeth, as interns, 
in the world of the large company, in French industrial groups or international 
financial institutions, and have a mixed memory to say the least, in fact a trauma 
for some, of these professional experiences.  
Adil: I took a placement year. First, internship at Société Générale. Finance. I was 
bored to death. So after the third month I was just waiting for the end. Second I got 
a place at JP Morgan in New York. Then I had a chat with Baptiste. We spoke 
                                                     
Le Moan, founder and CEO of Sigfox, et Mr. Simon Baldeyrou, CEO of Deezer France, 
30 September 2015. 
14 Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility, op. cit. 
15 Béatrice Madeline, « Loin des grands groupes, la nouvelle génération start-up voit le 
jour », Le Monde économie, 12 February 2017. 
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about the PriceMatch project, etc. and ended up saying ‘yeah, why not!’ (Interview, 
22 September 2014) 
Baptiste: I did three months at the IMF in Gabon. Then I came back and I started 
my internship at Goldman Sachs [in London] that was supposed to be a one-year 
placement. After seven months, I quit and I created PriceMatch. (Interview, 21 
August 2014) 
Léo: I did an internship at GDF Suez for a month, which was an internship in 
communication, where I didn’t learn much; then I did an internship at Orange for 
four months in Moscow, where what I really learnt was that… well, that you don’t 
learn much in large companies. At least as it happens I didn’t learn much. I didn’t 
really get along with my manager; I didn’t have the impression of making the 
contribution I could have, because the assignments I was given were really not 
interesting. It really confirmed my idea that I wanted to create my own company. 
(Interview, 24 September 2014) 
In spite of their young age—between 21 and 23 at the time of the creation 
of the company—PriceMatch founders have had the experience of working within 
a large group, which appears to be the very reason that encouraged Baptiste to set 
up a business. In an interview conducted with him in August 2014 he noted: ‘The 
real trigger is that I was just having a bad time at Goldman Sachs [j’ai badé]; I told 
myself “I really need to find a way to get out of this!” Around that time I went to 
see Timothée in Dublin, who had just finished his internship at McKinsey. He said 
to me that he had a bad time too; he was at Google, he said to me “It’s not interesting 
at Google if you’re not a developer.” We told ourselves that the only thing that can 
really be interesting, in the spheres in which we find ourselves, is to try to start up 
our own business.’ 
The experience of a certain degree of frustration is indeed so commonplace 
that nearly all members of the start-up allude to it when questioned about their 
professional situation prior to PriceMatch. Many are familiar with the boredom of 
underemployment. Basile recalls his internship at the Caisse des Dépôts, within a 
public administration which, because of a change at the top of the hierarchy, 
suddenly went wrong, putting its employees into to a state of complete inactivity 
for months: ‘The first month went really well, I had a project, my [superior] was 
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very accessible, we talked a lot. After a month, with the political changes,16 there 
were also changes at the top of the Caisse des Dépôts. We were waiting for a new 
chief exec. The person that I was working with knew very well that he was going 
to be leaving, so for him there was no longer any point in working on strategy, 
thinking about the future. After that, when I sent emails, the wait for a response 
became longer and longer, or just never came. Basically, I actually worked for a 
month and a half, then just spent a month and a half of floating around. In the end I 
said to myself that I didn’t want to spend the next three months doing nothing… so 
I started going to the incubator at Sciences Po to work on my own projects.’  Many 
have shared this sense of a loss of meaning at work. Some of my colleagues at 
PriceMatch confided in me about their unease during previous professional 
experiences when performing certain types of tasks, or engaging in certain activities 
that they found morally questionable. ‘I was in Paris at a firm called Solucom,’ 
recalls Karim, ‘that does consulting for the banking, insurance and energy 
industries, and advises on projects of digital development, technological change, 
etc. I was really uneasy about it… Spending your days doing Excel and PowerPoint 
files and performing analyses that are borderline scams… Because it’s junior 
consulting, you’re not an expert after the first four months. I was very much uneasy 
about it, it was deadly boring, and I didn’t quite like the suit atmosphere as it was 
all about appearance, looks, etc. I asked to get fired.’17 
In contrast to this boring and constraining environment, and despite the real 
difficulties that exist in the field of the new economy (long hours, low wages, and 
lack of job security), the start-up constitutes for its members a sort of refuge in the 
corporate world, where labour makes more (or less) sense again. The start-up seems 
to offer what the sociologist Alexandra Bidet has dubbed a ‘real job’ [vrai boulot], 
                                                     
16 The action in all likelihood took place in the spring of 2012 which saw, following the 
French presidential election, the Left coming back to power.  
17 It is quite ironic to read on the company’s website the following presentation: ‘Founded 
in 1990, Solucom is an independent consulting firm, listed on Euronext Paris and certified 
Great Place to Work in 2015.’ 
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in opposition to the ‘bullshit jobs’ of large groups18; a world in which each one is 
invested with increased professional responsibilities and where it is still possible to 
conduct a project from beginning to end and in all its aspects. This rejection of the 
large company, which can tend to the slightly cartoonish sometimes, is what makes 
possible the active commitment of the members of the start-up to their work, and 
goes a long way towards explaining its attraction. Carine is no more than an intern, 
yet she can confirm that she is considered a member of the group in her own right: 
‘I have a huge amount of responsibility. As I told you, I’m completely autonomous, 
I know that they trust what I do two-hundred percent, I don’t have to report on what 
I’m doing to someone. Even though Feriel is my supervisor, she won’t go and look 
at my client platforms, she won’t check the emails that I send… That’s something 
that I probably wouldn’t have in a big company. Here I was straight away able to 
do things my way… The big advantage is the independence and the responsibility. 
I know that I’m seen as an employee, that I have the same opportunities, I’ve even 
got more clients than certain people in the team. Which is fantastic!’ Maxime, a 
developer who went from working on the ‘algorithm’ to ‘back-end’, explains the 
reasons why he decided to join the start-up: ‘After my internship, I started looking 
for a company. I didn’t seriously think about staying at Amadeus because I just 
don’t think it’s my cup of tea. It’s quite a big thing. It’s more for people who want 
to settle down once they’ve started a family and all that; they want something laid 
back. I preferred something more dynamic like here, like a start-up. That’s what I 
was looking for: a start-up or something smaller. I’ve experienced large companies. 
There was huge inertia, I couldn’t do much; you were trapped somehow, in the 
sense that you were going around in circles.’ … ‘At Amadeus, there are either pure 
developers or guys who define the product, who write specs all day long; it’s like 
“Can I place a whitespace here or a capital letter there,” that kind of stuff. So it’s 
either you code and you do only that, you don’t think, you’re told to do this and 
that, and you write the lines; or you define the product and it comes down to writing 
docs and specs. It’s not really exciting. And I think it’s kind of the same everywhere. 
                                                     
18 Alexandra Bidet, L’engagement dans le travail. Qu’est-ce que le vrai boulot ?, Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, collection « Le lien social », 2011. On bullshit jobs, see 
David Graeber, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory, London: Allen Lane, forthcoming. 
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The thing is that when you are in a big thing you’re in a team that is extremely 
specialised; you’re a tiny part of the company.19 What I like here is that you can do 
everything; you can get the big picture of the product, but also all the technical 
parts; you don’t have to focus on something in particular.’ 
Indeed, it is common to define the start-up in relation to what would be its 
ideal-typical opposite, namely the large firm. Here are just a few examples from the 
interviews conducted at PriceMatch where the start-up would be characterised by: 
‘constantly changing tasks’, rather than ‘a cushy job where you’re paid 1,000 euros 
more to doze with other people who are dozing’ (Christine); ‘a sense of mutual 
motivation’ which is absent in large groups where ‘the teams are very big, very 
slow’ (Ilan); ‘easier, more direct relationships’ … ‘people are far more reactive in 
start-ups than in big companies’ (Karen); or else would be perceived as ‘a dynamic 
environment where everyone is a bit like you’, unlike that of the ‘big company 
where people have been in their job for ten years, don’t ask questions, walk straight, 
as they’ve been told to’ (Julien). Some employees claim that the start-up actually 
‘saved’ them, as is the case with Philippe, who confesses that he would most likely 
have succumbed to a nervous breakdown at the time of his first job at the Paris City 
Hall if not for the opportunity to work at PriceMatch. And many French celebrity 
entrepreneurs, among them Frédéric Mazella, Jean-Baptiste Rudelle and 
particularly Ludovic Le Moan, do not hesitate to bring up their first-hand 
experiences in large structures, public or private, in order to highlight the 
supposedly innovative working methods implemented in their own companies. 
Presenting his project of a hacker house, Paul Poupet, cofounder of Seed-Up, marks 
out a vibrant indictment of the torment of the large firm during his September 2016 
speech at the TEDx conference in Paris: ‘I saw that before joining this company, 
you have to send fifty CVs, get through four interviews. Then I saw that once 
you’ve got through all that, they just want you to come and fill in Powerpoints, and 
that to do real projects you have to wait a few years. I also saw the internal 
                                                     
19 This echoes the sociological critical anaysis of Georges Friedmann on assembly-line 
work, which smashes laborious activity to bits [miettes] and makes it an empty, 
meaningless shell. Georges Friedmann, The Anatomy of Work: Labor, Leisure, and the 
Implications of Automation, Wyatt Watson (trans.), Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1961[1956]. 
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organisation of these companies. I felt like I was in one of those history 
documentaries that they show you at school. You know, the stuff about 
taylorfordism, with the division of tasks and processes.’20 Clara Deletraz, with 
Béatrice Moulin, turned these difficulties at work into a start-up project, Switch 
Collective, specialising in the ‘brown-out’ of executives and which aims at ‘helping 
employees find their own way in a world where there are no longer pre-marked 
paths laid out for them’. ‘I worked in big CAC40 companies’, she says, ‘but there 
was no meaning to what I was doing. So I reoriented myself towards the public 
sector with the idea of serving the general interest. But I couldn’t stand the 
inefficiency and bureaucracy.’21 Likewise, most young entrepreneurs interviewed 
by the reporters of Le Monde22 willingly emphasise the reality of the opposition 
between the start-up and the large company: ‘At 24 years old, Laura Beaulier has a 
CV that most parents could only dream of. Studied abroad, speaks four languages, 
sporty, prestigious internships, an MBA from HEC… Yet the young woman, doing 
an internship in marketing at Areva, feels “totally useless.” This is particularly 
worrying given that she has “always wanted to create something in her life,” she 
has done internships with social institutions and, above all, when she was little she 
read a story about a girl who took over a business.’ … ‘It was all that was necessary 
to push Laura into starting out on her own after she finished her master’s at HEC, 
which had given her a taste for entrepreneurship’; ‘Graduates from ENSI in Caen, 
an engineering school specialising in electronic payment and data protection, Luc 
                                                     
20 Paul Poupet, « Des hacker houses pour repenser l’innovation », TEDxParis, 13 
September 2016 [online video]. http://www.tedxparis.com/paul-poupet-des-hackers-
house-pour-reorganiser-le-travail-a-lheure-du-numerique/ [Last consulted on 15 February 
2017]. 
21 Sibylle Laurent, « Réunions à la chaîne, tâches absurdes et hiérarchie insatiable : le 
"brown-out", cette nouvelle souffrance au travail », LCI, 25 October 2016 [online]. 
http://www.lci.fr/societe/reunions-a-la-chaine-taches-absurdes-et-hierarchie-insatiable-le-
brown-out-cette-nouvelle-souffrance-au-travail-2009276.html [Last consulted on 15 
February 2017]. 
22 Béatrice Madeline, « Start-up : Pourquoi ils se sont lancés dans l’aventure », Le Monde 
économique, 13 February 2017. 
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Pallavidino et Antoine Louiset began their project as part of their degree. “We had 
neither the experience nor the money to train people,” notes Luc, who’s major 
difficulty was finding developers, much sought-after by start-ups. “In the 
beginning, we met a lot of students that wanted to work for major companies, but 
it’s a trend that seems to be reversing”’; ‘Capucine Boulanger already has two 
employees on permanent contracts and two trainees. Currently in the process of 
recruiting a developer and a sales rep, she received around fifty applications for 
each post. “A lot of young people want to work in start-ups. They say that they want 
to do more varied work that advances quicker than in big businesses.” In interviews, 
the young woman “tells them what to expect”: lower wages at the beginning than 
in a big company, a lot of flexibility, less money spent on expenses… In return, 
candidates can have a serious hope of climbing the company ladder more quickly 
than in a traditional firm, and see their salary increase accordingly!’  
Members of PriceMatch fully agree: 
Cédric: Originally, I wasn’t at all thinking about doing this kind of thing [working 
in a start-up]. I mean, when I started my first year of prépa,23 my dream was to be, 
like, a trader.  
Vassily: Really? 
Cédric: Well yeah, because I found having to go to work such a pain that I said to 
myself ‘If I have to work, I might as well be paid as much as possible’. When the 
crisis happened, I looked into what the banks and that do and it completely put me 
off! I dunno, I just found it disgusting. And so I stopped wanting to do that. In the 
end, I kind of found myself in the complete opposite, in a start-up.  
Vassily: You don’t want to be a trader anymore? 
Cédric: Back then, I thought that’s what I wanted to do. Then, when you work as 
an intern, you realise what it is to work. And you realise that being a trader, or 
whatever, working in mergers and acquisitions, that sort of thing, means working 
                                                     
23 The classes préparatoires aux grandes écoles (CPGE), commonly called classes prépas 
or prépas, are part of the French post-secondary education system. They consist of two 
intensive years which act as a preparatory course with the main goal of training 
undergraduate students for enrolment in one of the grandes écoles. 
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9am to 10pm on a light day and 8am to 1am on a hard day, giving all your youth, 
from 24 to 32 years old… You can’t keep up that pace for eight years! And you 
think ‘Do I want to spend my youth at that pace? Do I really want to do that with 
my life? Do I really need that cash? Or aren’t there jobs in which I can have a better 
balance between being in a cool place and making some good money because 
you’re an engineer?’ (Interview, 11 September 2014) 
The opposition to the large firm represents one of the major virtues of the 
start-up for its members and orients the entire policy of its directors. It is expressed, 
among other things, by the total absence of any dress code in the organisation. ‘The 
atmosphere is so different from a big company. You can dress how you want, listen 
to music.’ Carine is quite fond of this custom. As she puts it, ‘having a bit of liberty, 
not too many rules, it also makes you want to work’. This casualness is even present 
within the sales team, despite them being in direct contact with the hotel world 
where high importance is placed on these kinds of details: uniform is almost always 
imposed on the personnel by the rules and regulations of these companies. 
Nevertheless, this mind-set is not shared by everyone in the start-up. Thus, Samir, 
from all his seven years of experience in selling, considers the casualness as a 
generalised slackening that is likely to penalise the salespeople at PriceMatch in 
their relationships with hoteliers: ‘They’re clever but they’re kids.’ … ‘I find it 
incredible that they go to meetings looking so shabby! Alexandre at the 
beginning—I mean, now it’s better, but at the start he would go to meetings in 
trainers with holes in them. Baptiste goes to meetings in an old polo that’s falling 
apart.’ 
11 June 2014. I accompany Baptiste and Carine to Hôtel d’Orsay for my first client 
meeting. The property is situated on rue de Lille, in the 7th arrondissement, just up 
the road from the museum of the same name. It is a seventeenth-century, classical 
building with an ostentatious façade filled with arches and sculptures. A plaque 
indicates that the hotel has been granted four stars. Baptiste is waiting for us in the 
entrance hall, his motorcycle helmet in hand. He is chewing the fat with a hefty 
man in a three-piece suit. It strikes me that there is something not quite right about 
the situation when I see the two next to each other: Baptiste is true to form, 
unshaved and tousled, wearing an unironed shirt, bright trousers and worn-out 
trainers; then there is the hotel manager in his fifties and a very classical, plain, 
blue suit and tie. The other members of the team turn up in dribs and drabs: the 
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receptionist wearing the hotel livery (grey and purple), and two ladies with 
colourful skirt-suits and Hermes scarves. Carine and I look like a pair of overgrown 
adolescents: she has a black tee-shirt adorned with a big pink bow; my own get-up 
is no better. The contrast could not have been any more dramatic between the two 
groups, between the ageing hotel industry and the new economy, tradition and 
modernity. 
 
‘Democratising Revenue Management’ 
Along with Duetto and some other smaller software publishers, Pricematch was one 
of a crop of recent entrants on a market of hotel revenue management systems 
(RMS) which has long been occupied by a handful of incumbent companies. These 
businesses, which include IDeaS and Easy RMS,24 provided solutions reserved to 
large hotel groups and luxury hotels only, due mainly to high cost and complexity.25 
‘A decade ago, RMS was exclusively the province of large hotels with high average 
daily rates,’ says a reporter of Tnooz, the main news website on innovation in the 
tourism and hospitality industries. ‘Industry pioneer IDeaS’s first client was a hotel 
so large it had four separate buildings. But RMS might go mass market as the cost 
                                                     
24 Founded in 1989, IDeaS was acquired in 2008 by a larger software provider, SAS 
Institute; EasyRMS saw the light of day ten years later and was bought as well in 2012 by 
Infor (which is currently the third largest enterprise technology provider in the world).   
25 Several major hotel chains chose, from the end of the 1980s, to develop internally their 
own revenue management solutions, as was the case for example with Marriott 
International and Hilton Hotels. On the dissemination of revenue management in large 
hotel chains in the United States, see Robert G. Cross, Jon A. Higbie, and David Q. Cross, 
‘Revenue management's renaissance. A rebirth of the art and science of profitable revenue 
generation,’ Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 50 (1), 2009, p. 56-81. In this article, the 
authors give an account of the transfer of revenue management techniques from the airline 
industry to hotels through a singular anecdote concerning the fortuitous meeting in the mid-
1980s of J. W. ‘Bill’ Marriott, CEO of Marriott International, and Robert Crandall, CEO 
of American Airlines; the latter, they say, having confided to the former this ‘best-kept 
secret of the industry.’  
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for customers drops and as it becomes easier for customers to use.’26 By adopting a 
type of Software as a Service (SaaS) model, these new companies have managed to 
offer revenue management services at affordable prices to a wider public, ranging 
from small independent hoteliers to large chains, and have accelerated the 
restructuration of this market. Indeed, an analysis of competition produced by 
PriceMatch reckons that the recurrent cost of the new entrants could be as much as 
twice as low as that of incumbent firms—the subscription amounts being between 
250 and 400 euros on the one side and between 400 and 500 euros on the other, to 
which must be added a significant saving on installation and setting up costs 
estimated at 3,000 to 5,500 euros. 
‘The ambition of PriceMatch is to industrialise and democratise revenue 
management for all hotels.’ [Correspondence, 28 April 2014] It is with these words 
that Baptiste presented, in the very first email I received from him, the aim of his 
company. It therefore defines itself in opposition to large groups—this time 
embodied by some large North American software publishers—and to the 
presumed clientele’s elitization of which these large groups are the vector. Its 
proclaimed goal is to lower revenue management tools’ prices to make them 
accessible to small independent hotels and to help them compete against large hotel 
groups, suggesting a sort of implicit alliance of the ‘smalls’ that the hotel industry 
and the new economy form against the major industrial power: ‘PriceMatch has 
given itself the objective of democratising yield management by making a web 
platform that is easy to use, well connected to existing tools (PMS and channel 
manager for hotels, ticketing software for event organisers, etc.) and automated for 
greater accuracy and rigour, at a price that is affordable for everyone’ (Blog note, 3 
June 2013). Thus when salespeople of PriceMatch succeeded in landing their first 
contracts with large hotel chains, and in particular when its collaboration with 
                                                     
26 Breanna Smith and Justin Kaminski, ‘An HVS Guide to Hotel Revenue Management,’ 
HospitalityNet, 22 July 2016 [online]. http://www.hospitalitynet.org/news/4077285.html 
[Last consulted on 15 February 2017]; Sean O'Neill, ‘Hotel revenue management software 
has its Pharrell Williams moment,’ Tnooz, 14 April 2015 [online]. 
https://www.tnooz.com/article/hotel-revenue-management-software-industry-survey-
2015/ [Last consulted on 15 February 2017] 
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Accor (now AccorHotel), the biggest hotel operator in France, became known to 
specialised circles, there was no hesitation in telling the story backwards: ‘As you 
may know, we began by developing solutions aimed at independent hotels, but we 
had several major chains asking to work with us: at PriceMatch, when we say that 
we want to democratise revenue management, we mean it!’ (Blog note, 17 
September 2014).27 According to a blog post (entitled ‘And 2005 will be Better…’), 
PriceMatch had more than 700 hotel clients at the start of 2015, 80 properties of 
which belonged to hotel groups; the overwhelming majority of the customer base 
therefore indeed derived from the independent hospitality sector. The start-up 
merged in December 2014 with its smaller counterpart PowerYourRoom, a 
company well established in Northern Europe, Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland.28 This rapid growth in activity was mainly financed—as mentioned 
above—by funds from a venture capital company and a hotel management and 
investment firm whose representatives sit on the start-up’s board of directors. In 
November 2013, PriceMatch received nearly one million euros from these firms. 
The start-up runs on a sizeable budget—although no comparison to that of 
its Californian counterpart, Duetto, which, after three successive investment rounds, 
                                                     
27 Behind these falsely candid discourses, the aim of PriceMatch’s managers was always in 
reality to conquer market shares in this sector, by offering their products and services to 
large hotel groups, both local and international. This is what comes out, for example, when 
reading the slides presented in May 2013 to the future investors: ‘We are mainly targeting 
2*/3*/4* independent hotels located in cities, which are the most likely to be interested by 
our offer. This represents 5,570 hotels and 192,000 rooms in France for a total yearly sales 
figure of five billion euros. We have begun to take steps towards the private apartment 
rental market and in the medium term we are looking to sell the product to large hotel 
chains.’  
28 Linda Fox, ‘PriceMatch picks up PowerYourRoom,’ Tnooz, 23 December 2014 [online]. 
https://www.tnooz.com/article/pricematch-picks-poweryourroom/ [Last consulted on 15 
February 2017] 
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had already received in July 2014 a total amount of 33,2 million dollars29—but 
which is limited by the imperative of high growth required by its investors. Nearly 
70 percent of PriceMatch’s expenditure is spent on compensating its employees 
(68.6 percent, a third of which in the form of social security contributions).30 Of 
this total, the supervisory cost is low (17.5 percent of the total payroll), the five 
founders receiving a monthly remuneration equivalent to the French guaranteed 
minimum wage (SMIC). The rest of the budget is divided among the other 
expenditure items, in more or less equal proportions, as follows: withdrawals from 
the current account (8.6 percent), business expenses and partnerships (6.4 percent), 
operating costs (6.2 percent), other costs (5.8 percent), and legal fees (4.2 percent). 
Equipment purchases are limited to the strict minimum, which explains the use of 
low-performance computer hardware that is sometimes ill-adapted (in particular to 
the needs of developers who are asked to come to the office equipped with their 
own laptops); likewise the chronic lack of certain equipment (the account managers 
use telephones at a rate that far exceeds supply, which comes down to four or five 
wireless appliances whose batteries run out too quickly, and regularly find 
themselves without one). At the height of these restrictions, when they have to 
travel, the salespeople and other representatives of PriceMatch barely ever stay at a 
hotel and prefer to use the online platform Airbnb for their business trips.   
 
 
  
                                                     
29 Information obtained from CrunchBase [online]. 
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/duetto-research#/entity [Last consulted on 15 
February 2017] 
30 This estimate was derived from the income statement as of 31 August 2014, that is, ten 
months after raising capital.  
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‘At PriceMatch, There is No Hierarchy’ 
PriceMatch is located at 8 rue du Sentier, on the first floor of the north building of 
the Maison Mozart, in the heart of what has been known as Paris’s ‘Silicon Sentier’. 
Situated in the east part of the 2nd arrondissement, the area around rue du Sentier 
was once the stronghold of the textile and garment industry in Paris, but 
competition from emerging economies, especially China, drove the industry into 
near-bankruptcy. In the late 1990s, in the days of the Internet boom, many start-up 
companies set up in the area taking advantage of reduced rents and the quality of 
the telecommunication and Internet networks due to its proximity to the Palais 
Brongniart, the historical Paris stock exchange. Although the collapse of the dot-
com bubble brought many of these companies to an abrupt halt, the area has since 
remained the preferred location for establishment of start-ups and incubators.  
PriceMatch shares the premises with Kelkoo, a price comparison service and a 
French start-up which had its moment of glory in the early 2000s, culminating in 
its takeover by Yahoo! in 2004. There is no entry for ‘PriceMatch’ on the intercom; 
instead one has to press ‘Kelkoo’ to have the entrance gate opened. In the hallway 
a gloomy sheet of paper with the company’s logo and an arrow has been put on the 
wall to indicate the direction. To the left, Kelkoo and to the right, PriceMatch. Each 
company has its own independent space, but there is only one coffee machine and 
it is placed in the area occupied by PriceMatch. People of Kelkoo are regularly 
coming and going to grab a coffee. Most of the time though, the interaction between 
the two teams does not really go beyond casual greetings, except for one time, at 
the beginning of summer 2014, when Kelkoo organised live screenings of the FIFA 
World Cup and invited people from PriceMatch to come over.31 
The place itself is not particularly impressive. It is a rather dark, open plan office 
with low ceilings, and a lingering odour of toilet. It is quite small—no more than 
70 square meters, at a rough guess—especially for the twenty to thirty employees 
working in the start-up at the time. The narrow windows overlooking the courtyard 
do not let much daylight get in, hence the constant use of the cold, artificial light 
of neon lamps. The workplace is clean and well maintained but it is not very well 
ventilated and, despite air conditioning running at all times, the air is still and the 
heat is suffocating in the hottest afternoons of the summer. 
                                                     
31 Another example of ‘becoming closer’ is when people of PriceMatch tried to poach some 
female employees from Kelkoo.  
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The main room is T-shaped more or less and is overlooked by the ‘aquarium,’ a 
glazed meeting room in the colours of Kelkoo—white and orange—where Baptiste 
has taken up residence, sometimes joined by his inner circle, and from which he 
can observe the team at work. The floor is covered by a faded brownish carpet, 
which may need to be changed, as it has quickly been worn out by the back and 
forth of the swivel chairs. In the lower part of the ‘T,’ on the right as one enters, is 
the coffee machine mentioned above, providing dishwater coffee and other hot 
drinks of the same genre—at least it is free—and, right after it, a door leading to a 
kitchenette and a toilet room.32 Against the west wall sit two tables with metal legs 
and a white top, each supposed to accommodate two people but rarely taken by less 
than four during working hours. On one of them sits the laser printer, which is 
almost exclusively used by Hanna, the accountant at PriceMatch, to output 
invoices. In the corner, a coffee table, on which lie a modem and two wireless 
phones—or at least their bases. It is surrounded by a hodgepodge of wires, a few 
empty boxes, some coats, an umbrella and a pair of sneakers. One could say it is 
some sort of cloakroom. In the middle of the room, a large table where employees 
eat at lunch time but which is certainly not big enough to accommodate everyone 
at the same time. On Mondays, it is used for the ‘Weekly Team Meeting.’ In the 
upper part of the ‘T,’ at the back of the room, two other long tables have been lined 
up, each accommodating eight people—and sometimes more. On the left are the 
developers and on the right the account managers. It happens sometimes that one 
or two developers sit at the account management table when ‘their’ place has been 
taken. The workstations have not been attributed beforehand and it is not unusual 
to see people changing place, should circumstances so demand. There is also 
trafficking of chairs going on—some supposedly more comfortable chairs being 
discreetly replaced by others—and computer screens. In the corner, on the account 
managers’ side, is a small fridge, mostly full of cans of beer that will be opened 
during the ritual ‘Beer Friday’. The walls are white and bare, except for a few 
shelves and a Magic Whiteboard stuck behind the developers on the north wall 
                                                     
32 It is recommended to leave that door shut at all times. Like a stinky fridge full of rotten 
food, opening that door releases the sickly smell of the sewer waste making the entire office 
smell like a toilet bowl. Most employees have long deserted this facility, choosing to go to 
the loo of the Quick restaurant or other bars in the area instead. When, in September 2014, 
PriceMatch moves to its next premises at the Partech Shaker, Baptiste proudly will confess 
to me: ‘For all the time we were there, I never once took a shit at the office.’ 
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(and a calendar on the east wall). On this whiteboard are two things: first, what is 
used to being called in the start-up industry a ‘Scrum task board’, delineated by red 
tape and studded with yellow and green Post-it notes; and, on the right of the 
‘Scrum’, is the remaining number of test customers to be made to pay by the end 
of the month, a number lugubriously called ‘Vendetta.’ Against the west wall, on 
the developers’ side, leans a paper board on which a list of PMS has been drawn 
up. There are four or five cabinets, each is stuffed with files and an odd assortment 
of arbitrary  
items: a clutter of boxes, folders containing the hoteliers’ contracts and assorted 
paperwork, office equipment, unused computer screens, laptops, phones, and other 
electrical appliances, a few alcohol bottles and some plastic glasses, a football, 
Carine’s fork, and two books—The Strategy of Conflict by Thomas C. Schelling 
and Poor Economics by Esther Duflo and Abhijit V. Banerjee. Perched on top of 
these cabinets: a screen displaying the platform’s performance in real-time, two 
trophies gathering dust—PriceMatch was awarded a special prize at the Innovact 
competition and the first prize of the Concours national de la création 
d’entreprise—and, again, empty boxes. All this typical office furniture was already 
there when the team arrived. One personal touch though: Julien has fitted an 
electric, height adjustable standing desk for his own use against the north wall, 
between the developers’ and the account managers’ tables. Other than that, there 
are some other cardboard boxes here and there, a lot of chairs, and nothing more 
really. 
All in all, the equipment consists of four or five wireless phones, several computer 
screens, including a large monitor in the meeting room, a few desktop computers 
and laptops, and a printer, as I have already mentioned. Expenses are frugally 
managed at PriceMatch—at least for cost items like equipment—and no more than 
what is needed to get the work done is purchased. The several Google 
Chromebooks bought by the management because of their relatively low prices are 
often subject to mockery from the developers. Most of the latter ‘prefer’ to bring 
their own personal laptops with them but are provided with an extra screen to work 
on. ‘Frugally managed,’ in this case, certainly does not mean ‘efficiently managed.’ 
Indeed, it is common to hear account managers complain about the lack of phones 
in the room, and they often have to join a queue to lay hands on one of them, even 
though a large part of their work is to be done by phone. The problem has gone 
from bad to worse by the end of the afternoon when all the batteries have gone flat. 
52 
 
 
It is the same situation at the Sales office.33 When all the phones have been taken, 
some telemarketers are asked to use their own cell phone to make their phone 
calls—in this respect, the account managers are lucky that the network is so poor 
in their office. The shortfall and deficiency of certain implements is a well-known 
problem at PriceMatch but it is slow to be alleviated, I think, less due to lack of 
means than lack of time and above all because no one in the company seems to feel 
responsible for this state of affairs. 
 
  
                                                     
33 A month or so before I arrived at PriceMatch, the sales team office was relocated to 19 
rue Pierre Lescot in Les Halles district—one metro station away from the head office—
because of lack of space but also, I was told, because the racket that the salespeople were 
making on the phone was getting on the nerves of the rest of the team. The premises are a 
renovated Parisian apartment, shared with Randco, an IT infrastructure services company. 
The salespeople of PriceMatch have their own room, with a desk accommodating seven 
workstations, and can also make use of a conference room, most of the time occupied by 
Adil—although he has his seat at the head of the table in the main room—and his seconds 
in command, Alexandre and Basile. It is bright, clean and quite simply nice in comparison 
to the Sentier premises. 
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Figure I.1.1. Plan view of the main office, rue du Sentier (Field notes, 31 July 2014). 
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Figure I.1.2. Plan view of the sales office, rue Pierre Lescot (Field notes, 12 June 2014). 
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In both its layout and arrangement, the room presents itself as a resolutely 
associative34 work space through the absence of closed offices, both for employees 
and directors. These are considered to be a luxury that only large firms can afford.35 
There is no clear-cut separation between those who organise work and those who 
execute it: the founders demonstrate their willingness to serve as an example by 
choosing to work in an open plan in the middle of their teams, even with no assigned 
workstation—the allocation of places and composition of teams can evolve from 
project to project. Should the need arise, they may join in with almost any task, 
even the least pleasant ones. This was evidenced by the involvement of the start-
up’s President in the commercial effort when, one afternoon in July 2014, he sat 
down at the telemarketing team’s table and made a few phone calls with them. 
There are no fewer than six desktop computers in the room, placed for the 
most part at the account managers’ table. The other staff members make use of a 
laptop, either lent by the company or their own one, which encourages everyone’s 
mobility in the work space, fosters communication, and enables the formation of 
multiple agencements.36 However, it is less the number of associations than their 
nature that gives this sort of spontaneous and shifting scenography its full power 
                                                     
34 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
35 Indeed, if open workspaces are largely widespread in large groups, it is often employees 
who occupy them, whereas the individual office model remains the norm for the 
management. Catherine Quignon, « Des bureaux collectifs pour les salaries… pas pour les 
dirigeants », Le Monde économie, 20 February 2017. 
36 This comment by Karen is typical on this count: ‘I particularly see the differences 
[between a large firm and a start-up] in terms of internal communication. When you’re in 
a big firm and send an email to someone you don’t know, that you might never meet, you’re 
going to be a lot more formal in the way that you write. In a start-up, at least this is what I 
do, you first go and speak to the person, then, if necessary, write an email to get extra 
information, get a written trace so that it can be forwarded to someone else, etc. So yeah, 
there’s a lot more oral communication and it’s more immediate, so you end up getting 
results much quicker than in a company. My impression is that people are far more reactive 
in a start-up than in big companies.’ [Interview, 29 May 2015]   
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and meaning. It is noteworthy that each team at PriceMatch includes one or several 
founding members, generally placed at the end of the table. This physical proximity 
suggests a quasi-equivalence link in terms of hierarchy between the factotums of 
the new economy, who work long hours for relatively low wages, and the founders, 
who will share between them considerable sums at the moment of the sale of the 
start-up. The idea is thereby given, concretely, that ‘at PriceMatch, there is no 
hierarchy,’ as explained by Karim, who very much appreciates this kind of 
organisation: ‘I think that being able to speak freely like that to Baptiste or another 
company-founder is really good. To be able to speak to Adil, work in a group 
together with no hierarchy, it’s important. Without that I would never have felt so 
involved, I wouldn’t have stayed.’ … ‘Yeah, I wouldn’t have liked there being a 
hierarchy. I don’t like hierarchies.’ 
The start-up is not simply the site of a zeal and intense work; it is also the 
support of a form of ‘sociability’37 that goes well beyond the walls of the 
organisation. The start-up members are not colleagues only, but become office- and 
playmates, almost relatives.38 Besides, many were friends or classmates before 
working together. Some have chosen to live in house share. This is the case of 
Baptiste and Léo. The cofounders reside in a large house in the heights of 
Ménilmontant, in the 20th arrondissement of Paris, in which they regularly organise 
parties where all the people of PriceMatch are invited. On weekdays some members 
meet after work in the bars in Grands Boulevards or Strasbourg-Saint-Denis to have 
a drink and to play pinball and table football. The start-up appears as the place of a 
complete relational isolation and a sociality in a vacuum. The shared foundation of 
values is, hence, is all the more guaranteed that individuals often see their social 
network merging into one, which revolves around the start-up. Politics is rarely 
                                                     
37 Georg Simmel, ‘The Sociology of Sociability,’ American Journal of Sociology, 55, 1949, 
p. 254-68.  
38 The reference to kinship between those individuals who develop in the start-up ecosystem 
can be found down to the name of the French seed accelerator, TheFamily, created at the 
end of 2013 and situated in the 4th arrondissement of Paris. 
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touched on.39 Social issues, such as youth unemployment and precarity, are 
occasionally broached during the interviews that I have conducted (even though 
almost a quarter of the start-up members are employed as casual workers). Only 
easily assimilated information such as sporting events (the FIFA World Cup, which 
took place from 12 June to 13 July 2014, was of course the subject of long 
discussion; especially the successful campaign of Algerian team in the 
championship was much commented by some of the passionate supporters) or 
miscellaneous news items (for example, those three air disasters in a row which 
occurred in the space of one week only in July 2014) are automatically given centre 
stage. The brunt of small talk at the coffee machine are about the activity itself; 
advice and tips on sales arguments or on how to write a line of code are traded; calls 
and appointments with hoteliers are analysed (especially those that went well); 
often the debates focus on business creation, the perpetual problem of start-up 
financing and assorted technicalities; information on the pending contract with 
Accor and the fundraising round to come. 
The extent of the management team and their quasi-omnipresence in the 
room play a significant role in the establishment of hierarchies within the start-up: 
there are no fewer than five founders, plus the same number of directors, all 
dedicated to the company’s success, in particular because they may own shares in 
it. Both a work post and an observation post, the location the latter hold in the work 
place is a site from which they can in a single glance embrace, supervise, and thus 
control the entire scope of undertakings, tasks, ideas, even leisure, which each of 
the employees takes an interest in and takes part in. ‘One morning,’ Cédric tells me, 
‘Nicky was causing trouble, he’d come into Stéphane’s and my office and spent 20 
minutes ripping into Julien [one of the cofounders], saying that Julien had an 
inferiority complex with the rest of company. Elias [another cofounder] heard 
Nicky coming out with all this from the toilets, and came in and snapped “I think 
                                                     
39 This note of 18 July 2014 is one notable exception: ‘After Samir left, we find ourselves 
in a small, intimate group, and Adil takes advantage of the opportunity to hail us [Alexandre 
and me] about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The day before, Israeli command decided, as 
part of the “operation protective edge,” to send ground troops into Gaza Strip with the 
stated aim of destroying the tunnel system used by the Hamas members.’  
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you’ve got better things to be doing than talking and you’ve certainly got work to 
do”.’  
Proclaimed enemy of the vertical and partitioned hierarchy of large 
companies, the start-up does not actually suppress any notion of hierarchy; it steers 
the action of its members according to an authority principle which is less 
bureaucratic than personal. This is what Max Weber has called ‘charismatic 
authority’ [Charismatische Herrschaft], the type of authority that derives from the 
charisma of the leader, in this case the leaders, which, although with a rational-legal 
basis, depends upon the qualities of the person rather than the role.40 This is because 
of the unspoken code according to which members of the start-up must be esteemed 
in the light of their competences and abnegation, and regardless of any account of 
their level of study nor even their status in the company. Everything takes place as 
if a certain ethic governed interpersonal relations and ruled out any leadership 
which would be far too reminiscent of that of a supervisor in a large company liable 
to threaten this ‘wholly personal devotion’ to the founders, hamper the smooth 
functioning of daily individual exchanges, and thereby endanger the specific hacker 
subculture that the start-up perpetuates.41 According to this ethic, notably, the 
importance of educational capital should not be exaggerated. The subject of 
educational rankings, such as university and college rankings or the individual 
ranking obtained in a competitive exam (concours), is occasionally broached but it 
                                                     
40 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation,’ in Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From 
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 77-
128. 
41 ‘Mistrust authority—Promote Decentralization,’ proclaims Steven Levy, who developed 
in 1994 a hacker ethic. ‘Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such 
as degrees, age, race, or position.’ Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer 
Revolution, Sebastopol, O’Reilly, 2010, p. 29 and 31. On this new working ethic which 
would oppose to the protestant ethic as defined by Max Weber, see Pekka Himanen, The 
Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of the Information Age, New York NY, Random House, 2001 
(with a prologue by Linus Torvalds and an epilogue by Manuel Castells). One can also find 
a monographic study of a hacker community in California in Michel Lallement, L’Âge du 
faire. Hacking, travail, anarchie, Paris, Le Seuil, coll. « La couleur des idées », 2015. 
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is almost always with the aim of undermining their legitimacy to achieve a positive 
hierarchy within the organisation. ‘They really have recruited well’, reckons Cédric 
about his colleagues of the engineering team. ‘In terms of qualifications, it’s 
difficult to know because they’re all Polytechnique graduates [polytechniciens]. For 
example, Marco, who left, wasn’t as good as the ones who stayed. Maxime really 
is better than we could have known when he was recruited.42 He’s just incredible. 
He’s involved in everything. He knows his way around any kind of coding. He gives 
advice to everyone (even Elias, despite the fact that Elias is a Partner). Elias isn’t 
as good at code as the rest of them. He’s not as good as Maxime, Romaric and 
Aurélien. Romaric is just so so good. Like, super intelligent, literally incredible. 
Aurélien, he really fits in well, very productive, very efficient, very good. And 
Julien, he’s a guy that already knows everything about PriceMatch and can hold 
huge amounts of information. He’s the big boss, he really is top quality.’ What 
matters most are individual and technical qualities, through which a cofounder 
proves himself worthy in the eyes of his employees of exercising a form of 
authority; these qualities are superimposed on the formal authority which is 
conferred by his position in the organisation chart. But if this transfer does not 
occur, no authority will be recognised and conflicts may break out, as indicated in 
the following anecdote, again told by Cédric, of his time spent at PriceMatch in 
summer 2013:  
One time I had a problem with Elias. … He was getting on my nerves, it was the 
evening and there was a problem with the PMS of a hotel that had been going on 
for a few weeks. He had decided that I should call them that evening. Firstly, I hate 
using the phone. Second, I’d already decided that I was going to head off, so 
whether I called or not tonight would make no difference because it was 6:30. 
Instead of calling, I decided to send an email. I was sat next to him, so basically 
when he saw the email, he said ‘but I told you to call them, so you call them.’ The 
tone he used was really unpleasant. I told him ‘OK well if that’s how it is, I’m off.’ 
(Interview, 11 September 2014) 
                                                     
42 Maxime is a graduate of Télécom ParisTech. He is one of the few engineers who did not 
go the Ecole Polytechnique. 
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This example helps illustrate what happens when the criteria of judgment 
and goals are not shared and that legal authority is not recognised. Elias, as a 
cofounder of PriceMatch, would have legal authority to command, but Cédric does 
not recognise it. The problem is not merely of a technical nature; indeed, Cédric 
deplores an authoritarian attitude which comes across to him as dissonant with the 
way in which power should be exercised within a start-up:  
I really love working with Léo, that’s the reason I stayed. … With Léo, I’m at ease, 
I can make jokes as much as I want. I don’t say to myself ‘he’s the boss’ or 
whatever. It’s really nice. By contrast, I’ve never really had a great connection with 
Elias, who kind of likes being the boss. … For me, it’s normal to have a friendly 
relationship with the guy who’s directly above me. That’s how I perform best; 
when I want to prove to the guy above me that I’m worth it, that there’s an 
intellectual relationship there. It’s about showing him that I’m intelligent and not 
just thinking to myself ‘if I don’t work I’m going to get told off, so I’m going to 
work like crazy.’ That’s why I don’t want to join a big company where I’ll be put 
into really frustrating situations every day that just don’t work with my personality. 
(Interview, 11 September 2014) 
The critique of the start-up slides quietly into another well-known theme, 
that of the big company, with its strict hierarchy, impersonal relationships and 
people-management strategies based on coercion. Under this angle, the room 
functions in the manner of a stage on which each can offer proof of his or her 
excellence in manipulating the group’s particular technical capital, namely 
technological mastery and knowledge of programming and data processing. 
Placement at PriceMatch is highly normalised. The order of the occupants, 
the materials they have, the position, the location they hold in the confined space of 
the room, all map out a complex and finely hierarchized structure. A strict order 
governs who occupies what chair at each table: it is the founders and the 
experienced staff who have precedence. They are most often placed at the end of 
the table. Next come the employees, in rough order of seniority, expertise—
undoubtedly—but also affinity, followed by the interns and other temporary 
workers. For example, at the salespersons’ table, in descending order of authority: 
Adil, sales director and cofounder; Alexandre, crack salesman and close friend of 
Adil; Samir and Roxane, other salespeople who joined the company more recently; 
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the interns (Guillaume, Hélène, Léa, myself, etc.) who succeed each other in 
telemarketing jobs at a frantic pace. Likewise, at the account managers’ table, team 
head Feriel has taken care to place at her side trusted people: on her right, Lucas, 
one of the first PriceMatch employees, and, on her left, Carine, intern but student 
in the same business school as her—‘my only two friends at PriceMatch’, she 
confided one day. The meeting room is reserved for the management. Its main 
virtue is to be sound-proof, and thus to offer a space relatively isolated in which 
professional confidentiality, personal confidences, even useless meetings and 
pointless chats are permitted—in particular it is in this place that the executive 
committee, or ‘Comex’, gets together to decide the company’s strategic orientation. 
Officially, it is open to any staff member, who may need it for diverse motives, for 
example a group meeting or welcoming a person external to the start-up. But in 
reality, it is almost always occupied by Baptiste, who has made it de facto his 
personal office—only Yoan, head of partnerships, allows himself to use it from time 
to time, and even that happens more often than not when the president is not 
present.43 The need for confidentiality cannot hide the social reason behind the 
quasi-permanent occupation of this place: the meeting room materialises Baptiste’s 
place and function in the organisation; it is the site of his authority (likewise, at the 
office at the Halles, Adil spends most of his time in the calm of his meeting room). 
The importance of this seemingly trivial scenography should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, it is one the essential elements of the ideology of the new 
economy: it communicates in a latent and physical way to the members of the 
organisation the values and categories of understanding of the universe of start-ups, 
the very ideas which oppose to the culture of the large firm—namely, a blending of 
‘fun’ with the group and individual ‘serious’,44 devotion and relentlessness in work, 
                                                     
43 When not in the meeting room, Yoan retreats to the entry hallway where he has arranged 
some sort of a private office in the corner, with a stool and a coffee table—a habit that he 
will not give up when PriceMatch settle in the spacious and comfortable premises of the 
Partech Shaker. 
44 Here I borrow the indigenous categories developed by the president and founder of 
Blablacar in « Frédéric Mazzella, l’ADN de la réussite ! », Manager & réussir, 8, 2015, p. 
10-13.  
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a pronounced sense of the dynamism of youth and spontaneity in action, and an 
emphasis on genuine competences rather than degrees and diplomas and 
independent learning.45 Surreptitiously, the physical setting supports the belief in a 
redistributive ideal between the members of the start-up and contributes to maintain 
the illusion of a real and concrete equality of everyone, whereas the social 
organisation of the company and its structural logics rather indicate that clear 
distinctions do exist—in particular with regard to access to management positions, 
which bring both social recognition and monetary wealth (via the shares in the 
company that they give right to), and which are tightly controlled by the cofounders 
and investors and reduced as much as possible. 
  
                                                     
45 Olivier Marty, La vie de start-up : Investir et S’investir dans une entreprise innovante, 
Master thesis, Paris, École Normale Supérieure and École des Hautes Études en Sciences 
Sociales, 2001; Olivier Marty, « La vie de start-up. S’investir dans les entreprises 
innovantes », Gérer et comprendre, 67, 2002, p. 4-15.  
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2. The ‘Dot-Com Kids’ 
 
It is well known—in particular since the work of the American sociologist Howard 
Aldrich46—that the overwhelming majority of business creation comes from groups 
of entrepreneurs and that the teams constituted are quite homogeneous. Thus, in 
France, several recent studies on start-up founders showed that only a quarter of 
these so-called ‘innovative’ companies involve one founder—with an average of a 
little more than two persons involved, founding team size ranges from one to six 
people.47 Contrary to the widespread image based on the native myth of the ‘solo 
                                                     
46 Using a nationally representative sample of organisational founding teams, Martin Ruef, 
Howard Aldrich and Nancy Carter found that about half of all efforts to found a new 
business involve teams of two or more people, with the rest being solo efforts. They also 
tested for the operation of five mechanisms affecting the composition of entrepreneurial 
groups and found especially strong support for two mechanisms that influence group 
composition: homophily in respect to both ascriptive and achieved charter (e.g. gender, 
ethnicity, and occupation) and network constraints imposed by strong ties. Martin Ruef, 
Howard E. Aldrich, and Nancy M. Carter, ‘The Structure of Founding Teams: Homophily, 
Strong Ties, and Isolation among U.S. Entrepreneurs,’ American Sociological Review, 68 
(2), 2003, p. 195-222. 
47 Jean-François Barthe, Nathalie Chauvac, and Michel Grossetti, « Entrepreneurs de 
circonstance : une enquête sociologique sur les fondateurs de start-up en France », Revue 
de l’Entrepreneuriat, 15 (3), 2016, p. 163-80. This article is part of a series of papers which 
derived from a survey conducted between 2005 and 2014 on 97 ‘innovative’ companies 
based in various urban areas of the South of France, namely Toulouse-Castres-Tarbes, 
Bordeaux, Grenoble and Marseille; see Michel Grossetti and Jean-François Barthe, « 
Dynamique des réseaux interpersonnels et des organisations dans les créations d'entreprises 
», Revue française de sociologie, 49 (3), 2008, p. 585-612; Fabien Reix and Michel 
Grossetti « Parcours biographiques et carrières entrepreneuriales », in Pierre-Marie 
Chauvin, Michel Grossetti, Pierre-Paul Zalio (eds.), Dictionnaire sociologique de 
l'entrepreneuriat, Paris : Presses de Science Po, 2014, p. 413-32. On the composition of 
entrepreneurial groups in France, see also Philippe Mustar, ‘Partnerships, Configurations, 
and Dynamics in the Creation and Development of SMEs by Researchers: A Study of 
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entrepreneur’, and on which public authorities tend to adjust support measures for 
business creation,48 setting up a start-up does not generally rest upon the individual 
efforts of a heroic and visionary entrepreneur but rather on a collective action 
carried out by individuals who are alike. This cooperation, or if one prefers, this 
association of entrepreneurs, which tends de facto to homophily,49 operates not in 
the seemingly rational choice of a complementarity of profiles but rather according 
to a logic of similarity, mitigating the uncertainty through trust and intimacy.50 It 
would be difficult to overstate the influence of friendship ties that the partners had 
built before the creation of PriceMatch: Baptiste, Léo and Julien have been friends 
since high school; Baptiste, Adil and Timothée met at Sciences Po; Léo, Julien and 
Elias are from the same cohort at Ecole Polytechnique (see Figure 3). Julien 
explains that, with regard to the decision to grant Elias cofounder status and with it 
a sixth of the shares of the start-up, ‘there was no real question. We had a discussion 
and said: “he has insight, he’s well integrated into the team, he’s cut from the same 
cloth as us. It would be absurd for him to be different, not have the same status as 
us”.’   
                                                     
Academic Entrepreneurs in France,’ Industry and Higher Education, 12 (4), 1998, p. 217-
21. 
48 Martin Giraudeau, « Le travail entrepreneurial, ou l’entrepreneur schumpetérien 
performé », Sociologie du travail, 49 (3), 2007, p. 330-50. 
49 Martin Ruef, Howard E. Aldrich, and Nancy M. Carter, ‘The Structure of Founding 
Teams,’ art. cit. 
50 This finding proves to be true in the case in point as well, but at the initial stage only. In 
the summer of 2012, the issue of the non-complementarity of profiles among the 
cofounders was raised. According to Léo, it had become a necessity to integrate new 
partners, with advanced skills in programme writing: ‘I was the only one with a technical 
background (Baptiste did a bit of econometrics but I was the one with the most technical 
experience). And it was a little bit bizarre to have four partners with only one having a 
strong technical background. That’s why we brought Julien on board (first he helped out 
sporadically, then we offered him cofounder status) and then Elias, who started as an intern 
before we offered him cofounder status too. We wanted to up the technical expertise in the 
team.’ (Interview, 24 September 2014) 
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Figure I.2.1. Sociogram of the founding team. 
Note—The first members of the founding team are represented by circles; those who joined 
later are shown by squares.  
The configuration of the sociogram thus drawn can be referred to, in the terminology of 
Jacob L. Moreno, as a star.51 This gives an indication on who is likely to lead the company: 
due to the central position they occupy in the sociogram, Baptiste and—to a lesser extent—
Léo can aspire to power. During the summer of 2014, when I conducted my participant 
observation, the most prestigious positions were indeed given to Baptiste and Léo who 
were respectively President and Chief Technical Officer (CTO). A clique can also be 
identified, as Baptiste, Léo and Julien form an exclusive group of high school friends. It is 
therefore expected that they benefited from a better access to information compared to the 
other members of the management team. This may help to understand too why the group 
did not collapse when Timothée left the company to enter the Ecole nationale 
d’administration (ENA) at the end of 2013. This resilience can certainly be explained by 
Timothée’s relatively isolated position in the sociogram. 
  
                                                     
51 Jacob L. Moreno, Sociometry and the Science of Man, New York NY, Beacon House, 
1956. 
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However, what is remarkable is the quasi-absence of any empirical studies 
in contemporary sociology on the social origin of those, founders and other 
employees, who work in start-ups.52 Note that one can get a preliminary idea by 
surveying the annual diversity reports of large high tech firms of the Silicon Valley. 
And evidence from biographies and native accounts suggests that the workers of 
the new economy come from economically and socially advantaged segments of 
society. Interviewed by reporters of the French version of the magazine Slate, 
Kourosh Davarpanah, president and cofounder of the start-up Inato, points out: ‘I 
have the impression that in France there is a lot more government help than in the 
US, but nevertheless, start-up founders come from pretty wealthy backgrounds.’53  
It is important to stress, however, that this selection (and self-selection) of 
start-up founders operates less via the constraint of access to monetary means than 
through the mediation of specific cultural capital, as Pierre Bourdieu would put it,54 
that is within reach of these most educated fractions of the French elite. In point of 
fact, there is not much of a direct economic barrier to start-up creation to speak of: 
the fee to be paid to register a SAS—the preferred status of start-up founders—in 
the trade and companies register amounts to 50 euros and the law requires no 
minimum amount of share capital.55 Likewise, accommodation in an incubator is 
often a free service, at least over an initial phase (at the Sciences Po incubator, 
                                                     
52 An exception is the book of Gina Neff (Venture Labor. Work and the Burden of Risk in 
Innovative Industries, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), published in 2012, on the career 
trajectories of high-tech workers in New York City’s ‘Silicon Alley’ in the 1990s.  
53 Jean-Laurent Cassely, « Start-ups: comment la bourgeoisie française a rattrapé la 
transition numérique », Slate, 19 April 2016 [online]. 
http://www.slate.fr/story/116817/bourgeoisie-francaise-transition-numerique#texte [Last 
consulted on 15 February 2017] 
54 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Forms of Capital’, in John G. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory 
and Research for the Sociology of Education, New York, NY: Greenwood, 1986, p. 241-
58. 
55 Notwithstanding this, the partners of PriceMatch had initially chosen to invest the sum 
of 2,000 euros each. 
67 
 
 
where the PriceMatch team resided for over a year and a half, an annual fixed sum 
of 12,700 euros56 was requested from the moment a start-up had benefitted from 
funding from the City of Paris)—although the living expenses of the founders, who 
did not pay themselves before October 2013, required sufficient and stable financial 
resources. Young persons in a less advantageous position are also eliminated 
because they lack the ‘cultural habitus’ demanded by the entrepreneurial 
profession: canvassing the first customers, managing teams and above all 
convincing investors require de facto a certain social comfort, a capacity to speak 
in public, a way of being and saying that can take root only in particularly 
favourable social and economic conditions. Below a certain threshold of 
‘incorporated cultural capital,’ one is highly unlikely to acquire the bodily and 
moral dispositions that are indispensable if one is to successfully carry out this 
activity. 
31 March 2016, I have a discussion with one of the investors (who wanted to 
remain anonymous) who took part in the fundraising for PriceMatch, and ask about 
the reasons which led him to bank on this start-up:  
‘It was Baptiste who first came to present the product to me. And yeah, I had a 
good feeling about it. We got on well, and he told me that they were currently 
looking for investors. I said that I could potentially be interested… I know the 
market, and I knew that their product had a niche. I could see that Baptiste had a 
personality that would make the whole thing a success. They had the three essential 
criteria, so I invested in the first round.’  
‘Can you clarify those three criteria?’ 
‘The management, the product, and the market.’ 
‘You mentioned Baptiste’s personality…’ 
‘Yes, I think that Baptiste has the ability to charm, to sell, to convince. You know, 
it’s the personality of the boss that makes or breaks a company.’  
Preliminary analysis of the profiles of the 34 members (with a median age 
of 25 years old, the maximum being 58) active in the summer of 2014 at 
                                                     
56 This price falls to 6,350 euros for start-ups nurtured outside the incubator. 
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PriceMatch57 confirms that start-up workers stand above the upper tier of the higher 
segments of the working population in employment in France. Two thirds of them 
(66 percent) had fathers in executive jobs or intellectual professions, 3 percent had 
fathers in intermediate occupations and 22 percent had fathers who were sole 
traders, craft or related trade workers. The remainder were either clerical, blue-
collar workers or farmers (16 percent). Twenty-three of the PriceMatch members 
(or 68 percent) had entered a French grande école (Ecole Polytechnique and 
Sciences Po, where the founders studied, are by far the most represented in the start-
up, with 21 and 15 percent respectively, although also present are other business 
schools such as the ESSEC and EM Lyon, as well as engineering schools, like the 
Ecole des Ponts ParisTech, Télécom ParisTech, Arts et Métiers Paris Tech, and 
CentraleSupélec); one member had earned a master degree at university and five 
others a bachelor. Only five (or 15 percent) had undergone vocational training at 
the level of ‘Bac+2.’58 For the purposes of comparison, of engineers, executives, 
and intermediate occupations in the private sector under 36 years of age in 2014, 
34 percent had fathers in executive jobs or intellectual professions and 54 percent 
of their fathers were clerical or blue-collar workers or farmers; 54 percent of this 
group had obtained a diploma from either school or university at bachelor-level or 
higher, and 21 percent had not completed higher education. The educational and 
socioeconomic status of start-up workers is thus quite a bit higher than that of the 
average worker in France.59 
                                                     
57 A questionnaire survey was conducted in the start-up during the summer of 2014. It 
provided standardised responses which can be subject to quantitative analysis: 34 people 
replied to the questionnaire (of the 38 members of PriceMatch at the time), that is, a 
response rate of 89 percent―see Appendix B. 
58 In fact, most of the start-up’s members reproduce a school capital already accumulated 
by their parents, as half of their fathers received Master or Doctorate degrees and only 16 
percent of them left school without graduating from secondary education.   
59 Some recent empirical studies conducted in these markets have shown that the high-tech 
entrepreneurs who start high-technology ventures have significantly higher education than 
the entrepreneurs who start low-technology ventures in traditional industries. For empirical 
studies on this topic, see Ayala Malach-Pines and Mustafa F. Özbilgin (eds.), Handbook of 
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Furthermore, although the information on the issue is fragmentary and not 
easy to find, the social recruitment of start-up workers tends to rise slightly as one 
climbs up the hierarchy of the organisation. Indeed, the work of economists 
indicates that the majority of business starters come from an affluent background. 
This is particularly true of these ‘incorporated’ companies that most closely 
resemble start-up businesses.60 The upsurge in the digital sector over the past 
decade of graduates from grandes écoles, in which new entrepreneurial training and 
incubators have been created, should make it clear that start-up founders do belong 
to these groups situated at the top of the class ladder. It may also be recalled the 
considerable influence of the family environment on educational success in France: 
according to figures of the Ministry of Education for the 2014-15 school year, 
children of executive and intellectual workers were eight times more likely than 
children of blue-collar workers to attend the classes préparatoires and grandes 
écoles, holding alone half of the places in these most selective courses. They only 
                                                     
Research on High-Technology Entrepreneurs, Northampton, MA and Cheltenhamand: 
Edward Elgar, 2010. 
60 On the specific influence of social background on entrepreneurial process, see David 
Branchflower and Andrew Oswald, ‘What Makes an Entrepreneur?’ Journal of Labor 
Economics, 16 (1), 1998, p. 26-60. More recently, the working paper of Ross Levine and 
Yona Rubinstein, ‘Smart and Illicit’ (subtitled ‘Who Becomes an Entrepreneur and Do 
They Earn More?,’ NBER Working Paper, 19276, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
August 2013) proposed to go beyond the social determinants (race, gender, schooling, and 
family background) usually retained in such studies and showed that it is actually a 
combination of smart, which the authors measure as learning ability where people in the 
survey are given exams when they are teenagers, and their willingness to bend and even 
break the rules and engage in aggressive risk-taking behaviour, which is measured by an 
index of the degree to which they engage in illicit activities before they entered the 
workforce, that predicts both entry into entrepreneurship and the comparative success of 
entrepreneurs—some thought-provoking findings that seem to suggest that the real 
difference between founders of tech start-ups and crack dealers is that the former come 
from wealthy families. 
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represent 15 percent of the French population.61 Thus, during the 2016 edition of 
the Consumer Electronics Show (CES), the Conference of grande écoles (CGE)62 
established that, of the 190 French start-ups present in Las Vegas, more than four 
in five founders (83 percent) had graduated from a grande école in their principal 
curriculum (79 percent) and or complementary curriculum (64 percent).63 By way 
of local confirmation, it should be noted that, of the five members of the founding 
team of PriceMatch, all obtained their principal degree in a prestigious grande école 
and three of them attended the secondary school of the ‘golden immigration,’64 the 
international lycée of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, where they met. Nearly all are white, 
                                                     
61 It would probably be of interest to try to understand the phenomenon of substitution that 
some commentators have observed in France (see, for example, Jean-Laurent Cassely, 
« Start-ups », art. cit.), through which well-off people seem to have taken over a business 
sector initially occupied by workers who are less privileged, thus transforming the 
economic and social composition of this economic space to the exclusive benefit of the 
economic and intellectual elite of the country, while, at the same time, the public authorities 
have reinforced their support to the creation and development of innovative companies. 
Such a process of ‘sectorial gentrification’ may be comparable to those observed in other 
main start-up ecosystems in the world, such as the San Francisco-Los Angeles area, New 
York, Boston, London, and Tel Aviv. 
62 Conférence des grandes écoles, « Bilan du CES de Las Vegas : 83% des fondateurs de 
start-up formés dans les Grandes écoles (Étude Conférence des grandes écoles) », Press 
release, 28 January 2016. 
63 In its annual survey on occupational integration of graduates of grandes écoles, the CGE 
confirms that entrepreneurship as a job prospect progresses from year to year: in 2016, 4 
percent of these students created their business upon leaving school, versus 3.5 percent in 
the previous year. It is noteworthy that this statistic does not take into account all those who 
came to work in a start-u, who are also more and more, and those who will embark in 
entrepreneurship after a brief call on a large firm. Conférence des grandes écoles, « Enquête 
insertion CGE 2016 : nette embellie pour l’insertion professionnelle des diplômés des 
grandes écoles », Press release, 15 June 2016. 
64 Anne-Catherine Wagner, Les nouvelles élites de la mondialisation : Une immigration 
dorée France, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1998. 
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male, and come from higher-income families—with the one exception of the son of 
a blue-collar worker of Moroccan origin.  
The start-up workers, then, do not belong to that new proletariat in the 
vanguard of the revolution, the hope of which fed by the very theoretical 
discourses—abstruse in many ways—on the consolidation of a ‘cyborg’ class 
supposedly independent of ‘the machinations of capital.’65 Instead, everything 
tends to indicate that most of them differ from other young employees thanks to 
their additional economic resources, and that they come from traditional middle-
class background and are attempting to maintain their social status by entering a 
profession that they perceive as a ‘real job,’ highly regarded by their immediate 
entourage, which furthermore offers the prospect—if only for a minority—of big 
financial earnings. Many of their fathers work in an ‘economic’ job, as a 
commercial agent, computer engineer, director of a communications agency, 
general contractor, baker, or lawyer, general practitioner, chemist, journalist or even 
painter. Many of them have a learned profession (9 percent), are executives in the 
private sector (28 percent) or heads of a company (22 percent) and a good number 
of them (44 percent) are self-employed or are employed in their own business. 
Perhaps most distinctive about their background is that nearly all of their mothers 
had access to paid employment and most of them (53 percent) held executive or 
intellectual occupations. To be sure, a contingent of start-up workers comes from 
the lower fractions of society, but they are not the majority; nor are the start-up 
founders issued from the working class those who are the more successful in the 
medium run.  
The headcount of PriceMatch increases markedly from one month to the 
next, and this in spite of the many departures. So: in May 2014, there were 22 
                                                     
65 Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn 
of the Post-Market Era, New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995; Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, The Labor of Dionysus, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1994. For a critical review of these books, see Georges Caffentzis, ‘The End of Work or 
the Renaissance of Slavery. A Critique of Rifkin and Negri,’ in In Letters of Blood and 
Fire. Work, Machines, and the Crisis of Capitalism, Brooklyn, NY and Oakland, CA: 
Common Notions, PM Press, 2013, p. 66-81. 
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members in the team; in September of the same year, 32 people worked in the start-
up despite six people leaving the company during the summer (four of whom were 
sacked). That is a turnover of nearly 70 percent over the period—similar rotation 
rates are commonplace for a digital start-up. And this figure does not even take into 
account the innumerable trainees and other unpaid reinforcements who came to help 
out at some point or another in the life of the organisation. Thus, Elias points out to 
me that ‘in one and a half years, 48 people worked for PriceMatch [there were 12 
employee posts at this time]. Today, we must be at around 60 or something like that 
[that is, 22 employee posts, six months later]. A lot of those people have worked for 
free or for the 436-euro internship compensation.’ A score of permanent members, 
including an inner circle composed of the founders and their close collaborators and 
friends, forms the backbone of the organisation. What motivates the participants 
varies according to their status. Most of the older members have invested a great 
deal of time and energy in order to ensure the success of the start-up. Thus, for 
them, PriceMatch is an essential act in which they express themselves personally 
and see further into the future.66 Others come to work at PriceMatch to get an 
advanced taste of entrepreneurship (this is the case with several members who join 
the start-up with an entrepreneurial project in mind, which they will launch when 
they leave PriceMatch), or to be in touch with a certain atmosphere or start-up 
                                                     
66 Sometimes with the explicit design of making their fortune, as with Adil, one of the 
cofounders for whom the question was settled from September 2014: ‘“Be king or be rich?” 
It’s a question that we ask ourselves as founders: “Would you rather have power, stay with 
the company and still be the boss in ten years’ time, or would you rather take a back seat 
and maybe leave at some point?” Personally I’m completely with the latter. I don’t care 
about being the boss of a RMS company, that’s really not my big dream’; or in ‘search of 
recognition,’66 like Alexandre who considers he has ‘something to prove as a person’ with 
the start-up: ‘I don’t think it’s that important for the newcomers, but for me, PriceMatch is 
a question of identity. Owning shares was extremely important for me because, beyond the 
money, the company is part of how I see myself. People don’t refer to me as Alexandre 
Devisme, they call me “Alexandre from PriceMatch.” And I like that because I feel that 
I’ve played my part in the company’s success.’ On the notion of recognition in sociology, 
see Alain Caillé (ed.), La quête de reconnaissance. Nouveau phénomène social total, Paris: 
La Découverte, collection « textes à l'appui », 2007. 
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culture (which can be defined in its formal opposition to the large firm), or to learn 
technical or business competencies.  
Cédric: It seems a bit weird to say this but actually I did the internship because I 
had nothing to do with my holiday and no money. So I thought, rather than do fuck 
all at my house in the 78 [Yvelines department] and be bored shitless, I’d find an 
internship in Paris. That would force my parents to pay for an apartment there, and 
in return I’d be learning things, I’d meet people and get a bit of experience. So I 
chose a company that seemed interesting based on two criteria. Firstly, that there 
was interesting stuff to learn. Which is the case here because at PriceMatch maths 
is the added value, algorithms and all that. If you’re working on the product, 
theoretically at least you’ll be working on interesting stuff. Definitely more than if 
you’re working in a company where all you do is enter a load of stats on past clients 
and send that to some supervisor or whatever. The second thing I was looking for 
was somewhere a bit cool. I was looking for somewhere to spend my holiday—it’s 
a bit weird to say that, but that internship was the transition between the two years 
of my studies. So I didn’t want massive pressure, to find myself getting whipped 
at Société Générale. A start-up seemed cool. So I ended up at PriceMatch. 
(Interview, 11 September 2014) 
Cédric articulates here in passing one of the factors that differentiates the 
foot soldiers of the corporate world who find themselves executing pointless tasks 
in a large firm and those who exercise their skill in a start-up and participate in the 
digital economy: the same dispositions can lead to one or the other career depending 
on the structure of possibilities on offer, but also on the state of monetary resources, 
namely, the financial support provided by parents or other kin necessary to work in 
a sector where average wages are relatively low. 
 
Organisations as Fields 
Within the start-up, and yet in spite of the declared absence of hierarchy, it is 
possible to make the distinction between, among others, leaders and the led, 
producers and dealers, incumbents and temps. Correspondence analysis brings out 
a first opposition (the first factor represents 14.2 percent of the total inertia; see 
Appendix C) between the cofounders and those, followers from the outset, often 
friends and classmates of the cofounders, who hold or are on the point of getting 
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company stock and sit at the executive committee table, that is the management 
strictly speaking, who decide what strategic actions to take, and the rest of the team 
or workforce, who execute them.  
On the one hand, the management team, essentially consisting of the cofounders 
and the so-called ‘Country Managers’. The strongest contributions to the first 
factor come from the former, in particular Baptiste and Léo, who held the highest 
positions in the company at the time—they were ‘CEO’ and ‘COO’ 
respectively―with 12.1 percent each; concerning the latter, Aymeric’s and 
Tristan’s contribution, whose job was to spread the good word about PriceMatch 
in Italy and in the United States respectively, was about 6.5 and 5.6 percent. Basile, 
who worked as ‘CPO’ for the company, may be added to this group of leaders, 
although his contribution is relatively weaker (3.8 percent). 
On the other hand, the employees, who are spread among several teams / business 
units such as ‘Account Management’, ‘Sales’, ‘IT’, and ‘Development.’ Among 
the subordinates who make the strongest contribution to this first factor are 
employees, often members of the account management team, who are still serving 
their probationary period. This is the case with Christian and Samantha (4.9 and 
4.7 percent) who have just arrived at PriceMatch, or students like Alex and Carine 
(7.1 and 5.7 percent) who have been here for a longer period of time and are 
completing an internship or work placement as part of their ongoing studies. 
In the intermediate positions, we find, among others, the software 
developers and engineers who are in relative proximity to the decision-makers, 
although they often do not directly take part in any managerial activities. Often 
united by old school ties, the engineers directly work with the cofounders on a daily 
basis—we must not forget that three of the cofounders belong to the technical team. 
Between these two poles are the members of the ‘developement team’, including 
IT specialists, but also the ‘unclassifiables’ who are legion in such an organisation 
in which the chain of command has not yet been stabilised. These unclassifiables 
often directly report to Baptiste. This is the case with Feriel who is the head of the 
account management team, and therefore is not just an account manager; with Yoan 
who deals with all kinds of partnership issues; or with Hanna who does the 
accounting. 
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Graph I.2.1. Individuals, horizontal axis 1, vertical axis 2 (n = 34). 
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Graph I.2.2. Active and supplementary variables, horizontal axis 1, vertical axis 2         
(n = 34). 
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The first factor brings out a typical form of compensation in the new 
economy—namely employee stock option plans. This is a very popular method of 
attracting, motivating and retaining employees when the company is unable to pay 
high salaries, which is often the case for start-up companies. It is also how Julien 
explains the relevance of such remuneration schemes at PriceMatch: ‘Romaric 
desperately wants to stay. Romaric at his interview for the internship, he said: “How 
much do you pay on a permanent contract? How much do you give in stock?” We 
said to him: “Listen big boy, let’s just focus on the internship for now.” He took the 
bait straightaway’ (Interview, 18 September 2014). Those joining PriceMatch did 
not receive options and shares as soon as they arrived at the company. Instead, they 
had to wait a relatively long time to get them—it was generally the case that they 
were entitled to receive options after their first full-year of employment. It is 
noteworthy that there was no well-defined process of granting stock options to 
employees; rather, it was fairly negotiable. As a result, one could find at PriceMatch 
some individuals for whom shares came relatively quickly (e.g. Elias, who was 
given cofounder status right after a three-month internship in the company) and 
others, less fortunate, like Cédric who started working at PriceMatch in the summer 
of 2013 but, presumably because he came and went and worked part-time for some 
time, was never granted any options at all. In most cases, however, time mattered.  
In fact, the length of service gives a fairly good sense of how the first factor can be 
interpreted as a model of the distribution of power and authority within the 
organisation. The reason is simple: being a shareholder gives some scope for 
influencing company activities—at the very least it facilitates knowledge of the 
company’s activities and access to its resources. As one example, a business unit 
manager, say one who supervises account management operations, who sits at the 
executive committee table and learns that the sales business unit will be 
strengthened by the recruitment of four new salespeople, can demand to be able to 
do the same and hire new members for her own team. Hence, appears the following 
opposition: on the one hand, the cofounders and their first recruits (e.g. Feriel, 
Alexandre, who embarked on the venture in the spring of 2013), who ended up 
benefiting from the employee option plan, who attended monthly executive 
committee meetings and took part in the company’s strategic decisions (pro rata of 
their stakes in the capital of PriceMatch); and, on the other hand, those who were 
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last to jump on the bandwagon and who did not have their say, like the new 
members of the account management team but also those of the sales team, which 
had been rebuilt from scratch over the summer of 2014.  
However, neither the managers nor the members of the workforce form 
homogeneous groupings. There are objective divisions within them and, as we shall 
see, these find expression in their confrontations. The second factor (which 
represents 9.7 percent of the total inertia) shows up another opposition, which 
relates particularly to the company’s commercial activities: on the one hand, the 
‘producers’, who not only include the members of the technical team who produce, 
in the strict sense of the term, price recommendations, but also the account 
managers who provide advice and support in respect of revenue management to the 
users of the platform; on the other hand, the ‘dealers’, be they sales managers, 
salespeople, or merely telemarketers, who are in charge of selling the product and 
service developed and maintained by the ‘producers’.67 
The second factor also highlights the spatialised nature of the organisation. 
We have seen that people of PriceMatch were spread across two offices in Paris—
branches had also been opened in both Rome and San Francisco. In fact, the 
producers were all located in the main office, in Sentier; while the dealers were in 
Les Halles office, except for the two country managers. Following the theorists of 
‘world economies,’68 one can see in such spatial division of labour a reflection of 
some form of hierarchical relationship between the core (i.e. Sentier) and the 
periphery (i.e. Les Halles and the offices abroad). This is only partly true. It is true 
to the extent that the salespeople and their managers were accountable to the 
management body, whose members were mostly located in Sentier. But when we 
                                                     
67 This opposition between ‘dealers’ and ‘producers’ is reminiscent of the traditional 
distinction between circulation and production, which has been well-established in political 
economy since the English classics (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill), that 
is, the distinction between the relationships of people with one another and with nature. 
68 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York: Academic 
Press, 1974. 
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look a little closer, things were not so simple. To begin with, if we consider the first 
factor again, it appears that the account management team was even more 
subordinated to the management than the sales team was. It may be recalled that the 
account management team was the only team at PriceMatch which did not include 
in its ranks any cofounders. Secondly, wages and other compensation seem to give 
form, at least in part, to the second factor. It is clear that the distribution of wealth 
took place in such a way that the greater part went to the salespeople and engineers 
and the smaller part to the account managers. When we look at interns’ 
remuneration, for example, we need to realise that telemarketers’ wages were at 
least twice that of the trainee account manager, who earned the equivalent of 30 
percent of the French minimum wage (a mere 436 euros a month in 2014). A 
telemarketer at PriceMatch received around 35 euros per appointment but for a task 
that was seen, even by those who held these jobs, as particularly unrewarding in all 
other respects. 
In the top left-hand corner are the salespeople and telemarketers, who earn 
relatively high salaries, especially as they can receive a commission depending on 
their performance. A large portion of them are new team members. This is both 
because telemarketers, who are often interns, are usually hired for short periods of 
time, and because most of the salespeople, if not all, had only just arrived following 
the reorganisation of the team over summer 2014.  
In the top right-hand corner, we find the managers of the employees just 
mentioned—let us recall that the sales team was jointly managed by Adil and 
Alexandre at the time. They had been on the job longer and, therefore, handled 
more decision-making responsibility. Tristan and Aymeric, the two country 
managers, make the strongest contribution to the second factor, with 14.5 and 10.6 
percent respectively. They are also the most isolated members of the PriceMatch 
team.  
In the bottom left-hand corner are the account managers. Although most of them 
have relevant experience in the hotel industry and in the domain of revenue 
management, the members of the account management team are paid relatively low 
wages in comparison to the rest of the team (Christian is an exception to that: as a 
senior account manager, he receives a salary comparable to that of engineers). One 
reason for this may be the large number of interns in the team. 
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In the bottom right-hand corner are the cofounders and other managers at 
PriceMatch—Baptiste and Léo are among the strongest contributors to the second 
factor, with 3.5 percent each. They are people with more seniority, higher 
responsibilities, and relatively humble wages given their high status in the 
company—at that time, the cofounders only allowed themselves a compensation 
equivalent to the minimum wage (1,129 euros in 2014). One can probably add to 
this group the engineers, especially those involved in backend and frontend 
development, in spite of their rather central, neutral position in the graph. 
Considering illustrative variables now, we see that the cofounders, and to a 
lesser extent the middle managers and engineers, have been educated at the most 
prestigious secondary schools and the foremost grandes écoles (Ecole 
Polytechnique and Sciences Po), seeming to justify, despite their very young age,69 
their strategic position in the company. It comes as no surprise that the members of 
the management team are also members of well-off sections of society, with parents 
employed in learned professions, as physicians, chemists or artists (painter) or 
working as senior executives in state administration or business. One of the 
cofounders has parents who happen to both be énarques70 and members of the high 
reaches of public service. In all such analyses, it is nevertheless important to avoid 
any type of crude generalisation. For example, Adil rose from a working class Paris 
suburban background—he grew up in La Courneuve, one of the most disadvantaged 
areas in France, which is incidentally where PriceMatch was registered—to enter 
Sciences Po based on his school record in 200771 and cofound PriceMatch a few 
years later. The employees situated at the opposite pole come from a humbler 
                                                     
69 PriceMatch is ruled by people who are significantly younger than most of the employees, 
making it the exact of opposite of a gerontocracy. 
70 ENA graduates. The Ecole nationale d’administration (ENA) is probably the most elitist 
grande école in France, both because of its acceptance rates and because a large majority 
of its candidates have already graduated from the best French grandes écoles. 
71 From 2002, The Institut d’études politiques de Paris, known as Science Po, started 
opening its doors to students from secondary schools located in disadvantaged areas on the 
basis of their school record and an interview, in order to diversify the overwhelmingly 
white intake. 
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background and generally lack the prized educational qualifications held by the 
managers—though nearly all of them have received a higher education. The 
youngest is 18 years old, the oldest 57, with the median age hovering around 25. 
Most members are men, and the management of the start-up is fundamentally a 
masculine space into which only Feriel has gained admittance under difficult 
circumstances where she had to face up to the disbelief—if not male chauvinism—
of her male colleagues.72 Smaller in number, women are as well first in line to be 
sacrificed when the start-up encounters liquidity problems. When they realised that 
the cash flow was insufficient to pay the current instalments until the next round 
fundraising, the directors decided to bring the probation period of several members 
of the team to an end. All the people leaving were women. That is how between 
July and August 2014 Roxane first, then Ines, Augustine, and Adriane left the start-
up. ‘It's difficult for me to look at the situation and not see that it's a sexist issue,’ 
explains Alex, account manager for the English-speaking customers. ‘In the time 
that I've been here [Alex started in April 2014 along with Augustine, Ines and 
Adriane], we've lost two men: we lost Franck who said “this really isn't what I want 
to do”; we lost Guillaume who said “I'm going to the best school in the world.” 
They both left on more or less positive note whereas those three four are all leaving 
bitter. If we give them the benefit of the doubt and we say “no it just happens to be 
that they all had performance issues”, even still, they're leaving bitter: Augustine is 
unhappy, Ines is unhappy, Adriane is unhappy, and Roxane is unhappy.’ In fact, 
inappropriate remarks to womankind and sexist jokes with sexual connotation are 
common currency in the start-up, and in the group of salespeople in particular. The 
low representation of women in the start-up universe is a fairly well-known 
                                                     
72 A particular episode illustrates these difficulties. In August 2014, the ‘seniors’ were to 
be rewarded for services rendered by being offered shares of the company. Basile, Feriel 
and Alexandre—because it is about them—had been recruited around spring 2014 at about 
the same time. In theory, they should therefore have received the same amount of shares. 
And yet, the founders had initially decided otherwise by granting 0.5 percent of the start-
up capital to Feriel while Basile and Alexandre would receive 1 percent each. ‘I felt like a 
reward from the Islamic Republic,’ says Feriel, ‘the girl equals half the man.’ [Interview, 
22 August 2014] After a long negotiation with the founding team, she finally won her case 
and received the same percentage as her male counterparts. 
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phenomenon which is regularly point out by the concerned parties themselves. In 
2013, Pinterest technologist Tracy Chou highlighted the issue in her post (titled 
‘Where are the numbers?’), which exposed the lack of published data from start-
ups and mainstream tech companies on the number of women in technical roles.73 
Alex confides what he thinks would be the desirable proportions for each team of 
the start-up: ‘It would make sense to me that the account management and sales 
should be about half female, and the engineering team should be about 20 per cent 
female because less women go into those industries.’ PriceMatch still has a long 
way to go, as it counts no women in the technical team at all. 
In the top right-hand corner, are the sales team managers who are well endowed 
with degrees awarded by some of the best grandes écoles in the country (Sciences 
Po and other business schools such as ESSEC and EM Lyon) and have fairly high 
social origins, for example a physician father and a chemist mother, which explains 
in part such academic success. Adil and Aymeric are exceptions, as both come 
from a working-class background (Aymeric’s parents are bakers) and both have 
received good higher education. 
In the bottom right-hand corner are four of the cofounders. They are young, 
polytechniciens (except for Baptiste who only holds a Master’s degree at the Ecole 
Polytechnique and is not entitled to this status as he did not go through the selective 
entrance examination at the beginning of the polytechnicien cycle), and come from 
higher social origins (e.g. one has a father who is CEO of a major public 
corporation in France and a mother who is General Inspector of Social Affairs).  
In the bottom left-hand corner, we find the account management team, whose 
members often hold degrees in tourism and hospitality. Several of them have a 
specialty in revenue management and went to some of the few academic 
institutions in France which offer courses on the subject such as ESSCA-Angers 
University and SKEMA Business School-Ecole Ferrières; Alex received the 
‘Certificate in Hotel Revenue Management’ from Cornell University. This team 
                                                     
73 Tracy Chou, ‘Where are the numbers?’ Medium, 11 October 2013 [online]. 
https://medium.com/@triketora/where-are-the-numbers-cb997a57252 [consulted on 20 
February 2018] 
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has the largest proportion of female members with 57 percent (excluding admin). 
It has also the highest average age, around 31 years old.  
In the lower part of the graph, the members of the technical team (all male) are 
situated in an intermediate position. With regard to social origins and education, 
there is a clear separation between the engineers and IT specialists. While the 
former share with the cofounders, whom they often met at school, a high 
socioeconomic (e.g. fathers who are an engineer or physician) and educational 
status (they all went to major engineering schools such as Ecole Polytechnique, 
Télécom ParisTech, Arts et Métiers ParisTech), the latter, from much lower social 
classes (fathers who are a mechanic or low-grade civil servant), have only received 
short vocational training. (It is important to note that this relationship is in no way 
systematic; see, for example, the case of Maxime, an engineer at PriceMatch, 
whose father is a farmer.) 
Finally, in the top left-hand corner are the salespeople who come from 
heterogeneous social origins ranging from a farmer’s child to the daughter of 
Parisian bourgeois parents with prestigious graduate studies. A quarter of the sales 
team are women. Among them is the doyen of PriceMatch—age: 58 years old. 
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Graph I.2.3. Individuals, horizontal axis 1, vertical axis 3 (n = 34). 
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Graph I.2.4. Individuals, horizontal axis 2, vertical axis 3 (n = 34). 
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As for axis 3, this isolates a small group of ‘independents’. Contrary to most 
of their colleagues at PriceMatch, they did not make a strong commitment to the 
start-up. Instead, they often worked part-time or no more than the legal 35 hours 
per week and were able to preserve multiple affiliations, in particular their academic 
ones. Among these independents, two types of profile can be recognised. On the 
one hand are self-employed engineers who mainly came to learn something at 
PriceMatch and to make a little money while they were about it. They often still 
had a foot in academia, eventually wanting to pursue further studies, for example 
in the fields of mathematics and machine learning. On the other hand are those with 
apprenticeship contracts who often divided their time between PriceMatch and their 
professional training centres. This type also share a certain number of social 
properties (they come from a working class background: for example, one’s father 
is a mechanic) that distinguish them from the independents of the first type (who 
are often sons of senior private sector managers). 
On the one side we find the apprentices, Hanna and Arnaud, who appear to be the 
strongest contributors to the third factor, with 17.9 and 12.9 percent respectively. 
Hanna does the accounting and invoicing at PriceMatch. She only works part-time 
as she is completing a two-year vocational training in accounting (brevet de 
technician supérieur or BTS) at the same time. Arnaud is also on a sandwich course 
but in computer science and only comes to PriceMatch three days every week, 
where he works in the IT team. Other contributors are self-employed people like 
Cédric and Sébastien, with 5.4 and 3.6 percent. Cédric is a student of Arts et 
Métiers ParisTech and an engineer and data analyst in the Algorithm team 
(although he works from time to time with the backend people). Over about a year, 
he has completed a series of internships and short-term assignments for the 
company, but has never really laid down his hat in the start-up. Sébastien, a 
Polytechnique graduate, also works on the algorithms as an independent contractor 
but, contrary to Cédric who often does the minimum, Sébastien does not count his 
hours (around 43 hours weekly) and, in fact, spends most of his time at the office. 
At the opposite pole come people of PriceMatch with other types of employment 
contracts, though they do not necessarily benefit from a more secure employment 
status (e.g. interns). We find, again, the country managers, Aymeric and Tristan, 
who contribute 6.7 and 6.5 percent respectively to the third axe. They both state 
that they work 60 hours per week. 
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* 
We have seen how the ecology of the corporate world and the culture of the large 
firms predispose the young people of PriceMatch to conceive their work as a 
meaningful activity which provides them with a space to perform the values which 
they hold dear, of innovation and entrepreneurial spirit. From this perspective, the 
large firm and the start-up are found in a relationship of rejection and opposition. 
However, once the temporal dimension is taken into account, this relation is 
ruptured and reversed by the financial imperative that ‘startupers’ must obey, which 
seizes on the start-up capacities to the pursuit of different, more directly functional 
and distant goals. Thus the first thing that founders always stress is the objective of 
development and rapid growth of the company. Baptiste sketch out the perspective 
of the start-up he runs: ‘Today we are thirty employees in the company. With the 
next round of fundraising, we go to a hundred or so—rather eighty—and that in the 
space of three to four months only. So we have to hire fifty people in a few months, 
across eight offices around the world’ (Interview, 21 August 2014). In other words, 
it is necessary to spend lavishly in order to grow as quickly as possible 
In the start-up universe, ‘survival’ is not synonymous with ‘success,’ as in 
the neoinstitutionalism scholarship for example74; quite the contrary, although there 
are several admitted ways to succeed, the outcome is always the same, that is, the 
loss of the social life and identity of the start-up.75 All in all, as will become apparent 
hereafter when I examine the mechanisms and politics of value-creation, the start-
up can be seen as a liminal and transitional object which is attracted to its exact 
opposite as by a magnet and whose disappearance is thus ineluctable—through its 
                                                     
74 See, for example, John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations: 
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,’ American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2), 1977, p. 
340-63; Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,’ American Sociological 
Review, 48 (2), 1983, p. 147-60. 
75 It is noteworthy that ‘success’ here is closer to the Spanish terminology which translates 
this term by ‘éxito’.  
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purchase by a larger company or an initial public offering, or IPO, or simply by the 
defection of investors. So much that the start-up members dream up their 
professional future, as the manager of such and such service, in a form of 
organisation that has very little to do with the start-up here and now.  
Karen: At the start of 2014, I worked at Quick for a few weeks to keep afloat, and 
that was the moment when I said ‘OK, I think I’m just going to have to forget about 
consultancy’. So I did a few months temping in an insurance company—they were 
putting in place a new IT system so they needed someone to enter information into 
their database. Then, from September to December, I was just looking for any kind 
of work. And one day, on APEC [Association for Executive Employment], I found 
an advert for Pricematch who were looking for an administrative assistant, 
basically a secretary. I wasn’t exactly over the moon. I mean, shit, five years of 
studying to end up as a secretary, what a joke. I turned up without having done any 
preparation. In the end the three people I met—Alban, Adil and Léo—convinced 
me with what they came out with, with what they were doing, with the atmosphere. 
So I thought ‘OK, I’ll try it. It’s not like I’ve got any other offers’. And that’s how 
I ended up at PriceMatch. Not because the job was particularly interesting—they 
sold me the thing on the premise that with it being a start-up, one day the company 
would be getting bigger, and my post might develop… So I said to myself that if I 
can prove myself in this bullshit job [‘boulot de merde’] to begin with, perhaps I’ll 
have the chance to do more interesting stuff.  
Vassily: They said that explicitly to you? 
Karen: When I met Alban, I told him ‘It’s a while now that I’ve been job searching 
and I haven’t found anything in consultancy. So now I’d rather start from lower 
down and climb up’. And he said to me ‘yeah, there’ll be opportunities to develop 
within the company. (Interview, 29 May 2015) 
Alex: My career objective, or my career sort of idea, is that I would like to stay 
with PriceMatch. And I can see the company doubling in size. It’s almost doubled 
in size since I’ve been here; I can see it doubling again in the next six months to a 
year, and then doubling again. In two years, I can see all the work that I’ve done 
bearing significant amount of fruit, at which point I won’t be a revenue manager 
anymore. So that would be cool.  
Vassily: What do you see yourself doing? 
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Alex: I don’t know, I could be a manager? Like Basile for example, he started as a 
revenue manager and now he’s the chief people officer. He started much earlier 
than I did, sure. So maybe it would take more than two years but that is the kind of 
thing that I’d like to do. (Interview, 21 August 2014) 
At the sale of the start-up, in May 2015, Karen will be given a position having 
nothing to do with her qualifications in the human resources department of 
Booking.com, which she will decline. Alex will be dismissed. 
The start-up thus defines itself against large firms, in much the same way as 
Marcel Mauss has argued for the Arctic societies, in and through a process of 
schismogenesis76: at the same time that it interacts with them in the normal course 
of business and has no prospects except becoming just like them or being 
assimilated by them, the start-up stands opposed to the large firms as motion is to 
inertia, as the release of individual and collective initiatives is to the constraint and 
routine hindering them, as the efficient—at least from the standpoint of 
development and technological innovation—and labile organisation of a creative 
and didactic work is to the hierarchical and functional organisation of a strictly 
normalised and clearly divided activity symbolised by the bureaucracy of private 
and public administrations in which most startupers have spent some time.  
 
Baptiste: ‘I Like Telling Stories’ 
Baptiste was born in 1990 in France, his father a private sector manager and his 
mother a teacher. Right from lycée, Baptiste wanted to be an entrepreneur, as he 
                                                     
76 Marcel Mauss, Techniques, Technologies, and Civilizations, Nathan Schlanger (ed.), 
London: Berghahn Books, 2006 [1913/1948]. The notion of schismogenesis has been 
coined by Gregory Bateson, which he has defined as ‘a process of differentiation in the 
norms of individual behaviour resulting from cumulative interaction between individuals.’ 
Gregory Bateson, Naven: A Survey of the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of 
the Culture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three Points of View, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1936. For application of this principle in recent work, see 
James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast 
Asia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009; David Graeber, ‘Culture as Creative 
Refusal,’ Cambridge Anthropology, 31 (2), 2013, p. 1-19. 
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explains in an interview on 21st August 2014: ‘My sister and I used to think up 
ideas for companies. It’s something I’ve always been interested in. But no-one in 
my family has set up a company. Perhaps in my extended family but it’s not 
something I’ve grown up with’. In 2011, Baptiste was playing with the idea of 
creating his own business with Adil, a classmate that he met in the lecture halls of 
of Sciences Po Paris (‘He wanted to do something in Islamic finance, but it never 
happened’), but it was only a year later that the idea became a reality, with the 
creation of PriceMatch S.A.S. in January 2012. Baptiste was aged 22.  
One of the investors, a rich 40-something manager of his family’s hotel business 
which includes 15 or so hotels in France, and who sits on the board of the start-up, 
harbours a certain admiration for Baptiste. On 31 March 2016, several months after 
Booking.com had bought the start-up, he gave me his analysis of PriceMatch’s 
success: ‘What made the company, it wasn’t me; it was Baptiste’s personality. His 
partners of course too, but particularly Baptiste. He knew how to connect people, 
get people talking about his product, create enthusiasm around it.’ … ‘I think that 
guy has a capacity to seduce, to sell, to convince, and that also played a role with 
Booking. You know, the personality of the boss, that’s what the success of a 
company depends on.’ 
Between 2004 and 2007, Baptiste attended the international lycée at Saint-
Germain-en-Laye, where he met two of his future associates, Léo and Julien. In 
2007, he was selected to attend the Institut d’études politiques (IEP) in Paris, and 
followed a program in ‘Sciences and social sciences’, notably directed by Bruno 
Latour, and organised jointly by Sciences Po Paris and the University Pierre et 
Marie Curie (UPMC). His choice was strategic: ‘I was a bit lucky because you had 
to have heard about it. I was only the second year they did it, so I imagine that the 
ratio between the number of applicants and the number actually accepted wasn’t 
too bad… I wasn’t a big fan of maths but I’d done a Bac S [the scientific stream of 
the Baccalauréat], and most importantly it meant that I didn’t have to sit the 
entrance exam.’ At Sciences Po, Baptiste met two future cofounders of PriceMatch, 
Adil and Timothée.  
These three grew closer in 2009 in New York during their year abroad. Having 
achieved a double-degree in mathematics and science and technology studies, 
Baptiste turned towards finance, and, between 2009 and 2010, attended lessons at 
New York University Leonard N. Stern School of Business. On his return to France 
in 2010, he took a prestigious master’s in Economy and Public Policy, organised 
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jointly by the IEP in Paris, Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole nationale de la 
statistique et de l’administration économique (ENSAE), but he didn’t finish it. 
‘There aren’t many lessons, but you really have to work in your own time. Back 
then, with PriceMatch going on at the same time, it wasn’t easy. I got taken apart 
by the teachers, and I had to give up after three months.’ In 2014, he ended up with 
a master’s in Finance and Strategy from Sciences Po Paris.  
Whilst studying, Baptiste did several internships, particularly in the finance sector: 
at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Libreville between March and June 
2011, and from June 2011, at Goldman Sachs in London, where he took care of 
banking supervision and portfolio strategy. It was during this internship in the big 
investment bank, whilst his career seemed to be taking off, that the need to start his 
own business was strongest and things started to speed up: ‘The real trigger is that 
I was just having a really bad time at Goldman Sach, and so I told myself I really 
needed to find a way to get out of this.’ 
In 2009, during a seminar on economics and sport that he was taking at Stern, 
Baptiste learnt about a start-up specialised in dynamic pricing for sports events, 
Qcue. At this time, the company was attracting attention from commentators for its 
success in landing huge contracts with several big clubs from the American 
National Baseball League. Baptiste was convinced that a market for dynamic 
pricing existed in France, and more generally in Europe, in the football industry. 
In September 2011, Baptiste decided to suggest this idea to three of his friends and 
old classmates, Léo, Adil and Timothée. With the others keen to get on board, the 
small team got to work and put together a dossier that was presented to the 
incubator at Sciences Po in November or December 2011. ‘It’s a ten-slide 
PowerPoint presentation. You arrive in front of a jury of ten people who’ve never 
heard of your idea and you have ten minutes to convince them. A lot of it is down 
to luck, but they tell you that it’s no different in your life as an entrepreneur.’ Their 
project was accepted. In January 2012, Baptiste quit his internship at Goldman 
Sachs and returned to Paris.  
Baptiste has worked in practically every role at PriceMatch. At the start of 2012, 
he worked with Léo on the design for the prototype for the algorithm (‘I took care 
of the econometrics, because Léo had never done that’). It was he who designed 
the first user interface in Excel (‘I pretty much designed the product: I’m the one 
who did the Excel’). From summer 2012, Baptiste worked on the commercial side 
with Adil and the first interns, during the launch of a huge door-to-door campaign 
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on the streets of Paris (‘We hired interns from the EBS [European Business School 
of Paris] and went out with them to work on sales’). He also worked on creating 
partnerships with suppliers of property management systems and channel 
managers, before progressively delegating this task to Yoan in 2014 (‘All the first 
partnerships, that was me; I was the one who went to see them, who canvassed 
them’). In much the same way, having been in charge of the team of account 
managers (‘when we started having some clients, I became director of account 
management’), he passed this role on to Feriel in June 2014. As he puts it: ‘As soon 
as I can delegate, I delegate’. That said, it is still Baptiste who, even in summer 
2014, calculated the regression coefficients used to predict long-term demand.  
When I meet him in May 2014, Baptiste is the president of PriceMatch, a position 
that, according to him, simply consists of ‘representation’. Representation, here 
understood as external representation, is that which is said to stakeholders outside 
of the start-up. Baptiste is very much capable of talking in public (‘I like speaking 
at conferences’). He makes full use of this talent to convince clients and partners, 
in particular the ‘big ones’ (‘Nowadays what I like doing most is the big projects: 
the big chains such as Accor, the big PMS, the big channel managers’), and to 
negotiate with investors: 
‘I am very much involved in raising funds. I am the one who talks to the investors 
all the time. For me, this is external representation. I think that, among the partners, 
I’m the one who can best tell stories. I like telling stories. And when you raise 
funds or when you give a presentation at Best Western, what they like is that you 
tell them stories. And I like that. My partners, most of them, don’t like that. So I 
think that this is my strongest added-value [to the group]. Those guys, you don’t 
convince them with numbers, contrary to what people may think. Even investors. 
Our business plan, they didn’t even look at it. We had to do one just for form’s 
sake, but no one looked at it. Really, all they listen to is your story.’ (Interview, 21 
August 2014) 
 
Léo: ‘Revenue Management Is Like Physics’ 
A polytechnicien, Léo is part of the founding team of the start-up. He is 24 and has 
known Baptiste since high-school―they were in the same class in their final two 
years. With a strong background in science and technology, Léo first took care of 
the creation of the price recommendation algorithm; he was also the person 
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responsible for creating the first interface connections with the PMS, or ‘RFC’. As 
time passed, he went from a strictly operational role to a strategic role that led him 
to define the priorities and direction of the technical team. Today, he is also 
responsible for financial issues, notably fundraising, but ‘not the representation 
side, that’s Baptiste’, he assures me. Very close (they share a house in the upper 
reaches of Ménilmontant in Paris, where they throw a few parties with employees 
from PriceMatch), Léo and Baptiste occupy perfectly complimentary positions in 
the start-up. At the risk of caricaturing too much, Léo creates the product and 
Baptiste sells it; a sort of parallel act to Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak at Apple.  
In 2009, after doing the classe préparatoire at lycée Sainte-Geneviève in 
Versailles, Léo was accepted at Polytechnique, at the same time as two future 
cofounders of PriceMatch, Julien, also a classmate from high school, and Elias. In 
the third year, he enrolled in the Master’s in Management and Innovation ‘for the 
business side of it’. In the fourth year, he chose a Master’s that was ‘not very 
demanding’ in Network Engineering ‘to have enough time to do PriceMatch’. ‘A 
complete education’, is his summary, with a ‘strong strain of maths, applied maths 
and physics’ as well as a solid base in ‘economy, statistics, a bit of econometrics 
and a bit of IT too’. In 2011, Léo did an internship in an arm of GDF77 Suez in 
Moscow; then, in 2012, also in Moscow, at Orange, when PriceMatch had been 
already registered. ‘I did a few internships’ … ‘that basically taught me that you 
don’t learn much in a big firm’ … ‘and which encouraged me in the idea that I 
wanted to create my own company.’ Léo comes from a well-off family on the edges 
of the aristocracy: his mother and father are both énarques, one director of a large 
public company, the other working high-up in the civil service, they own a few 
properties on the Ile de la Cité in Paris, etc. For him, create his own business, 
‘create an idea from scratch without owing anything to anyone’, was a way of 
‘earning respect’ from his peers, even if he does admit that ‘given my studies, my 
socio-economic background, I’m pretty privileged compared to other people’. 
When Baptiste came to see him with the idea for PriceMatch, Léo was immediately 
on board: ‘Straight-away I thought the idea was very good. What was particularly 
interesting was that it attacks’ … ‘a major market dysfunction, which is that the 
information available on the reserve price of the customer and the real sales price 
of the business is asymmetrical. And so you can say to yourself’ … ‘that the 
                                                     
77 Gaz de France. 
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functioning is less than optimal by a few percentage points. That means that if you 
could solve that problem, offer to every consumer his or her reserve price, and if 
you did that for every good in the world, you could increase global GDP by 5 
percent.’ ‘Market dysfunction’, ‘asymmetrical’ information, ‘reserve price’, this is 
specific vocabulary from microeconomics that Léo seems to master perfectly. 
However, when we get onto the discussion of the problem of revenue management, 
it’s not economics that he spontaneously refers to, but physics: ‘I find the issue 
interesting.’ … ‘It’s that the problem of revenue management, it’s a problem of 
modelling. It’s like physics―it’s even like law actually: you’ve got a reality; you 
try to cut it into hypotheses to generate a model; then, you do some testing to get 
the data; and then at the end, you manage to model reality. And so in that respect, 
it’s a quasi-scientific discipline. I mean, it’s true that there are still lots of sources 
for improvement: in terms of the amount of data that you take into account, the 
behaviour of consumers, the way you collect data on consumers, etc. That can 
change a lot of things. Because what’s interesting is also to see the start-up side 
and the R&D side in a start-up, which is under so many financial constraints, etc., 
that it doesn’t always take the route that you would want as a scientist. So if we’d 
wanted to make an incredible revenue management model, we’d have had to spend 
lots, lots more time. But we have to pay social security… (Interview, 24 September 
2014) 
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3. A Politically ‘Scientific Pricing’ 
 
The work of price-setters in the hotel industry is an analytical and rational activity 
that aims to increase, by adjusting the price and availability of rooms, and with the 
help of sophisticated algorithms, the profitability of a particular hotel. These 
algorithms do not eliminate ‘the need for human judgment entirely.’ … ‘There will 
always be variables that cannot be accounted for in such algorithms.’ … ‘The 
objective in developing optimization models’ … ‘is to allow yield management 
agents to focus their efforts on these variables by making routine tasks more 
systematic.’78 Thus, there is between the man and the machine a specific division 
of labour, which raises the ‘agent’ to the rank of skilled workers, at ease with 
statistical undertakings and with a good knowledge of the hotel sector. 
Nevertheless, what is striking at PriceMatch is less the analytical character of the 
work of price-setters, or account managers as they also are called, than the 
importance of control activities.  
Indeed, account managers spend only a small fraction of their total time of 
work on statistical analysis and other studies of the kind. Much of their work 
consists not of production but of monitoring.79 Many candidates, trained in revenue 
management in business schools, turn out to be disappointed by the lack of any 
analytical dimension in their work and resign from the start-up after a few weeks, 
to the great displeasure of Feriel, the head of this unit, who tries to attract these very 
professional profiles: ‘I’ll tell you about our role according to the job description.’ 
… ‘Normally an account manager should spend 60 percent of their time checking 
                                                     
78 Peter P. Belobaba, ‘Airline Yield Management: An Overview of Seat Inventory Control,’ 
Transportation Science, 21, 1987, p. 63-73, p. 67 (quote). 
79 Much like in our societies, men occupy in general activities of production while women 
are restricted to those of reproduction, the team of engineers who contribute to the 
construction of the algorithm at PriceMatch is exclusively made up of men, while that of 
account managers who control and make sure of the quality of the prices produced by this 
algorithm is predominantly female (4 women and 3 men)—see Chapter 2.  
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platforms: make sure that everything is fine, send emails to push certain dates, etc. 
Because unfortunately, you always have clients who don’t connect, so if you send 
them a little email saying “on this date you’re already 80 percent occupied, you 
should push your price up,” that gives them a reason to connect, to get interested in 
the platform. Normally, each account manager should visit a client once per week 
(although not the same client mind). But I have the impression that people are a 
little sedentary here and that rule hasn’t been too successful… So that, that would 
be around 70 percent of our work. And 30 percent of our work, that would be to 
make suggestions of ways to improve the platform, all the necessary improvements 
on the platform, we talk about them. I think that we do that well—Léo said that to 
me that we do that well and I hope he was being honest. That’s the thing that we 
AMs are most interested in. It’s much more interesting to develop a product, to say 
“it’s missing this, it would be good to add that,” than to check all the platforms. No 
disagreement there. So that’s how I see the post.’ … ‘But in reality, the account 
managers spend 50 percent of their time sorting out bugs: bugs on the PMS 
interface, bugs in the algorithm, bugs bugs bugs.’ (Interview, 22 August 2014) 
Although they can in principle manage their time as they like (as is the rule 
in the start-up), the members of the account management team have in fact a fairly 
well-established work routine, based on the pace of hoteliers whom account 
managers are in regular and frequent contact with. The typical menu of a day 
consists of more or less the same elements for each account manager. In order: 
answering emails, checking the imports of availability, analysing the activity 
reports, checking the price recommendations on the platforms and, if time permits, 
working on particular studies (competition, budget, etc.). The time spent on each of 
these tasks fluctuates according to the portfolio of hotels and from one account 
manager to the other. The following description applies to most of the account 
managers in charge of Europe-based customers. As an example, here is Carine’s 
typical day. She gets to the start-up just before 9:30am, puts a Tupperware in the 
fridge, and sits down at her workstation. After turning her desktop computer on and 
chatting with Feriel and colleagues of the team, it is time to get to work. She begins 
by opening her inbox pricematch.travel, checking the emails that require a quick 
response, replying by email or by phone. Then she logs into the platform and, 
browsing the calendars of the hotels in her portfolio, she makes sure that the 
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occupancy rates have been uploaded properly from the properties’ PMS—and, 
otherwise, she contacts the hotelier to arrange, as soon as possible, an intervention 
of the technical team, to fix the broken script on the reception’s computer. She 
consults her mailbox again, this time to examine, for all the hotels that she is in 
charge of, the ‘activity reports’ on the largest fluctuations in the prices of the client-
property and competition and in the occupancy rate—all values being measured in 
comparison to those of the day before. Just enough time to check the price 
recommendations for critical dates (and even, from time to time, to modify them 
when considered ‘wrong’) and to reply to non-stop calls from clients, it is already 
lunch time: she has it at the table situated in the centre of the room, in the company 
of the members of the account management unit. Carine closes her day around 6pm, 
at an early hour in the start-up, one could even say at ‘office hours’, replying to the 
last phone calls of the day and to the new emails which have arrived as well as those 
of less importance that pile up endlessly. 
On this basic pattern, which varies little, are added other activities, like more 
in-depth control of the platform, indicators (occupancy rate, price suggestions, price 
of competitors, customer segmentation, etc.) and their variations: once every three 
weeks, Carine conscientiously reviews all the hotels of her portfolio. Besides, 
fortnightly, she attends the team meetings, in which she relays the possible requests 
of customers and the bugs that they have experienced in order to improve some 
features of the platform—these discussions on the technical aspects of the product, 
to which Léo participates as the Director of Operations, makes the connection 
between the users and account management work, on the one hand, and the 
algorithm, on the other. Client service activities are supplemented by ‘side 
projects’: Carine works in collaboration with Romaric and Sébastien on the 
prototype of a hotel pricing system for Lucien B., or Freddy, a former Director of 
Revenue Management at Accor, who now starts up his consultancy firm; she also 
carries out market studies for client-hotel.  
 
The Factory of Prices 
Carine: In the morning, when I arrive, I open my emails, I deal with the urgent 
stuff. When you see an email from a client that’s not happy, you deal with it straight 
away.  
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Vassily: Do you get a lot of ‘not happy’ clients?  
Carine: It’s not so much that they’re ‘not happy’, it’s more clients who find that the 
product hasn’t quite performed right… It’s stupid but, if a price transfer doesn’t 
work properly, the client will say ‘once again PriceMatch does not give me the 
right price, I can’t do my yield [management]’. All it takes is a client who decides 
to do their yield [management] at 8am and you arrive 9 or 9:30, and you end up 
with an email saying: ‘I’m not happy, I haven’t received my prices’. Or a PMS 
breaks. That’s the second thing I do in the morning, look up which hotels haven’t 
had their price imports and intervene as quickly as possible, or at least warn the 
client: ‘we haven’t had the import today, so your ORs [occupation rate] aren’t 
necessarily right, don’t follow our recommendations, we need to work on them.’ 
After that I look at the activity reports. These are the reports … that show the 
biggest variations in ORs for a hotel between today and the day before, and the 
biggest variations for its competitors. I look at the reports for all of my clients, note 
the important dates for each client and look at the platform for those dates. 
Normally, if a client takes fifteen rooms out of thirty, I would hope that the 
recommendation will increase. I check that it is coherent with the pick-up and I 
look at the important dates to see if the algorithm’s rec [recommendation] is right. 
If it isn’t, I make sure I change it in advance, before the client notices it. It does 
happen that there are mistakes. Actually it happened last week: a client who had an 
83 percent OR, and took ten rooms, and the algorithm told him to lower prices… 
Vassily: You mean that your job is also to bail out the machine when it messes up? 
Carine: Oh yeah! Check the prices are coherent, logical, that they make sense. And 
if they don’t make sense, I do everything that I can to change the recs, playing with 
all the different settings that we have. But when it’s just one date that looks wrong, 
I just change it by hand and put a recommendation that I think is right.  
Vassily: And the platform allows you to do that. 
Carine: Yes very much so. But Lucas and I are the only ones to do it. The others 
just wait for it to sort itself out on the whole. We all have distinct roles in the BU, 
and I’ve been given authorisation to do that. At the start, Feriel checked all my recs 
but now I’ve just been told ‘it’s fine, change them how you think’s best’.  
Vassily: The other way to do it would be to change the weighting, right? 
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Carine: Right, change the weighting of competitors, change the objective (either 
by lowering the OR or lowering the average price), events, etc. That’s where you 
can play around with it. Then redo the import, launch the algorithm again, because 
it may be that it hasn’t launched itself, or it may be that the hotelier’s just changed 
the price and you haven’t taken it into account… The thing with the algorithm, one 
of its weaknesses is that it’s a bit slow to take into account changes made by the 
hotelier. For example, in Spain, when they lower their price by thirty euros from 
one day to the next, the drop will be registered straight away because we take into 
account the average price for the last few days… so that can create recs that are 
way out. So sometimes I just them change by hand. I try to do it as little as possible 
but I prefer to just do that quickly before the client notices. As soon as the client 
calls to say that the rec is wrong, you’ve lost your credibility, they trust you less. 
Then you do have clients that are totally cool with us, they trust the recs, they just 
check quickly in the morning and send the prices, they don’t ask any questions. 
And there are some that ask questions every day, ‘why this rec?’, then they’ll look 
for the date right at the end of the month and be like ‘why does it say that?’. 
Vassily: They’re things that you don’t think are useful to look at in detail?  
Carine: What I do, I look at my hotels in real detail three times per week. That takes 
up most of my day. I look at the platform, I download the Excel thing, I look at 
each day, look at the variations. The thing is, I’d like to do that more, but when 
you’ve got a client calling you, interrupting you, you have to respond and so 
sometimes I don’t have time to check the platforms. But I try to do it properly three 
times each week. And the activity reports and important dates I do every day. I 
make sure I do that everyday, each morning, just to see the big mistakes, the big 
surges in activity that we need to keep an eye on.  
Vassily: Is that it for a typical day?  
Carine: Generally there are also meetings, meetings to improve the algorithm. 
That’s our second objective as an AM, as RMs: improve the algorithm, give 
feedback on what clients ask for, about bugs. Sometimes I have external meetings. 
Not very often, because I don’t have many clients in Paris. I also have other tasks. 
This is a new thing, we’re starting to have side projects now. At the moment, I’m 
working on the thing with Freddy Bodin from Accor. Then I’ve got a new task for 
a hotel that wants us to look at their budget and their strategy for 2015. Generally 
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that means doing a study of competitors, a report on the figures. I have little tasks 
like that. (Interview, 4 August 2014) 
* 
Lucas: You need to check all the time that that’s right, that you have the right fares, 
that the recommendations are relevant, etc.  
Vassily: And so how do you work? What is a typical day for you? 
Lucas: At the beginning of the week, generally, I try to check the payments of all 
my hotels. Then I look at, for example, all that is concerned with broken PMSs or 
clients who do not log in. And generally depending on my checks on the platforms, 
I have stuff to discuss with the clients. Next I send emails or I call them to talk 
about fares, things I don’t understand, why is it too expensive or too cheap, etc. 
Well we discuss. 
Vassily: The relationship with the hotelier, is it important for you? 
Lucas: It all depends on hoteliers. Some are autonomous. I myself have clients who 
only call me when there’s something wrong. And, with those people, we talk about 
everything but recommendations, because they know [their revenue management]. 
You can’t simply tell them to follow a recommendation, and especially if you don’t 
yourself find it necessarily relevant for her hotel. They like the platform, they pay, 
I check again just so that everything works and that’s it. 
Vassily: And when they don’t pay yet?  
Lucas: Then you have to try and find a way to convince them [the hotelier], or 
make sure that the recommendations are getting it right. Everything depends on 
how the hotelier approaches the thing. Some of them treat it like some magical 
power. They follow everything and don’t ask questions. Then there are others for 
whom it is a decision-making aide. So they just look at the dates etc. And then there 
are others who just sit on the fence with the thing. Like, when they have a rec that 
they like, they go for it, whatever. For me, they’re the best ones. They just look 
themselves, don’t ask any questions about the recommendations. They don’t bother 
you. … I don’t reckon that you have to upload all the fares, all the time, that you 
have to blindly follow the recommendations. The recommendations are based on 
a mathematical logic, but it isn’t necessarily one that always works. For example, 
if there’s no pickups, we will ask to drop [the price]. But if, for example, on this 
specific date, you have an event and that the client knows perfectly well that she’s 
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going to take [bookings] at the last minute, then she may be right not to lower her 
fares, perhaps lowering her fares too early is a mistake. That, that is a general 
criticism that we can make to the recommendations, that these are a little too 
pessimistic. … 
Vassily: So you check the recommendations on the platform, and then what do you 
do? 
Lucas: I change them so that it is as I feel like it. In all the setup that we make, 
generally, we want to make sure that we like the platform. And then I ask the client 
if she likes it. And, depending on the feedback she gives, we make changes so that 
it’s more coherent with her pricing policy.  
Vassily: And you, do you sometimes change the recommendations directly on the 
calendar? 
Lucas: No, because I reckon that I won’t be always looking at it; that I prefer that 
the setup is good, even if I have a rubbish date. I prefer that on the whole it is 
coherent; that it is a logic that the client understands, rather than changing a 
recommendation, because this recommendation will then be fixed, and so if there’s 
a huge pickup or that the competition[‘s price] soars up, then I won’t be able to 
react.  
Vassily: But you take the risk of having a negative comment from the hotelier, or 
even of losing her? 
Lucas: I don’t think that she’ll piss you off for one date; it’s more the overall 
consistency over the 90 days that she’ll judge than one or two dates really rubbish. 
If you do your setup correctly, you’re not supposed to have really rubbish dates. 
Well normally. … So yeah, I check the platforms to see if everything is alright. 
And then, in general, I send emails to give advice or I call the clients, either because 
they haven’t logged in or because there’s something interesting to tell them, in 
particular for those clients in their trial period whom you always have more to say 
to than clients who already pay. (Interview, 5 August 2014) 
There is a fascinating parallelism here between the account managers of the 
start-up and specialised workers of the factories of industrial capitalism—a world 
which could not be more remote a priori from that of the so-called ‘new economy.’ 
Account management resembles in manifold aspects a repetitive, if skilled, 
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industrial work: on the one hand, controlling the ‘quality of prices’80 displayed on 
the platform, just as one would check the aspect of a manufactured piece coming 
out of an assembly line; on the other hand, fine-tuning the machine that account 
managers know almost intimately—sometimes even better than engineers—and of 
which they appreciate the sensitivity, according to many parameters (competition 
weight, objective of revenue or occupancy, events weight, etc.). Moreover, this 
parallel with industry and the process of industrialisation is in a sense recognised—
even claimed—as the following extract from the company’s blog indicate: ‘We 
have therefore decided to industrialise and democratise yield management for all 
hotels. How? By conceiving algorithms that predict future demand and give to our 
clients price recommendations to help them maximise their revenue.’ … 
‘PriceMatch wants to start the second yield management revolution by 
industrialising it more and making it accessible to non-specialists. We’ll do this by 
constructing simple-to-use web platforms that are well connected to existing tools 
and by making the system fully automated’ (Blog post, May 17 2013).81 
Among the most frequent misrepresentations of revenue management is the 
idea that the determination of prices consists essentially of endlessly getting their 
levels moving randomly. In fact, account managers rely on rational, if sometimes 
contradictory, pricing scripts, such as this rule whereby a steep increase in the 
number of reservations taken from one day to the next (the pickup) demands an 
                                                     
80 Muniesa, Fabian, « Un robot walrasien. Cotation électronique et justesse de la découverte 
des prix », Politix, 13 (52), 2000, p. 121‐54. 
81 On pourrait multiplier à l’envi les passages qui soutiennent le programme d’une 
industrialisation du revenue management comme dans cette note de blog datée du 27 avril 
2013 : ‘PriceMatch aims to industrialise yield management, a system of fixing prices based 
on reservations, as used by big transport companies, for example. PriceMatch offers a 
completely automatised web platform that calculates demand predictions and gives price 
recommendations to our clients, sold as Saas and very easily adaptable to a variety of 
sectors.’ Ou encore dans cet extrait (du 5 juin 2013): ‘PriceMatch has given itself the 
objective of industrialising and democratising yield management for independent hoteliers, 
to help them have a head-start with their clients and get a greater part of the consumer 
surplus by selling their rooms at the optimal price.’  
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increase in prices, that facilitate the decisions that they make at different stages of 
the price production process.82 But, just like everyone else in the start-up, the ‘one 
sole objective’ of account managers is commercial.  
23 June 2014. It is 9:12 when the weekly meeting begins. Fifteen minutes early and 
among the first to arrive, I choose to set up at Augustine’s table, back to the wall, 
laptop on my knees, so that I can take notes comfortably. There are around 15 
people around the table (including the author); two others, Alexandre and Ines, 
arrive part-way through. Of the five founders, only two are present: Julien (who is 
chairing the meeting) and Elias. Someone murmurs to me that the rest are on a 
‘business trip’. Julien begins the meeting by going through the agenda. Beyond the 
usual round table, the focus will essentially be an email sent by Baptiste yesterday 
(which I hadn’t received at that point), that I reproduce in full below: 
‘Hello all, 
You will have noticed that there are more and more of us at PriceMatch. I 
just wanted to clarify with everyone the new official responsibilities that 
certain members of the team will take on: 
- Léo will now be taking care of Product Management: he will be the 
person responsible for defining our Roadmap, and will be in charge of 
defining development priorities for the product.  
- Feriel will manage the Account Management business unit without me 
from now on. The unit’s principal objective will be to get our clients 
to pay us.  
- Yoan is now in charge of developing and managing all of our strategic 
partnerships with the PMS and Channel Managers. His mission is to: 
a) get the partners moving, b) negotiate partnerships, c) train partners 
in sales and account management, d) ensure that all partnerships 
created are productive.  
- Basile is leaving the BU for Account Management and is now our CPO 
(Chief People Officer). His mission is to: a) recruit the right people at 
the right moment, b) integrate them and ensure that they are trained 
                                                     
82 Olav Velthuis defines these scripts as ‘a set of routines which function as a cognitive 
manual for the variety of pricing decisions.’ Olav Velthuis, Talking Prices, op. cit., p. 117. 
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(this will be done by the BU themselves), c) ensure that there is a good 
level of communication between teams, d) maximise the productivity 
of everyone, e) ensure that we have all of the necessary metrics 
available in Salesforce and that the CRM is filled in properly.  
All of that looks good on paper BUT in the short term absolutely all of us 
need to be concentrating on one sole objective: increase our turnover! 
To achieve this objective: 
- We must concentrate all of our commercial effort on hotels likely to 
pay quickly, i.e. hotels that have a PMS partner or that are already 
RFC’d, and that are in France. That means that, for the time being, we 
will be forgetting about all the salons and exotic conferences around 
Europe and elsewhere. 
- AM [account managers] must help salespeople to secure more clients 
(talk to Adil about this, he will manage you). 
- All developers must dedicate some time (around one day per week) to 
RFC to help out André and so that we can launch the 100 hotels waiting 
for a RFC as soon as possible.  
- Everyone needs to give they’re all and focus on the common goal.  
Thank you for having read up to here, I’ll very happy to respond to any 
question that you might have! Enjoy the weekend! 
Baptiste’ 
‘We have fun but at the end of the day we’ve gotta make money, and for that we’ve 
gotta make ’em pay’. This is how Julien summarises the words of his partner. There 
follows a debate on what clientele to target. Feriel, now the only supervisor for the 
account manager team, claims that ‘it’s the groups that take up all our time, because 
they have such specific demands,’ and she notes that they have already spent ‘six 
months on Balladin and the deal is still not done’. According to her, it’s ‘on the 
independent hotels that we should be focusing’. Alexandre, speaking for the sales 
team, retorts that ‘yes, groups take more time for you, but for us signing up a little 
Parisian hotel takes a lot of time.’ He continues by criticising Baptiste’s proposal 
to focus on ‘hotels that have already been “RFC’d”’: ‘You can’t tell us to target 
PMSs’, he claims. He fears having to give up on several prospective clients because 
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of a technical problem that, according to him, ‘should be sorted out sooner or later’ 
by the start up. ‘We already have enough obstacles as it is without giving ourselves 
more’, he adds.  
Julien signals his desire to start going around the table, cutting short the debate that 
had flared up. Each person, although often the team supervisor, is invited to explain 
what she or her team has been doing this week and what is left to do. For the team 
of developers: Elias underlines the constantly growing constraints on time and 
human resources of the interface operations with the PMS (‘RFC’), indirectly 
responding to Alexandre’s earlier remark; Sébastien informs us that he has created 
a number of graphs that show a significant improvement in the accuracy of the 
algorithm; finally, Aurélien announces the collaboration between PriceMatch and 
Eventful, which will help get more detailed day-to-day information about local 
events likely to affect demand for a given hotel.  
The telephone rings and Carine picks up. ‘Hello, Carine from PriceMatch!’  
Meanwhile, Feriel talks about the Account management team’s week, which, 
according to her, has been very good: ‘We got going on 13 hotels last week, which 
is better than two weeks ago, and we got a group, Simply’. Nevertheless, she notes 
that none of the hotels are situated in Paris, slyly returning to the aborted debate on 
target clientele. ‘Concerning Operation Vendetta, we currently have 43 hotels that 
are not paying’.83 I am led to understand that this evocatively-named operation 
                                                     
83 It is important to understand that customers are typically divided into two categories: 
‘clients in trial period’ and ‘clients who pay.’ A client in their trial period tests the platform 
in general for a period of one month (but it is sometimes much longer than this), a period 
during which the account manager who has been allocated this hotel will try to provide 
evidence of the reliability of the algorithm and of the quality of its outcomes (the price 
recommendations), by means of regular monitoring and frequent, sometimes daily, contact 
by phone or via email. If the hotelier is convinced, she will likely choose to take out a 
monthly subscription, for which the price is calculated on the basis of the number of rooms 
in the hotel (between five and ten euros per room), and will become a customer who pays. 
The latter will not require too much investment from the account management who will 
only examine the platform once in a while, usually weekly. The members of the account 
management team seek therefore to maximise both the conversion rate (for clients in their 
trial period) and the retention rate (for clients who pay). 
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consists in converting test hotels, in particular those that are still going strong, into 
paying subscriptions. Feriel promises that her team will do everything to get this 
figure down. To finish, she announces a decisive meeting with the negotiators from 
Balladin next Thursday.  
Next is Basile’s turn. Freshly crowned with his new responsibilities as director of 
human resources, he allows himself to make an observation on the state of the 
treasury: ‘PriceMatch has enough to keep going for seven or eight months but we 
need to put more into raising new funds’. This is why ‘it is crucial to reach our 
sales objectives’. Objectives that he then proceeds to remind everyone of, before 
announcing the arrival of a new recruit among the account managers, Samantha.  
For the sales team, Alexandre, who has made himself spokesperson in the absence 
of Adil, assures that the sales effort has been refocused on the Paris market, and 
seems to therein imply that he hasn’t given up on targeting large groups. 
Concerning Salesforce, the client management software recently bought by the 
start-up, he notes that ‘we are still in the early stages’ and ‘there are lots of problems 
for accessing the metrics that need to be sorted out before the software can be really 
efficient.’ Finally, Alexandre announces the imminent creation of the ‘Yield 
Academy’, a series of seminars about revenue management aimed at hoteliers, 
given by a specialist from the hotel sector and organised by PriceMatch. Augustine, 
head of marketing in the start-up, was clearly not in the loop and is unsettled by 
this announcement. She makes a fairly vague proposition of a piece for the blog 
and the organisation of some event at some future point. The meeting finishes with 
that. It is 9:38. The staff members return to their post in a ballet of office chairs.  
Far from being neutral and technical, the work of account manager 
constitutes ‘a form of rhetoric: its purpose is not to inform but also to convince,’ 
and presupposes the construction of narratives designed not simply to ‘make sense’ 
of a particular level or a variation of price, but which are also important as a way to 
‘document or establish the legitimacy’ of the algorithm.84 It is one thing to find the 
right price, quite another to make it accepted by the hotelier and, even more so, to 
fit with the diversity of customers. ‘Whenever we personalise the platform, in 
                                                     
84 Bruce G. Carruthers and Wendy N. Espeland, ‘Accounting for Rationality: Double-Entry 
Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality,’ American Journal of Sociology, 
97 (1), 1991, p. 31-69, p. 35 (quote).  
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general, we want the platform so that it looks right for us,’ explains Lucas, an 
experienced account manager in the team. ‘Then we ask the client if he or she is 
happy with it. And depending on the feedback, we make changes so that it’s more 
coherent with the client’s pricing policy’ (Interview, 5 August 2014). However, the 
technical mastery of the platform by the account manager to calculate a hypothetical 
optimal level of price is of little help whilst the hotelier gives the product the cold 
shoulder; and it is only after the account manager has managed to make her use the 
platform that it becomes possible to convince her of the very technical nature, or 
efficacy, of the algorithm. Recall Feriel’s comment: ‘you always have clients who 
don’t connect,85 so if you send them a little email saying “on this date you’re already 
80 percent occupied, you should push your price up,” that gives them a reason to 
connect, to get interested in the platform’ (Interview, 22 August 2014). Thus, 
adherence comes prior to belief. But, just as scepticism pertains to the belief in 
magic86, hoteliers are often not duped by the possible manipulations by the start-up 
with regard to the price recommendation. In fact, the simultaneous belief in the 
recommended price, the algorithm, and more generally revenue management is an 
‘ambiguous belief,’ tinged with scepticism and doubt; a path that lead hoteliers to 
believe not because ‘they’re not exactly all Einsteins’ as suggested by one hotelier 
about the other hoteliers, but on the contrary according to a plan of a rationality that 
                                                     
85 This information is known by the account managers who have access to a dashboard 
showing, among other elements, for each user of the platform, the number of times the 
hotelier logs on during the month as well as the number of recommendations she has 
followed. 
86 ‘Scepticism is included in the pattern of belief in witchdoctors. Faith and scepticism are 
alike traditional. Scepticism explains failures of witchdoctors, and being directed towards 
particular witch-doctors even tends to support faith in others.’ Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, 
Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1937, 
p. 193.  
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one can refer to as Pascalian: the hotelier believes because fundamentally ‘we never 
know.’87 
I could quote entire pages of filed notes in support of this notion of 
scepticism. I will make do with one excerpt (from 2 July 2014) in which Feriel give 
the anecdote of a particularly painstaking hotelier that she had to deal with: ‘I had 
a hotelier who kept questioning our recommendations. He was always looking for 
problems to see if the rec was right, and how we made our recommendations. 
Honestly! Luckily they’re not all like that. One day, he was trying to find the 
Achilles heel and he put his price at 2000. His average price is 80-90. So he said: 
“Ah! Your recommendations are wrong!” Because the algo the next day had 
recommended like 1900. But we were trapped, because the algo does an average of 
the previous days – the three previous days. That’s why you have to always check 
the platforms.’ 
 
‘Your Recommendations Aren’t Right’ 
Richard C., 37 years old and owner-manager of a hotel since September 2011, was 
one of the very first clients of the start-up. His father, in his role as head of business 
angel funds at Science Po, was president of the incubator jury when the boys from 
PriceMatch came to present their project: ‘Originally they wanted to fill football 
stadiums, like what happens in the USA.’ … ‘My father told them, and he was 
right, that there was more potential in hotels. In Paris, there aren’t many football 
stadiums but there are 1600 hotels. So my father naturally nudged them towards 
the hotel business, and introduced me to them.’ 
Callegari seems to have never left the well-heeled neighbourhoods of western 
Paris. His professional life, his ‘history’ to use his expression, has been lived in a 
sort of ‘silver triangle’88 drawn between the metro stations Pont de Neuilly and 
                                                     
87 For a recent analysis on ambiguous beliefs, see, for example, Julien Bonhomme, The Sex 
Thieves. The Anthropology of a Rumor, Dominic Horsfall (trans.), Chicago IL, HAU 
Books, 2016 [2009]. 
88 The « golden triangle is a part of the Champs-Elysées neighbourhood in the 8th 
arrondissement of Paris, marked out by the avenues Montaigne, Champs-Elysées and 
George-V, and which is home to very rich families, businesses and luxury shops.  
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Trinité and the RER station Avenue Foch: After studying economics and 
management at Paris Dauphine university (Avenue Foch), where he got a DESS in 
telecommunications, he worked for around ten years at Sony Music Entertainment 
(Trinité-d’Estienne d’Orves); but the lack of professional opportunities in the 
music sector led him to set up as a hotelier (Pont de Neuilly). ‘I had the opportunity 
to take over a family business, and so I got into that, four years after, in 2011.’  
The establishment, for a time ‘Hotel du Château’ then renamed ‘Le Bon Hôtel’, is 
located in Neuilly-sur-Seine, a very rich town just outside central Paris; the fact 
that it is so close to the business neighbourhood la Défense means that its clientele 
is ‘professional’. A three-star hotel when he took it over, he got his fourth in 2014 
after a long period of renovation work; the hotel now has over sixty rooms, which 
makes it, in metropolitan France, a large independent hotel.89 
In April 2012, Callegari met Baptiste, Adil and Timothée at his hotel. But it was 
with Baptiste that he says he had ‘the most direct relationship. Maybe because of 
the three he was the one that was most at ease, not technical, but in terms of 
relationships and business.’ Despite his short experience in the hotel business, 
Callegari had already worked with a revenue management company, e-axess, with 
whom the previous owner had worked, but the experience seemed to have finished 
badly: ‘It was supposed to be revenue management; in fact it was a con. I 
understood that very quickly so I terminated the contract.’ But he liked the boys 
from PriceMatch and following the meeting he accepted to become their first pilot 
business.  
Callegari tells me: ‘At the time, they didn’t know the hotel business.’ … ‘So I 
taught them a few things: about the importance of Topsys and Availpro or other 
competitors with whom I worked; about the tools that hoteliers use. We talked 
about this and that. I gave them a few ideas and then they went away and got to 
work.’ … ‘I gave them my figures for the three years I’d been owner and the 
forecast for the year; they put them in the machine; and very quickly they gave me 
some’ … ‘recommendations. For a little more than a year, I received the results, 
sheets on excel sent daily.’ … ‘I played the game: I asked about the accuracy of 
                                                     
89 According to Insee, the average independent hotel in metropolitan France has 25 rooms 
(compared to 80 rooms for a chain hotel). Florent Favre, «En 2014, une chambre d’hôtel 
sur deux appartient à une chaîne », Insee Première, 1553, June 2015. 
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their suggestions.’ … ‘Very quickly I said to them: ‘Your recommendations aren’t 
right, they’re not always reliable, they’re not bad but they’re lacking this and that.’ 
So we worked on them regularly.’ 
By the summer of 2014, Le Bon Hôtel was still important in the life of the start-
up. For example, it is the only hotel whose ID number all the engineers knew by 
heart: 1018.90 And for a reason: this is the establishment in the company’s register 
whose records go the furthest back; so it tends to be present in any tests that 
PriceMatch does. Notably it was from the first performance tests on Le Bon Hôtel 
that the following slogan was born, used on all the start-up’s marketing material: 
‘Increase your RevPAR by 7.2% on average! ». (Interview, 8 December 2015) 
 
  
                                                     
90 The number is easy to remember: 10/18 is a French publishing house that publishes books 
in pocket format—books of around 10x8 centimetres, hence the name.  
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4. The Rhetorical Logic of Algorithms 
 
Even if the platform is overflowing with many and various data, more or less treated 
and formatted in dynamic tables and colourful graphs (price of competitors, demand 
segmentation, performance indicators, etc.), the price recommendation remains the 
key information, in the eyes of the start-up’s members, because it justifies both the 
technical credentials of the product and the designation of ‘innovative company’ 
granted to this organisation. So as Alexandre, the ace salesperson at PriceMatch and 
a ‘sociological case’ according to Feriel, likes to say to clients: ‘Following your 
competition, it’s the lowest level of sophistication of yield management, because if 
your competitors are wide of the mark, you’re going to be too’ (Field notes, 15 July 
2014). Without its algorithm for determining the optimal selling price, the rest of 
the data would be of little value, as Julien, cofounder and head of the front-end unit, 
notes: ‘It’s true that a big part of the value of the product, it’s not the scientific algo, 
impressive, made by the engineers; it’s displaying the data, giving insights about 
what’s going on. Have you taken lots of reservations? Have competitors changed 
their prices? Have you got more Americans this year than last year? Do they spend 
more or spend less? Etc. That, that’s pretty valuable for the guy.’ … ‘The data, he’s 
got it all there in his PMS but it’s impossible to display it. Either he can’t because 
the PMS doesn’t have the right export function, or it does but it’s old and rubbish. 
So what we do is we access the raw data in the PMS, which may or may not be 
fairly convoluted, and then we process it to make it look nice. Have a nice 
dashboard, nice visuals of the data; the hoteliers, they love that. But the algo, it does 
give us a certain scientific legitimacy. You say to yourself: ‘We haven’t just made 
some jumped-up rate-shopper, we’ve got an algo, we’ve read white papers.’ That 
gives some real credibility’ (Interview, 18 September 2014).91 
                                                     
91 In fact, one could affirm in the case in point that the form (the user interface) matters just 
as much as the substance (the accuracy of the recommendation) as both share only one 
goal—justification. This excerpt from an interview conducted with a hotelier and 
longstanding client of the start-up is typical on this count: ‘The PMS today, in particular 
Topsys, offer a bit more analysis. Topsys will analyse sales, length of stay, forecast for 
however many days, so help you to understand the results so far.’ … ‘The PriceMatch 
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Although it occupies only a small fraction of the development team—in the summer 
of 2014, only two engineers, Charlie and Maxime, out of eight, were fully dedicated 
to it—the algorithm deserves a close analysis. First, because it shows that a price 
and more generally value are social and organisational constructs. But more 
importantly, being located halfway between trade and the actual ‘science’ of 
pricing, the algorithm allows us to decipher the complex and apparently 
contradictory blend of technique and rhetoric, prediction and performative 
gesture,92 of science and politics, that gives the work of fabrication of prices its 
distinctive properties and capacities in the specific context of the start-up.93 
  
                                                     
model gives figures. That is their aim and their one and only desire: give figures. It’s true 
that today, PriceMatch gives something more refined, that’s more and more the case—they 
didn’t do that at all at the beginning, by the way. So they explain prices by certain events, 
by competitors, etc.’ (Interview, 8 December 2015). To get a better idea of the increase in 
these ‘refined’ elements, see Appendix D at the end of this document, which traces in 
images the transformation of the platform’s user-interface. 
92 Michel Callon, ‘Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics,’ 
in Michel Callon (ed.), The Laws of the Markets, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, p. 1-57. 
93 For sociological empirical studies on algorithms, see Fabian Muniesa, Des marchés 
comme algorithmes: sociologie de la cotation électronique à la Bourse de Paris, PhD 
Thesis, Paris, École Nationale Supérieure des Mines, 2003; Daniel Beunza and David 
Stark, ‘Tools of the Trade: The Socio-Technology of Arbitrage in a Wall Street Trading 
Room,’ Industrial and Corporate Change, 13 (2) 2004, p. 369-400; Donald MacKenzie, 
An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape the Markets, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2006; Martha Poon, ‘From New Deal Institutions to Capital Markets: 
Commercial Consumer Risk Scores and the Making of Subprime Mortgage Finance,’ 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34 (5), 2009, p. 654-74; Alex Preda, ‘Tags, 
Transaction Types and Communication in Online Anonymous Markets,’ Socio-Economic 
Review, 11 (1), 2013, p. 31-56. Donald MacKenzie provides a short review for this nascent 
sociology of algorithms in Donald MacKenzie, ‘A Sociology of Algorithms: High-
Frequency Trading and the Shaping of Markets,’ working paper, 2nd draft, June 2014. 
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Figure I.4.1. ‘The PriceMatch algorithms’ (Blog note, 2 May 2013). 
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1. Demand Estimation 
The first function of the algorithm is the demand estimation model. It is divided 
into two main functions: a) long-term forecast and b) short-term forecast. Long-
term demand (a) is estimated using the booking history extracted from the property 
management system (PMS) of the hotel.94 Each arrival date is characterised by an 
occupancy rate and a number of features, such as day of the week, month of the 
year and year, holidays, and local events. A linear model95 is used to evaluate the 
effect of the characteristics of a date on the occupancy rate. Once calculated, the 
regression coefficients are used to forecast the occupancy for dates in the future. 
Graph I.4.1 shows that occupancy is affected by seasonal variations—summer, for 
example, is an off-peak period for this particular hotel. Several nights yield records 
for attendance, such as in the case in point Valentine’s Day, New Year’s Eve, or 
the week of the Paris Motor show. Others, on the contrary, are marked by 
particularly low occupancy rates, for instance holidays, like Bastille Day and 
Armistice Day. A close-up view on January shows the day-of-the-week variations 
throughout the month—peaks during the week and troughs at weekends—, 
indicating that the hotel in question is aimed at business rather than leisure 
customers (see Graph I.4.296). 
Historic data are also used to obtain two standard reservation paths: a 
weekday’s standard path and weekend day’s standard path. Both reservation paths 
                                                     
94 A property management system, or PMS, is a software application used by hoteliers to 
cover the key management functions in a property. These include front office (reservations 
and sales, invoicing) and back office operations (provisioning, staff management and 
payroll, and accounting, particularly through its provision of some key performance 
indicators). 
95 In statistics, this linear model is referred to as an analysis of covariance, or ANCOVA. 
It is a regression model in which the dependent variable y is quantitative but all the 
explanatory variables X are dummies or qualitative. It indicates whether the presence of a 
phenomenon xk increases or decreases significantly the value of y, ‘all other things being 
equal.’ 
96 All graphs represented in this section have been developed from the data, as of 24 
November 2012, PriceMatch’s first pilot hotel.  
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are the average evolution of reservations taken over the booking period. Both are 
normalised by dividing by the final occupancy rate. The short-term demand forecast 
(b) is based on such reservation paths and inventory information supplied by the 
channel manager. Depending on the number of days before the arrival date and the 
actual occupancy, the final occupancy is estimated, and this estimation is repeated 
on a daily basis. The results presented in Graph I.4.3 are rather counter-intuitive 
from a revenue management perspective. Central in most models is the assumption 
that leisure customers tend to book earlier than business customers. This is already 
mentioned in Kenneth Littlewood’s seminal study on revenue management: 
‘Surveys indicate that there is a strong tendency for low-yield passengers [leisure 
passengers] to book earlier than high-yield passengers [business passengers].’97 
This is probably the modelling assumption that is most taken-for-granted among 
revenue and pricing managers. Yet, if one accepts that hotels are more likely to be 
populated by businessmen on weekdays and by a leisure clientele on weekends, the 
standard paths shown here in fact come to challenge the ‘lowest-class-books-first’ 
assumption: reservations for weekdays, which are likely to be made by leisure 
customers, seemed to be taken earlier. Another observation is that, as it appears, 
cancellations were less likely to happen at weekends—unlike the weekdays curve, 
the weekend curve is continually growing. Finally, when representing the short- 
and long-term demand forecasts together, it is easy to see that, for the short-term 
prediction, cycles are more pronounced; they are above all more irregular (see 
Graph I.4.4). 
  
                                                     
97 Kenneth Littlewood, ‘Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings,’ Journal of 
Revenue and Pricing Management, 4 (2), Apr. 2005 [1972], p. 111-23, p. 118 (quote). 
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Graph I.4.1. Long-term prediction for occupancy, 2012. 
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Graph I.4.2. Long-term prediction for occupancy, January 2012. 
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Graph I.4.3. Normalised standard paths for week and weekend,                                      
30 days prior arrival date. 
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Graph I.4.4. Short-term versus long-term occupancy forecasts,                                       
24 October to 24 November 2012. 
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From the long- and short-term forecast thus obtained, the final demand 
forecast is calculated—for the coming thirty days at the time, then over a three-
month horizon. This proceeds in the following adjustments: first, the two demand 
forecasts are combined (following a linear combination, the short-term forecast 
gradually gains in weight in relation to the long-term forecast as the arrival date 
approaches); a second adjustment consists in taking into account possible 
cancellations (it is assumed that the closer the arrival date, the less likely a 
reservation will be withdrawn, and this is formalised by a simple linear 
relationship). 
Demand estimation is probably the area of the algorithm where most of the 
improvements have been made since the launch of the platform and it was still being 
changed in the last few months prior to the takeover. The short-term demand 
forecast, for example, was completely overhauled at the beginning of 2014 to 
improve its effectiveness and to allow the establishment of a wider range of 
reservation paths. This is permitted by using a matching function to derive night-
similarity measures. Nevertheless, the set of data on which to calculate the 
occupancy rate in the future has remained more or less unchanged. I will get back 
to this idiosyncratic use of available data in the next section. For now, I will turn to 
the optimisation part of the system.  
 
2. Price Optimisation 
The careful reader will have noticed that something seems to be missing in the 
account I have just made of the demand estimation function: prices. As startling as 
it may be, my description is accurate. Information on prices is not used in the 
determination of demand. And yet, a brief review of the literature in operational 
research indicates that most of the statistical models do indeed rely on price data to 
estimate demand. One could refer to dozens of models in support of this statement. 
It is sufficient to mention the series of expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) 
models, which are by far the most popular models in practice.98 Indeed, both 
                                                     
98 Peter Belobaba, ‘Application of a Probabilistic Model to Airline Seat Inventory Control,’ 
Operational Research, 37, 1989, p. 183-97; Peter Belobaba, ‘Optimal vs. Heuristic 
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EMSR-a and EMSR-b heuristics, for example, assume two rate classes (or rate 
categories), associated with different levels of demand. Thus, in the model devised 
by Baptiste and Léo, the predicted final occupancy rate is calculated irrespective of 
the price at which reservations have been made.  
In many respects, the solution that has been found at PriceMatch to solve 
the optimisation problem is original. Informed by their strong background in 
economics, and microeconomics in particular, the algorithm’s architects chose to 
make their model rest upon the notion of price elasticity of demand. Léo specifies 
the relationship between demand and price: ‘It is true that the point we project on 
the demand curve, which is an occupancy at a given price, is worth whatever it’s 
worth. But the assumption was to say that, in the vicinity of that point, there was 
some elasticity that we knew about, thus allowing us to calculate, to approximate 
the demand curve in the vicinity of that point’ (Interview, 24 September 2014). 
  
                                                     
Methods for Nested Seat Allocation,’ presentation at ORSA/TIMS Joint National Meeting, 
November 1992. 
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Graph I.4.5. Price elasticity of demand as a function of price. 
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Graph I.4.6. Price elasticity of demand as a function of the number of                         
days prior to the arrival date, 30 days. 
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The price elasticity of demand constitutes therefore the missing link 
between the demand forecast calculated in the first stage and the price 
recommendation. The so-called point elasticity of demand method should make it 
possible in principle to predict the impact of a change in demand on the equilibrium 
price. It uses differential calculus to calculate the price for an infinitesimal change 
in quantity at any given point on the demand curve. The optimal price, P*, is equal 
to the absolute value of the first derivative of price with respect to quantity, dP/dQ, 
multiplied by the point’s quantity, Q, and the elasticity, Ep. However, the optimal 
price can be computed only if the formula for the point-price elasticity, Ep = f(Q), 
is known. The price elasticity of demand at PriceMatch is only approximately 
known: 
Léo: The second component was the optimisation. So here, it was extremely basic, 
and still is a bit, in the sense that we kind of produced an elasticity matrix… 
Vassily: You mean you made it up? 
Léo: Yeah, we made up an elasticity matrix by taking figures from the literature 
that seemed right to us. (Interview, 24 September 2014) 
Although ‘made-up,’ the elasticity matrix follows a certain logic. The 
starting point is, as pointed out in the previous conversation, a set of price-elasticity 
values found in the literature in operational research, and in particular in one study 
which came to be known at PriceMatch as the ‘Egyptians’ paper.’99 In this paper, 
the authors assume that the point-price elasticity is dependent on two main 
variables—the price of a hotel room and the number of days before the arrival 
date—and present an example of elasticity matrix. The matrix built by the people 
of PriceMatch is essentially derived from this example, and the missing values 
extrapolated. I have reproduced here the elasticity vectors thus obtained according 
to price (see Graph I.4.5) and as a function of time prior to arrival (see Graph I.4.6).  
                                                     
99 This paper was published in an Egyptian academic journal: Heba Abdel Aziz, Mohamed 
Saleh, Mohamed H. Rasmy, and Hisham ElShishiny, ‘Dynamic Room Pricing Model for 
Hotel Revenue Management Systems,’ Egyptian Informatics Journal, 12 (3), 2011, p. 177-
83. 
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Two observations can be made. Firstly, the non-linearity of the elasticity 
both in relation to prices and days prior to arrival. While on average the price 
sensitivity tends to decrease here as the price goes up, there are peaks and troughs 
along the way (see Graph I.4.5). Likewise, price elasticity of demand varies 
according to the number of days before the arrival date. Two stages can be 
distinguished: up to a fortnight prior to arrival (day–15), the demand for hotel rooms 
is less and less elastic; beyond this period, however, it becomes more and more 
elastic (see Graph I.4.6). Secondly, in both graphical representations of the data, 
price elasticity of demand is negative and seldom exceeds 1 in absolute value. This 
means that an increase in prices will cause a decrease in demand, and vice versa, as 
is the case for ‘normal goods.’ The model was not therefore applicable to the price-
setting of suites and luxury rooms of five-star properties, or if one prefers of ‘luxury 
goods,’ for which the elasticity is by definition positive. This should not come as a 
surprise, given that the high-end segment of the hotel market does not constitute the 
target clientele of the start-up—luxury hotels already have a long history in using 
revenue management systems, and thus are believed to be much more difficult to 
acquire. 
It is easy to understand how the optimal elasticity matrix must differ from 
one property to the next. It is well known that customers’ price sensitivity in the 
hotel industry is a function of, among other factors, geography, luxury, and size. It 
is clear, for example, that the customers who stay in higher-end hotels are far less 
price sensitive than those of lower-end hotels. To take account for differences in 
price sensitivity, values of the elasticity matrix should logically be adjusted 
according to each type of property. In spite of efforts to develop ad hoc values, the 
algorithm of PriceMatch makes use of one single elasticity matrix for determining 
the optimal price. ‘I tried to play around with the data we had,’ Léo says. ‘But I 
didn’t manage to find [he corrects himself]… We didn’t manage to reach conclusive 
findings on what elasticity values really are’ (Interview, 24 September 2014).100  
                                                     
100 In September 2013, PriceMatch announced in the company’s blog the development of 
a new method to determine the price elasticity of demand for each hotel type. However, the 
method was never implemented: the elasticity matrix remained the same for all 
126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph I.4.7. Prices derived from three different strategies,                                              
24 October to 24 November 2012. 
 
  
                                                     
PriceMatch’s clients, whether located in Paris, in the provinces or elsewhere, independents 
or hotel chains, one-star or five-star properties, etc. 
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From this elasticity matrix, the optimal price can be calculated. In fact, three 
different prices are computed: the price that maximises occupancy, the price that 
maximises revenue, and the optimal price which is a combination of the two. Both 
the volume-maximising and revenue-maximising prices are determined for a given 
occupancy forecast and price elasticity of demand. A linear combination is then 
used to turn these two prices into one (see Graph I.4.7). This so-called optimal price 
is set for each room type as a function of the current occupancy and remaining days 
before the arrival date.  
From a revenue management perspective, the determination of a price that 
maximises quantity seems supererogatory. Recall the seminal work of Kenneth 
Littlewood, which introduces the idea of maximising the revenue received on a 
particular flight, rather than maximising the number of passengers carried (cf. 
infra).101 The reason why the algorithm departs from such a fundamental principle 
is probably to allow for different degrees and types of strategies. In particular, it is 
important to understand that a volume strategy is by definition more conservative 
than a revenue strategy. Let me take an example. Take two hotels, A and B, of 
different sizes which both have one room to be filled only. Hotel A has a capacity 
of ten rooms while Hotel B has one hundred. Under these circumstances, the 
shortfall resulting from the room remaining empty is more significant for Hotel A 
than it is for Hotel B. Thus, hotelier A will be more likely to offer a lower price to 
ensure that the room is taken, whereas hotelier B will probably try to temporise to 
sell it at full price. In economic theory, it is said that manager A, who runs a smaller 
property, is more risk averse. Yet, we know that the overwhelming majority of 
hotels are independent businesses of small size. Moreover, these are the target 
clientele of PriceMatch. We understand now the relevance of calculating the price 
that maximises volume: it makes it possible to adapt the offerings to meet the needs 
of the customer base and it makes it possible to move the cursor to any strategy or 
tactic, either conservative or more aggressive, by simply altering a parameter on the 
platform. 
 
                                                     
101 Kenneth Littlewood, ‘Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings,’ art. cit. 
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3. Rules of Control 
Once calculated, the optimal price is subjected to a number of control rules. 
Sometimes the purpose of these rules is simply to contribute to effective price 
adjustment, but rules are also important as a way to establish the legitimacy of the 
revenue management system. When used this way, a rule constitutes a form of 
rhetoric: its purpose is not simply to find the right price but also to convince and 
persuade.102 In the following, I will present first the ‘tactical rules’ (a), then the 
‘rhetorical rules’ (b). 
A first set of rules of control can be referred to as tactical rules (a), because 
it is concerned with the pricing tactic or strategy of the hotel. Tactical rules can be 
turned on and off at will by the members of the account management team. For 
example, the following rule according to which: if it ends in the digits 0, 1 or 2, 
then the price is rounded to the next lowest price ending in the digit 9. The 
underlying assumption of this rule is that certain prices have a psychological impact 
and tend to be perceived by customers as being significantly lower than they 
actually are, tending to round to the next lowest monetary unit. We know from retail 
pricing that prices such as 1.99 euros are associated with spending 1 euros rather 
than 2 euros. This is the basis of what is known as psychological pricing in the fields 
of marketing and economics. For a hotel room, this technique should make it 
possible in principle to increase the number of reservations, without significantly 
reducing the revenue for each sale, and thus to increase revenue.  
Another example relates to price matching. Price matching is when retailers 
give you a refund of the difference between their higher price of a good and their 
competitors’ lower price for the same good. The so-called ‘one-euro-less’ rule 
makes it possible for a particular hotel to price-match its competitors by offering a 
lower price, and more specifically: if the next lowest competitor’s price is close 
enough (four euros or less), the recommended price is set at 1 euro less. (We note 
in passing how PriceMatch was a poor naming choice. Price matching is about 
                                                     
102 On the tension between the rhetorical and the technical, see Wendy N. Espeland, Bruce 
G. Carruthers, ‘Accounting for Rationality,’ art. cit. By rhetoric the authors simply mean 
techniques that are used to make a convincing or persuasive argument. 
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guaranteeing the lowest price. Revenue management, on the other hand, aims at 
charging each customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay, or the highest acceptable 
price. By almost any measure, revenue management and price matching practices 
are therefore in contradiction with each other.) 
Some features of the revenue management system at the SNCF103 has been 
reported publicly by the company itself. In particular, we know that French national 
railway has adopted what is sometimes called by the actors an ‘ascendant revenue 
management’ rule. Such a rule makes it technically impossible for revenue 
managers to reopen lower-value discount classes, that is, to make prices go down.104 
A similar rule can be found in the algorithm of PriceMatch. But, unlike in the case 
of the railway, downward changes in prices were not completely prohibited in the 
start-up. Instead, they were allowed, under this rule, up to a certain limit. By default, 
this limit was set at 3 percent. By reducing this percentage, the hotelier will hope to 
secure sales by encouraging customers to make their reservations earlier on, as, by 
increasing it, she will give herself more flexibility in pricing decision to react to a 
fall in demand.  
Then, rhetorical rules (b). Their purpose is to convince users of the platform 
that the recommended price is right. Léo states it very clearly:  
A big chunk of the algorithm is about implementing rules so that it addresses not 
only the optimisation problem but also the concerns of the hotelier. … We tried to 
respect constraints which are not necessarily aligned with the optimisation interests 
of the hotelier. Somehow, if we provide a hotelier with a recommendation that 
seems absurd to her, it is the whole tool that is being put into question. So you need 
to find the right balance between actually optimising the selling price and 
reassuring the hotelier. (Interview, 24 September 2014) 
                                                     
103 Société nationale des chemins de fer français.  
104 Jean-Michel Normand, « Voyager à tous prix : la fabrique des tarifs », Le Monde 
Magazine, 8 April 2011. In other instances, however, the SNCF admitted that deep-
discount seats could be made available for sales again when faced with a large number of 
cancellations. 
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Indeed, several rules were developed to control for the possible bugs and 
other defects which may arise from the optimisation model. Graph I.4.7 gives an 
idea of the kind of defects that need to be identified and corrected (see above). We 
can see that, when maximising occupancy, the algorithm returns a few negative 
price values. Negative values mean customers should be paid to accept to stay in 
the property. It is easy to imagine how users of the platform would react to such 
price recommendations, hence the use of a simple rule of control that will avoid 
displaying such negative values on the platform.  
Another set of rules situates the final recommendation within a network of 
prices to which it is compared and from which it is derived.105 These ‘reference 
prices’106 include, among others, the minimum and maximum prices, competitors’ 
prices, actual price, and recommended price (of the day before). The price is first 
compared to the price list of a particular hotel, in particular the minimum and 
maximum prices. The aim of this series of rules is to ensure consistency in all prices 
offered by a particular hotel. A rule is used, for example, to make sure that the 
recommended price will never be below the minimum price nor above the 
maximum price, or rack rate. Likewise, another rule guarantees that a double room 
will always be more expensive than the single room, and so on for the different 
room types of a property.  
The price is also determined in relation to the median price of neighbouring 
hotels, so that ‘the hotel is correlated with its market to some degree,’ as the 
engineers justify. By default, the correlation coefficient used here is set at 20 
percent, but the account managers are able to modify this parameter from the setting 
tab of the platform. Most of them consider that 30 percent is the right level. And 
                                                     
105 Michel Callon and Fabian Muniesa, ‘Economic markets as calculative collective 
devices,’ Organization Studies, 26, 2005 [2003], p. 1129-250; Sandrine Barrey, 
« Formation et calcul des prix : le travail de tarification dans la grande distribution », 
Sociologie du travail, 48, 2006, p. 142-58. 
106 For an application of the notion of ‘reference price’ for the contemporary art market, see 
Olav Velthuis. 
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they can even adjust weights attributed to each competitor to take account for the 
heterogeneity of the hotel’s set of competitors.  
Moreover, the price is seen together with past recommended prices. More 
precisely, in the prototype version of the algorithm for example, the differential 
between the price for a particular day, Pd, and the recommendation of the day 
before, Pd–1, could not be greater than 10 percent. By means of this rule, the 
engineers of PriceMatch sought to provide against erratic variations in 
recommended prices from one day to the next, which would leave, according to 
them, a bad impression on the users, and ensure a sense of consistency and 
continuity over time in the recommendation.  
Finally, the price is derived too from the actual price. The actual price is the 
listed or posted price, not the recommended price. It is the price actually set by the 
hotelier. A rule is used to make sure that the recommended price is no more than 
15-percent different from the average actual price of the last three days. Again this 
number of days is a parameter in the model and can be modified at will by the 
account managers. According to Léo, this rule pertains to the micro-negotiation 
which is being played out with the users of the platform: ‘Some hotels are charging 
way too much, but we’re going to say to them that they’re charging a little too much, 
and despite that they won’t necessarily follow us. So, knowing that they don’t lower 
[their prices] when they are told to lower a little, if they were told to lower [their 
prices] drastically then it’s unlikely that they would listen to us’ (Interview, 24 
September 2014). 
With regard to algorithms, the order in which the rules intervene matter. 
This order tells us something about the form of the relationship between the start-
up and its customers. In the case in point, the algorithm must respect a fundamental 
priority: the price must be close enough to the average actual price. If this condition 
is satisfied, a second priority can intervene: the price must be close enough to the 
previous recommended price. Other additional priorities I have reviewed above can 
come into play if the price interval thus delimited allows it. What the order of rules 
seems to imply here is that the PriceMatch’s algorithm gives high priority to 
customer satisfaction. It incorporates in its architecture the slogan, used and 
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popularized by a hotelier, César Ritz, according to which ‘the customer is never 
wrong.’  
 
‘Success Stories’ 
A report on a project in progress for the development of a new function in the 
platform, this subsection presents the main stages in the detection process of the 
so-called ‘success stories’, that is, these dates for which the algorithm has 
performed best. This function has been developed by Cédric and the following 
excerpts are from his internship report presented at Art et Métiers ParisTech in 
April 2015. 
Presentation of the task 
One of the major problems when offering a decision-making service is being able 
to prove the worth of the tool that is developed. One way is to use a priori methods 
of projections based on a specific scenario: by putting the price at 100 euros, 
turnover is estimated to be 1000 euros, whilst if the price is put at 80 euros, the 
turnover is estimated at 1200 euros. Another method is to prove the tool’s worth a 
posteriori, once the trajectory has been observed: by applying our recommendation 
of 100 euros, you have filled your hotel and got a turnover of 1300 euros. This 
work is absolutely necessary for two reasons: firstly, the account managers must 
be able to convince the client of the benefits of the product, so that the client does 
not cancel the contract (the service is offered on a non-binding basis), and then the 
account manager must be able to persuade the client that she must follow our 
recommendations. … Highlighting the results obtained with the help of the tool 
allows us to demonstrate its worth. This work following up clients is done by the 
account managers, but they have a large number of clients to manage, and it is 
difficult to do all of this work manually because it is very time-consuming as well 
as being subjective. It is also worth noting that the majority of these account 
managers have a master’s in revenue management, and therefore they have a good 
understanding of dynamic pricing, and the different metrics used in defining tariffs 
(price curves, the trajectory of the occupation rate, etc.). 
The idea suggested by Baptiste W. (CEO of PriceMatch) was therefore to create a 
tool that would detect nights when the company had made money for hoteliers: 
known as ‘success stories’. My job was to create and implement this tool, starting 
from scratch. I had final clients (the hoteliers), intermediate clients (account 
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managers, who had to validate my tool’s suggestions), and one requirement: find 
the right nights. In order to properly demonstrate this requirement, here are two 
nights, one very good, and one very bad.  
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Figure I.4.8. Occupation rate metrics and price for a ‘good’ night. 
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Figure I.4.9. Occupation rate metrics and price for a ‘bad’ night. 
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It is clear that these nights have completely different characteristics, and a tool 
should be able to at least filter out all of the average nights that don’t stand out. 
Given the large amount of subjectivity involved, there is no perfect response or 
algorithm: so I chose to follow a ‘lean start-up’ approach with the aim of 
developing a minimum viable product (MVP) with this new functionality, then to 
start over and gradually try to improve it.  
… 
The task 
To best complete the task, I began by making sure what was needed. Therefore I 
organised meetings with the account managers to talk about the subject, because 
these people would be my primary users, but also because their wide practical 
knowledge of revenue management was a gold mine: they represent the expert 
opinion to be coded into the algorithm. I therefore used them for two purposes: 
their experience as a user, and their knowledge as an expert. Once I had done this 
early research, I formalised it into a functional specification.  
One of the most important steps was the definition of the key performance 
indicators (KPI) of a past night, in order to compare different nights. The most 
important indicators were the following: 
- Gap between the hotelier’s prices and our recommendations 
- Final occupation rate 
- Average price 
- Ascendant yield 
- Increase in revenue compared to the previous year, if available 
- Number of recommendations followed by the hotelier 
Having done this, I was able to pass to the first phase of implementation, and I 
created a code linked to these metrics and the functionality, as well as 
corresponding unit tests. Once the first version of the functionality was 
implemented, I tested it on several hotels and asked for feedback from some 
account managers, trying to test as many different scenarios as possible.  
This allowed me to identify the weaknesses in my algorithm, and I added a few 
metrics, and modified the weighting between them. In this way, we constantly 
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improved the functioning of the algorithm so that it met the needs of the account 
managers.  
Results  
The results, even if they are subjective, seem satisfactory, and the algorithm will 
go through a phase of web development so that it is directly accessible to account 
managers on the platform.  
… 
The tool should allow account managers to concentrate on recommendations to 
make for the future, and no longer waste time going over past nights so that they 
can show clients the product’s value. Eventually, the idea is to automatically 
generate account managers’ feedback. They could validate or not a night as a 
success story, and perhaps automatically send emails to clients, that feature these 
nights. That said, before going this far it is necessary to ensure that the algorithm 
works effectively, because sending the wrong nights to clients would be disastrous 
and completely discredit the company. 
Personal feedback on the experience 
The task gave me an opportunity to initiate myself in the development of an 
innovative product, and forced me to keep to the strict minimum and then redraft, 
rather than try to find a perfect solution directly, which would have been my natural 
preference. But this approach is not realistic when the objective is so complex and 
subjective, and I had to learn to calibrate my demands with feedback from the 
people who would be using it, and not just go with what I personally thought was 
the best option. 
The expression a ‘good date,’ or ‘good night,’ which comes up frequently 
in the vernacular of the start-up, denotes this idea whereby there is, at least in the 
minds of actors, a ‘normal’ behaviour of prices, which engineers and account 
managers of PriceMatch seek to identify, with the additional difficulty that what is 
normal for some can be considered as deviant by others.  
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Algorithms as a Moral, Rhetorical and Technical Device 
A hybrid figure between theory and practice, and between research and action, the 
algorithm produces what Fabian Muniesa calls ‘effects of rightness’ [effets de 
justesse]107 quite specific to revenue management that can be articulated or 
discerned only in concrete situations. ‘Putting an algorithm into place’ is an 
‘explicitation work,’ which expands to wider complexity and the need to establish 
choices between several possible states.108 In the first place, the algorithm is a 
search for a compromise, notably from a moral point of view; the specific 
organisational context in which it spreads out results in operations of compliance 
with the practices and moral values in use. The following interview excerpt 
illustrates various ways in which account managers, as well as hoteliers, have to 
deal with this issue of morals in their work: 
Vassily: At PriceMatch, you don’t necessarily do ascendant yield. 
Carine: We have the option. We can do it for clients. Personally, I’ve got it 
activated for two clients. For me, ascendant yield works. It teaches the consumer 
to always book early, which helps us: the more you have early reservations, the 
easier it is to manage fluctuations, make estimations, that kind of thing. I mean it’s 
more an advantage for us that for the consumer. But the downside is that the 
algorithm hasn’t necessarily been designed for ascendant yield. A hotel always 
runs the risk of losing a group reservation, or loads of reservations at once, meaning 
it has to lower prices. If that happens, we’re stuck, because the rec isn’t going to 
have taken that into account, and will tell the hotel to keep raising the price. So it’s 
more that the algo needs to be improved, to be more reactive. Because at the 
moment it’s just a condition that says: ‘you won’t make the price lower than 
yesterday’. It needs to be able to adapt to peaks and troughs of demand.  
                                                     
107‘A configuration with an algorithm gives a special effect of efficiency and fairness, that 
we call ‘a rightness effect’: a ‘rightness effect’ but at the same time with a technical sense, 
like when we say that the answer to piece of arithmetic is ‘right’.’ Fabian Muniesa, Des 
marchés comme algorithmes: sociologie de la cotation électronique à la Bourse de Paris, 
PhD Thesis, Paris: École Nationale Supérieure des Mines, 2003, p. 288.  
108 Fabian Muniesa, ibid., p. 287. 
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Vassily: You said that in Spain, your hotels are used to practising descending yield; 
that they drop the prices at the last moment 
Carine: I have hotels that work very very well. But I’ve got three hotels in 
Barcelona that fill up massively in the last couple of days. They try and do a sort 
of medium price: when they have a few reservations coming in, they’re happy, they 
put up the price. But if they want to be full, they have to drop the price. …We tried 
with one hotel starting low and then going up little by little. We tried on three 
different dates, and on all three, the OR was in the red. So it’s tough. In my opinion, 
ascendant yield, it makes sense when activity is good, in cities where you’re fairly 
full all year, at least to have a base. Like Paris. Barcelona no. Barcelona’s just 
tourists. Summer in Spain, it’s just tourists.  
Vassily: Hold on, hold on! You said there’s just tourists. But doesn’t that contradict 
the idea, which is pretty widespread in revenue management, that tourists reserve 
earlier than business?  
Carine: That depends on the destination. Barcelona, you have at least five flights a 
day, even more. You can go just like that: ‘I’m going to go for a weekend there’. 
And generally, it’s not expensive. You tell yourself that you can always find 
something not too expensive, so you wait. And then, it depends on the category of 
the hotel. In this case, a hotel with three stars (three Spanish stars, so yeah!) And 
maybe not so well-located. I think that they take lots from other hotels that are 
already full, so they’re reservations for the same day or two days before. But that’s 
how they fill up in Spain: with last-minute tourists. It’s the opposite of Paris, where 
you see hotels that are full until December, when you look at the three hotels in 
Barcelona, in October they’re at zero percent. … 
Vassily: Do you not find that shocking, this idea of just dropping the prices at the 
last moment? As a client, for example. 
Carine: Yes, of course. At the same time, from the hotelier’s point of view, imagine 
that it’s 3pm and you’ve still got 20 rooms to sell. You try anything. You drop the 
prices, because you’ve still got fairly significant fixed costs and you need to try 
and cover them. In fact, I find that logic less shocking than the opposite, because 
for me, someone who reserves in advance really wants to go: they absolutely want 
to go to this destination on those dates, etc. Someone who buys at the last minute, 
either it’s on a whim or it’s an unforeseen event. So, yeah, it’s less expensive, but 
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it’s not like they’d wanted to go absolutely on that date and that time. So yeah, as 
a consumer, to me that seems fine. (Interview, 4 August 2014)109  
But the algorithm is not always a matter of morality; it is often a means and 
support of a particularly intense form of rhetorical work. Because the revenue of 
the start-up is so intrinsically linked to the users’, or customers’ opinion on the 
quality of the recommended price, it is vital that one gains their trust about the 
reliability of the algorithm. The revenue management system having become a 
commodity in its own right, one must be capable of explaining, if not the 
mathematical subtleties which it incorporates, at least the overall logic of the 
algorithm, reinforcing the results that fit in this interpretative norm and, on the 
contrary, alleviating those that deviate from it; how to contain, for example, the 
erratic variations in price recommendations so as to make correspond what is with 
what should be according to the user’s way of thinking.  
Finally, the strictly technical aspect of algorithms should not be neglected 
on account of being self-evident: one must not forget that revenue management 
consists in solving a complex mathematical problem that requires having available 
powerful computing capabilities and calling in advanced optimization and 
                                                     
109 In the questionnaire carried out at PriceMatch, I wanted to get the perspective of 
members on two distinct pricing practices: known as ‘early bird’ and ‘last minute’. More 
precisely, I asked the following questions: ‘Do you find it normal to give a reduction in 
price to customers that book a long time in advance?’ and ‘Do you find it normal to give a 
reduction in price to customers that reserve at the last minute?’ These are the results. There 
is consensus on ‘early bird’ pricing: everyone asked found this pricing method, which gives 
preferential prices to customers reserving a long time in advance, totally acceptable; one 
person out of the 34 didn’t have an opinion on the question. According to respondents, 
‘early bird’ pricing is moral because it respects a certain logic of exchange: the idea that 
the various constraints associated with this tariff (cancellation fees, etc.) compensate for 
the few euros that are saved. Actually, it is not exactly the same package or product that is 
being sold. The ‘last minute’ tariff gives preferential prices to customers reserving a few 
days before the arrival date. Although this practice was also largely supported by those 
asked, five of them (out of 34 people, so around 15 percent) expressed some reservations, 
and three said that they had ‘no opinion’. Regarding this tariff, members of the start-up had 
more difficulty finding a compensation with which to justify it.  
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stochastic techniques. Now, finding the solution to such a problem is not an easy 
thing to do. One way to achieve this is to proceed by trial and error, by trying many 
configurations, which sometime implies making mistakes, until—although nothing 
is less certain—the ‘one best way’ dear to Frederick W. Taylor is found.110 The 
start-up is not much suited to this kind of innovation; quite the contrary, the 
permanent state of emergency that characterises it effects a dogged adaptation 
process of its technology. For instance, the fabrication out of whole cloth of price-
elasticity values. This is but one example of these multiple arrangements with the 
realities of the market, which one is hard-pressed to know whether to ascribe to the 
realm of intent to deceive or to necessity, that defines algorithm implementation in 
the concrete case of the start-up.  
At PriceMatch, engineers must pursue a twofold objective: how to 
continually improve the performance of the algorithm, but also how to constantly 
allow for the requests of hoteliers—through the intermediary of account 
management—toward potential fulfilment of them. ‘The improvements that were 
made [after the first version of the algorithm] are full of little optimisations, full of 
business rules that came out of it,’ says Léo. ‘But, once again, rather than improve 
the algorithm’s performance, we were thinking from the point of view of what the 
hotelier was expecting to see, because at some point you have to sell the product’ 
(Interview, 24 September 2014). This direction has nothing accidental about it; it is 
the product of a rational and documented deliberation process conducted by the 
members of the technical team involved. To realise this, one needs, for example, 
only to browse the internal document I have reproduced hereunder (see Table I.4.1), 
which shows the tension that exists between the rhetorical dimension (here 
illustrated by the ‘marketing value’) and the technical aspects of the algorithm.  
  
                                                     
110 Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, New York, NY and 
London: Harper & Brothers, 1911. 
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Proposed 
Enhancements 
Marketing 
Valuea 
Technical 
Valueb 
Complexity
/Time 
Scorec Ranking 
Decorrelate price 
recommendations for 
each room type—this 
means to have the 
number of rooms 
reserved for each room 
type; today 
recommendations are 
made based on the total 
number of rooms 
reserved 
1 2 - d - - 
Provide price 
recommendations for 
more than two room 
types 
1.5 2 1.5 2 2 
Provide price 
recommendations for 
more than 30 days in 
advance 
1.5 2 1.5 2 2 
Offer a price list to the 
hotelier based on the 
demand, long-term 
forecast and a record of 
the impact of each 
event on demand 
3 2.5 1 4.5 1 
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Note—(a) Is it a selling point?, (b) Does it improve the property performance?, (c) Marketing 
Value + Technical Value – Complexity, (d) This depends on the available data in a PMS. If 
it is not available then it can be rather complicated. 
 
Table I.4.1. Plan for algorithm improvements, autumn 2012. 
Provide a map of the 
events that take place 
in the area around the 
hotel 
1.5 1 3 -0.5 6 
Take into account the 
online reputation—this 
means crawling 
booking.com to get the 
online reputation 
history, incorporating 
it as a variable in the 
regression model, and 
displaying it on the 
platform to the hotelier 
3 1 3 1 4 
Collect detailed 
bookings from the 
PMS with information 
on the nationality of 
guests to carry out 
further analyses (e.g. 
cross-checking 
nationality against 
events taking place in a 
country would help 
improve the algorithm) 
1.5 1.5 3 0 5 
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The algorithm thus presupposes the combination of quasi-antinomic realms: 
technical methods and variables that make it possible to calculate a price, wedded 
to the ability to contain it by successive rules of control, to regulate, transform, and 
exploit it according to a plan that is objectively rational even as it remains far remote 
from that of the science that crafted it. This contradiction, inherent in its logic, 
explains why sociologists have insisted so much on the performative111 nature of 
algorithms. The performativity of economics can easily be confirmed here through 
both a ‘theory effect’ [effet de théorie]112 and a performative effect in a more 
restrictive sense113: a theory effect, because the architects of the algorithm have 
been trained to the basics of economics and in particular microeconomics and have 
made use of this knowledge in a practical objective; but also a restrictive 
performative effect, because the economic theory is therefore incorporated in the 
algorithm, exempting the users of the platform have any knowledge of it. 
 
* 
At the end of this ethnographic journey―suddenly interrupted by the acquisition of 
the start-up in May 2015―, the work in the start-up reveals itself to be a sort of 
‘politicised science,’ a rhetorical and eminently political activity, even as it might 
seem to involve only those methods and variables that, incorporated in the 
algorithms, appear neutral and technical. And the start-up emerges as the product 
of individual actions carried out more or less separately which, while loosely 
                                                     
111 ‘Scientific theories, models and statements are not constative; they are performative, 
that is, actively engaged in the constitution of the reality that it describes.’ Michel Callon, 
‘What does it mean to say that economics is performative?,’ CSI working papers series, 5, 
2006, p. 10 (quote). 
112 On the notion of theory effect, see Pierre Bourdieu ‘The Social Space and the Genesis 
of Groups,’ Theory and Society, 14 (6), 1985 [1984], p. 723‐44; Marie-France Garcia-
Parpet, « La construction sociale d'un marché parfait : le marché au cadran de Fontaines-
en-Sologne », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 65 (1), 1986, p. 2-13. 
113 For a definition of restrictive performativity, see Philippe Steiner, ‘Gift-Giving or 
Market?,’ Journal of Cultural Economy, 3 (2), 2010, p. 243-59. 
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defined and organised in projects, are nonetheless objectively coordinated through 
meanings that start-up members gives to their actions and the importance that these 
actions gain by being incorporated in a larger system of meaning. These elements 
of an anthropology of value as ‘meaning of actions’114 bring to centre stage the 
notion of productive activity in this limiting case of activity that is carried out in a 
start-up business and call for a move beyond the long-established separations 
between value and values, ideal and material, our own actions and some ‘concrete 
totality’ (as Karl Marx would put it), by indicating how the two phrases of these 
enduring dichotomies are formed together and mutually supported, complement 
and buttress themselves but also undermine one another in the same momentum. 
To venture the lessons of this inquiry, I propose that the formation of what 
one may call the digital mode of production―that is, a specific set of relations 
between surplus extraction and the creation of human beings, which defines the 
mechanics of value-creation in the start-up world―is founded on a twofold 
antinomy. The first stems from the fact that productive activity in start-ups seems 
situated at the boundary between ‘material’ reality and abstraction, a sort of 
empirically realised limiting case of value-creation, yet one that develops an 
exceptionally complex, technical product of bits and quantisation steps, whose 
production is performed in a purely pragmatic mode, due to more prosaic short-
term financial pressures. Whence the second contradiction: innovative 
entrepreneurship is a tall order, no doubt among the most uncertain ventures as 
evidenced by the very high number of start-ups that fail, whose actual 
success―either being acquired or issuing an IPO―means essentially the death of 
a form of organisation where innovations could spring up.115 This means that one 
                                                     
114 David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our 
Own Dreams, New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001. 
115 Contrary to a widespread idea, innovation does not generally occur within the American 
internet giants that constitute Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM) 
but rather outside the latters, in start-ups that gravitate toward them and often end up being 
absorbed by them, as attested by the many examples reported by specialised medias of 
innovative companies founded by ex-employees of GAFAM. See, for an example of this 
sort of innovation detour, Valentina Palladino, ‘Google Acquires Smartwatch OS Startup 
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cannot undertake a sociology of the start-up ‘culture’ that have the wherewithal to 
capture and convey the hallmark of the so-called ‘new economy’, without 
immersing oneself in the organisation, in its initial phase. In other words, first-hand 
understanding of the rituals and beliefs displayed in organisations is here a 
necessary condition of an adequate knowledge of the object, since ‘it is value’, 
according to Graeber, ‘that bring universes into being’116 
Finally, the start-up is not made up of a discrete sum of accounting assets, 
of resources that can be transferred by sale and technical methods that would exist 
aside from the organisational context in which they are implemented but of an 
confused system of rituals and symbolic practices that, being constantly produced 
and maintained in and through the very functioning of the start-up, exist only in a 
situation so to speak―this explains the many failures that follow start-up 
acquisitions: the specific assets that these organisations possess are totally 
embedded and, once they have been delocalised, devoid of utility in any other 
structure. The work in the start-up is a ‘productive activity,’ in the sense of Karl 
Marx117, that is, it is not simply a matter of technical activity but also of seemingly 
mundane activities that encode symbolic structures. It follows that the creation of a 
start-up and the production that it supports come down to a process of value-
creation of things, such as an algorithm or an organisation, as well as human beings, 
a particular valorisation of economy in which ‘the genesis of norms’ takes place 
‘simultaneously with the practice of professional activity’ … ‘and the ever-relative 
effectiveness of the imposed norm.’118 
                                                     
Cronologics, Founded by Ex-Employees,’ Ars Technica, 13 December 2016 [online]. 
https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/12/google-acquires-smartwatch-os-startup-
cronologics-founded-by-ex-employees/ [Last consulted on 2 March 2018] 
116 David Graeber, ‘It Is Value that Brings Universes into Being,’ HAU: Journal of 
Ethnographic Theory, 3 (2), 2013, p. 219-43. 
117 Karl Marx, Capital: Critique of the Political Economy, Vol. 2, London: Penguin, 1885. 
118 François Vatin, ‘Valuation as Evaluating and Valorizing,’ Valuation Studies, 1 (1), 
2013, p.  31-50, p. 46 (quote).  
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1. Introduction: Revenue Management Systems, the Rhetoric of 
Science and the Paradox of Performativity 
 
‘Selling the right seats to the right customers at the right prices.’ 
―American Airlines, 19871  
 
This is the statement used to describe and justify the function of revenue 
management systems, or yield management systems.2 Formulated for the first time 
by American Airlines in its 1987 annual report, it can be found in many 
publications, either practitioner or academic, produced along with the development 
of these systems. Such a slogan articulates, often abstract, schematic representations 
of the market that a sociological approach may be in a position to dissect.  
For more than thirty years, the service industry has implemented 
sophisticated technical frameworks for revenue and pricing management and these 
pricing technologies have given rise to an industry of consultants and software-
solutions providers. In parallel with this, and at roughly the same pace, certain 
                                                     
1 American Airlines Inc., 1987 Annual Report, Dallas TX, 1987; Barry C. Smith, John F. 
Leimkuhler, and Ross M. Darrow, ‘Yield Management at American Airlines,’ Interfaces, 
22 (1), 1992, p. 8-31, p. 8 (quote). This definition of revenue management has been taken 
up in the mainstream publication of Robert G. Cross, Revenue Management: Hard-Core 
Tactics for Market Domination, New York, NY: Broadway Books, 1997. For an academic 
example of the typical vocabulary used for the hotel industry, see Sheryl E. Kimes, ‘The 
basics of yield management,’ Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 30 
(3), 1989, p. 14-9. 
2 The term ‘yield’ is specific to the airline industry. It is referred to as a measure of average 
fare paid per mile, per passenger. At present, the preferred term is, more generally, ‘revenue 
management,’ when the technology, after having been elaborated in the airline industry, 
spreads to other economic sectors, such as the railway sector and hospitality, as we will see 
thereafter in this presentation. Preliminary analysis of occurrences of phrases, carried out 
by means of the Google Ngram Viewer, confirms prevalence, since the beginning of the 
2000, of the term ‘revenue management,’ by comparison with that of ‘yield management’ 
or ‘dynamic pricing,’ to refer to this pricing technology.  
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normative discourses have emerged with regard to seat inventory control and 
pricing. The aim of this essay is to analyse an aspect of this intertwining between 
technical pricing tools, on the one hand, and theoretical arguments on price 
formation, on the other hand. Indeed revenue management, especially in its 
computerised version, is often understood as a real ‘scientific pricing’ 
(characterised by ‘rational thought’ in opposition to ‘guesswork’).3 It seems to me 
that a sociological research on the way this science of prices is ‘performed’, to use 
Michel Callon’s phrase,4 would allow us not only to better understand the social 
effects that characterise the production of prices (how economics plays a role in 
shaping the reality which it purports to describe?), but also to learn about the limits 
of the efficacy of performative gesture. In this essay, I have chosen to concentrate 
on the issue of economic representations, and in particular on what David Graeber 
calls the ‘paradox of performativity,’ at the expense of the process and variables 
involved in price formation, of which I will only provide here limited information.5 
                                                     
3 For a plea for scientific pricing, see E. Andrew Boyd, The Future of Pricing: How Airline 
Ticket Pricing Has Inspired a Revolution, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
4 Michel Callon, ‘Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics,’ 
in Michel Callon (ed.), The Laws of the Markets, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, p. 1-57; Fabian 
Muniesa, « Un robot walrasien :  cotation électronique et justesse de la découverte des prix 
», Politix, 13 (52), 2000, p. 121‐54; Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo, ‘Constructing a 
Market, Performing Theory: The Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives 
Exchange,’ American Journal of Sociology, 109 (1), 2003, p. 107-45; Donald Mackenzie, 
An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2006; Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu (eds.), Do Economists 
Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007; Fabian Muniesa and Michel Callon, « La performativité des sciences 
économiques », in Philippe Steiner and François Vatin (eds.), Traité de sociologie 
économique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009, p. 289-324. 
5 On the issue of social construction of prices, see Mark J. Zbaracki, ‘Pricing Structure and 
Structuring Price,’ working paper, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2005; 
Olav Velthuis, Talking Prices: The Symbolic Meanings of Prices on the Market of 
Contemporary Art, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; Sandrine Barrey, « 
Formation et calcul des prix : le travail de tarification dans la grande distribution », 
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This paradox, whereby the actors who create and maintain markets cannot explicitly 
say that some abstractions of economic science can become true simply because 
people believe they are true, deserves indeed, in the case in point, our full attention.6 
My research object is a maker, amongst others, of a revenue management 
system: PriceMatch is a French company, more precisely a start-up, specialised in 
pricing for hotels.7 I consider here revenue management system as ‘technology of 
the future’: a combination of ‘esoteric forms of knowledge’ and ‘pragmatic 
techniques,’ of which command is claimed by certain specialists, and that aims at 
                                                     
Sociologie du travail, 46 (2), 2006, p. 142-58. See also my own contribution to this debate 
on price setting practices in the hotel industry, Vassily Pigounidès, The Work of Setting 
Prices in a Large Hotel Resort, Master Thesis, Paris: Paris-Sorbonne University and 
Cachan: Ecole normale supérieure of Cachan, 2011. 
6 David Graeber, ‘The Sword, the Sponge, and the Paradox of Performativity: Some 
Observations on Fate, Luck, Financial Chicanery, and the Limits of Human Knowledge,’ 
Social Analysis, 56 (1), 2012, p. 25-42. In spite of the merit of this idea, David Graeber’s 
contribution to the debate on performativity of economics went almost unnoticed. One 
exception is the Laura Bear’s study on Bengalese entrepreneurs, in which the paper is 
mentioned, however very timidly. Laura Bear, ‘Capitalist Divination: Popularist 
Speculators and Technologies of Imagination on the Hooghly River,’ Comparative Studies 
of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 35 (3), 2015, p. 408-23. 
7 This study is part of a larger inquiry, including semi-directed interviews with actors who 
have contributed to the dissemination of revenue management, as well as observations 
conducted in companies of the hotel industry which use this technology. In the case at hand 
here, the empirical material was collected between 2014 and 2015 by following, in their 
day-to-day work, the professionals involved directly or indirectly to the work of setting 
price (revenue managers or account managers, engineers, IT technicians, salespeople, and 
hotel managers). It consists essentially of field notes and transcriptions of semi-directed 
interviews conducted with people at different layers of the organisation. This material was 
completed by a series of internal documents related to the functioning of the revenue 
management system developed by the engineers of PriceMatch, and in particular by the 
founders of the start-up. See Appendix A. 
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predicting and influencing upcoming events.8 In the hotel industry, revenue 
managers (pricers), who work in independent properties or in hotel chains, receive 
price suggestions on electronic platforms (directly on their computer or through 
remote servers) and decide, on the basis of these recommendations, price levels of 
hotel rooms. In this labour division between man and machine, the algorithm is in 
charge of accurately predicting, on the basis of past bookings, the demand aimed at 
the hotel for a given room and date, and of determining a selling price which will 
maximise the revenue of the property. It executes a logical programme in which the 
rules for price determination are henceforth inscribed, which exempts the user to 
have in mind the economic theories that she should be applying. I propose to 
analyse the way in which these rules can be mobilised in a specific representation 
of price formation. At this point, I want to make it clear that the issue of economic 
representation offers a rhetoric, if not political, meaning: a particular understanding 
of price formation can become real simply because the actors who promote this 
understanding are capable of convincing most of us, but this economic 
representation can become effective if and only if these actors do not admit that this 
may be the case. It is precisely, I believe, this paradox that the neo-institutional 
sociologists try to express when they speak of the ‘logic of confidence.’9  
                                                     
8 David Graeber, ‘The Sword, the Sponge, and the Paradox of Performativity,’ art. cit., p. 
39-40. 
9 The institutionalisation of rational myths in organisations is necessarily surrounded by an 
aura of hypocrisy and deceit. It seems to me that this is precisely what John W. Meyer and 
Brian Rowan really mean when they state that: ‘The more an organization's structure is 
derived from institutionalized myths, the more it maintains elaborate displays of 
confidence, satisfaction, and good faith, internally and externally.’ In fact, another way to 
put it is that you cannot actually tell that you are the head of the ‘rationalised myth’ division 
in some company, even though this is exactly the kind of job you do in reality. John W. 
Meyer and Brian Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony,’ American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2), 1977, p. 340-63, p. 358 (quote).  
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The anthropologists often use the concept of ‘performativity’ to describe the 
expressive performances of magicians in the so-called ‘primitive’ societies.10 The 
question, for them, is to determine and to define the type of rationality that gives to 
magic its efficacy while it does not provide any predictions, and to know how we 
can drift from magical rationality to critical and scientific rationality. But the 
problem becomes slightly more complicated when we introduce the possibility of 
scepticism in relation to magic.11 Many pages have been written in anthropology 
about the ambivalence of magical beliefs which can exist within the very 
communities in which these beliefs take root. These debates on magic tend to 
circumvent the issue of scepticism: if the vast majority of witchdoctors are ‘frauds,’ 
a handful of them are seen as ‘reliable practitioners,’ and thus the problem of 
trickery is of no relevance. Quite the opposite, and following Graeber, I consider 
that scepticism, precisely, is what is interesting here. Hence, I have encountered, 
during my investigation, a hesitation as for the attitude to adopt vis-à-vis revenue 
management solutions: a technology that impresses by the complexity of the 
mathematical formulae and the scale of the database used or a mere ‘theory effect’ 
                                                     
10 Stanley Tambiah, Culture, Thought and Social Action: An Anthropological Perspective, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; David Graeber, Toward an 
Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams, New York, NY: 
Palgrave, 2001, p. 240-47.  
11 The argument of scepticism can be found, for example, in the study of Edward E. Evans-
Pritchard on Zande diviners in Soudan. So he writes: ‘Scepticism is included in the pattern 
of belief in witchdoctors. Faith and scepticism are alike traditional. Scepticism explains 
failures of witchdoctors, and being directed towards particular witchdoctors even tends to 
support faith in others.’ Rituals specialists also adopt a rather ambivalent position towards 
their own practice, as evidenced by the initiation of Kamanga, a Zande witchdoctor, related 
by Evans-Pritchard, or the experience of Quesalid, a Kwakiutl shaman, related by Franz 
Boas and Claude Lévi-Strauss. See Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and 
Magic among the Azande, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 193 (quote); Franz 
Boas, Kwakiutl Ethnography, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1966; Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, « Le sorcier et sa magie », Les Temps Modernes, 41, 1949, p. 385-406. 
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(as Pierre Bourdieu would put it12) and, in which case, revenue management 
appears as a sort of scam, but whose consequences are no less real and significant.13  
I will address this issue in three stages. I will begin with a description of the 
circumstances, both political (the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act) and technological 
(the advent of new information technologies), which have enabled the emergence 
of revenue management systems in the passenger air transport sector in the United 
States. In particular, I will focus on the revenue management system at American 
Airlines. We will see how the airline successfully established itself as a leading 
actor on the nascent market for revenue and pricing management technologies. I 
will present some of the properties of the DINAMO (Dynamic Inventory Allocation 
and Maintenance Optimizer) system—a system that I will then compare to its 
railway version as it was developed at the SNCF,14 the SOCRATE (Système offrant 
à la clientèle des réservations d'affaires et de tourisme en Europe) system. Thus we 
will see how the concept of optimality becomes one of the key arguments for the 
development and implementation of these pricing systems. 
Next, I will give further details on the issue of economic representations 
involved in this kind of pricing technology. To this end, I will analyse, through a 
digression on scientific literature, the vocabulary specific to the seat inventory 
control problem, which can be found in academic texts that have sought to promote 
the automation of price determination. These texts contain the neoclassical 
                                                     
12 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,’ Theory and Society, 14 
(6), 1985 [1984], p. 723-44. For a practical application of the concept of theory effect, see 
Marie-France Garcia, « La construction sociale d'un marché parfait : le marché au cadran 
de Fontaines-en-Sologne », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 65, 1986,  p. 2-13. 
13 This is what W. I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas have already stated in their well-
known ‘theorem’: ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.’ 
Quoted by Robert K. Merton in Robert K. Merton, ‘The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew 
Effect,’ Social Forces, 74 (2), 1995, p. 379-424, p. 380 (quote). 
14 Société nationale des chemins de fer français. 
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intuitions, à la Jules Dupuit,15 of the microeconomic theory of the monopoly—a 
theory, which conclusion is to discriminate among consumers by charging different 
prices according to the value each individual place on each good. We will see how, 
in this literature, a separation between ‘heuristics’ and ‘optimal models’ surfaces. 
In particular, we will observe the rhetorical operations involved in the academic 
substantiation of these models.  
Finally, in a last section, I will return to the techniques of revenue 
management and describe a practical situation where such a device was put in place. 
I will describe the development of an online revenue management platform, 
commercialised in the mid-2010s by PriceMatch, a French start-up specialising in 
hotel pricing. We will see how this specific innovation articulates the notion of 
optimality and certain economic arguments in order to ‘perform’ a price—in this 
case a price suggestion. This pricing tool was devised with the purpose of 
convincing the users that the prices thus calculated are technically and scientifically 
sound. We will see how this practical case can illustrate the paradox of 
performativity that I have defined above.  
 
The Sociology of Price Formation 
This research has unfolded from its outset in the context of a scientific movement 
of renewal of the issue of price formation. For two decades, empirical sociological 
studies have addressed the object of prices specifically, contributing to the 
emergence of a research space where inquiries on the social construction of actors’ 
preferences and others focusing on various devices that shape and produce prices 
on the markets stand alongside.16 How does the structure of relations affect the 
                                                     
15 Jules Dupuit (1804-1866) was a French economist-engineer of the Ecole Nationale des 
Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC), whose work has formed the basis for the contemporary 
microeconomic theory and has proposed a formalisation of the welfare economics. See 
Robert B. Ekelund Jr. and Robert F. Hébert, Secret Origins of Modern Microeconomics: 
Dupuit and the Engineers, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
16 For a review on this nascent sociology of price formation, see Jens Beckert, ‘Where Do 
Prices Come From? Sociological Approaches to Price Formation,’ MPIfG Discussion 
Paper 11/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, March 2011. 
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price of legal services in large law firms or the stock-market value of American 
firms? How do devices (either legal, cognitive, organisational, or material) 
contribute to making prices on the American market for electricity, on the 
derivatives market in Chicago or at the Paris Bourse, and what is the key to success 
in pricing innovation? How should a price be established in situations where 
uncertainty on quality exists as is the case of the market for academics, the market 
of contemporary art, or that of Burgundy wine? How to set a price where there is 
none, or how much is the cost of oil slicks? How is the work of price-setting carried 
out in large retailers or in machine maintenance firms?17 The dynamism of research 
on this subject, which this enumeration of questions suggests, is evidence of the 
construction for several years of an economic sociology of prices.  
                                                     
17 Brian Uzzi and Ryon Lancaster, ‘Embeddedness and Price Formation in the Corporate 
Law Market,’ American Sociological Review, 69, 2004, p. 319-44; Ezra W. Zuckerman, 
‘Structural Incoherence and Stock Market Activity,’ American Sociological Review, 69 (3), 
2004, p. 405-32; Valery Yakubovich, Mark Granovetter, and Patrick McGuire, ‘Electric 
Charges: The Social Construction of Rate Systems,’ Theory and Society, 34, 2005, p. 579-
612; Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo, ‘Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: 
The Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange,’ American Journal of 
Sociology, 109, 2003, p. 107-45; Fabian Muniesa, « Un robot walrasien. Cotation 
électronique et justesse de la découverte des prix », Politix, 13 (52), 2000, p. 121-54; 
Christine Musselin, The market for academics. Studies in higher education, New York, NY 
and Abingdon: Routledge, 2010 [2005]; Olav Velthuis, Talking Prices: The Symbolic 
Meanings of Prices on the Market of Contemporary Art, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005; Yuna Chiffoleau and Catherine Laporte, « La formation des prix : 
Le marché des vins en Bourgogne », Revue Française de sociologie, 45 (4), 2004, p. 653-
80; Marion Fourcade, ‘Price and Prejudice: On Economics, and the 
Enchantment/Disenchantment of Nature,’ in Jens Beckert and Patrik Aspers (eds.), The 
Worth of Goods: Valuation and Pricing in the Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011; Sandrine Barrey, « Formation et calcul des prix : le travail de tarification dans la 
grande distribution », Sociologie du travail, 46 (2), 2006, p. 142-58; Mark J. Zbaracki, 
‘Pricing Structure and Structuring Price,’ working paper, Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania, 2005. 
156 
 
 
My exploration of revenue management thus draws from this field of 
sociology, by unfolding some of the unifying concerns on pricing technologies and 
price-setting work in organisations. 
The contemporary renewal of economic sociology, generally attributed to 
Mark Granovetter and New Economic Sociology (NES), has been talked about a lot 
in sociological literature, notably for having put an end to decades of mutism of 
sociology with regard to economics.18 A similar trajectory can also be noted for the 
sociology of pricing, albeit a little later. For example, there was no entry for 
‘pricing’ in the index of the second edition of the famous Handbook of Economic 
Sociology, edited by Neil J. Smelser et Richard Swedberg and published in 2005.19 
In the NSE line of analysis, a host of works about prices have attempted to 
uncover the ways in which pricing practices are inscribed in complex sociability 
networks.20 They bring into the fore the game of social mediation that underlies 
pricing. The processes and the variables at play when determining prices are here 
linked to their implication in social rather than commercial institutions. The 
irreconcilable connection between actor and network is constitutive of the non-
economic mediations and motives that structure the adjustment of supply and 
demand, with the expression of relational behaviours distanced from short-term 
opportunist strategies (trust, reciprocity, etc.) 
                                                     
18 Bernard Convert and Johan Heilbron, ‘Where did the new economic sociology come 
from?’, Theory and Society, 36 (1), 2007, p. 31-54. 
19 Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, 2e 
ed., New York NY and Princeton, NJ: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University 
Press, 2005. At the letter ‘p’ however, we find reference to the work by Viviana A. Zelizer, 
Pricing the Priceless Child. Viviana A. Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child, New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1985. 
20 Among the most notable contributions to this research current are Wayne Baker, ‘The 
Social Structure of a National Securities Market,’ American Journal of Sociology, 89 (4), 
1984, p. 775-811; Joel Podolny, ‘A Status-based Model of Market Competition,’ American 
Journal of Sociology, 98, 1993, p. 829-72; Beth A. Benjamin and Joel Podolny, ‘Status, 
quality, and social order in the California Wine Industry,’ Administrative Science Quaterly, 
44, 1999, p. 543-69; Brian Uzzi and Ryon Lancaster, ‘Embeddedness and Price Formation,’ 
art. cit.; Ezra W. Zuckerman, ‘Structural Incoherence and Stock Market Activity,’ art. cit. 
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The sociological variations around pricing determinants (network, status, 
etc,.) are more diversified than the quasi-systematic resort to regression would have 
us think. An example is the study by Robert G. Eccles and Harrison C. White on 
the price determination for transporting goods in American heavy-industry 
companies. The study essentially focusses on the the approach of the organisation 
as a space of mutually restricting competitive economic positions and interfaces.21 
More recently, there is the study by Valery Yakubovich, Mark Granovetter and 
Patrick McGuire on the history of electricity pricing in the USA, which insists on 
the central position of networks of power relations in which actors are embedded, 
as well as economic theory (non-linear pricing) and measuring instruments 
(meters) in the social construction of this market and of prices.22 This essay takes 
this same path of historical sociology, mindful of heterogeneous and institutional 
processes of production of a given market. In it we will see the central role of 
sciences and techniques, but also of governments, in the production of successive 
pricing regimes establishing price as a social consequence.23 
A second branch is brought about by comparing thinking on the question 
of the coordination, interaction and matching of supply and demand on the markets, 
which sociologists approach through the fundamental notion of goods 
                                                     
21 Robert G. Eccles and Harrison C. White, ‘Price and Authority in Inter-Profit Center 
Transactions,’ American Journal of Sociology, 94, 1988, p. 17-51; Robert G. Eccles, The 
Transfer Pricing Problem: A Theory for Practice, New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1985. 
22 Valery Yakubovich, Mark Granovetter, and Patrick Mcguire, ‘Electric Charges,’ art. cit. 
23 In the same vein, the following passage is from Economy and Society, and is often cited 
in sociological studies on pricing: ‘Money prices are the product of conflicts of interest and 
of compromises; they thus result from power constellations. Money is not a mere ‘voucher 
for unspecified utilities,’ which could be altered at will without any fundamental effect on 
the character of the price system as a struggle of man against man. ‘Money’ is, rather, 
primarily a weapon in this struggle, and prices are expressions of the struggle; they are 
instruments of calculation only as estimated quantifications of relative chances in this 
struggle of interests.’ Max Weber, Economy and Society, Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press, 
1968[1921], p. 107-8.  
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qualification.24 The sociological approach of prices becomes that of space, 
contentious and in competition, of diversified and combined equipment directed to 
allow the determination of a price.  
The various works in this general direction are run through with questions 
linking them together.25 The question of coordination involves taking into account 
the apparatus, objects, arrangements and more widely the whole group of human 
and non-human intermediaries to which are delegated all or part of the 
responsibility for price determination. Pricing in the space of the market is 
essentially the result of a distributed activity. What’s more, analysing the procedure 
by which prices are calculated involves the social operations procedure of bringing 
up to standard—or profit-sharing, if you prefer—of actors, of spaces and of objects 
in a continuous process of construction of the supply and demand, and of definition 
of the properties of goods, or qualification.  
This shared system of analysis does not exclude there being major 
divisions between actors, particularly concerning the fundamental question of the 
relation between sociological theory and economic theory. In the material approach 
                                                     
24 See, Christine Musselin and Catherine Paradeise (eds.), Quality: A Debate, Amy Jacobs 
(trans.), Sociologie du travail, 47 (1), 2005, p. e89-e123. 
25 For empirical work in sociology that links pricing and qualification of goods, see, for 
example, Fabian Muniesa, Des marchés comme algorithmes: sociologie de la cotation 
électronique à la Bourse de Paris, PhD Thesis, Paris: Ecole des Mines de Paris, 2003; 
Donald Mackenzie and Yuval Millo, ‘Constructing a Market, Performing Theory,’ art. cit.; 
Yuna Chiffoleau and Catherine Laporte, « La formation des prix », art. cit.; Christine 
Musselin, The market for academics, op. cit.; Sandrine Barrey, « Formation et calcul des 
prix », art. cit.; Lucien Karpik, Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities, Nora 
Scott (trans.), Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 2010 [2007]; Koray Çalışkan, 
‘Price as a Market Device: Cotton Trading in Izmir Mercantile Exchange,’ in Michel 
Callon, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa (eds.), Market Devices, London: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007, p. 241-60; Catherine Grandclément, Vendre sans vendeurs : sociologie 
des dispositifs d’achalandage en supermarché, PhD Thesis, Paris: Ecole des Mines de 
Paris, 2008; Luc Boltanski and Arnaud Esquerre, « La "collection", une forme neuve du 
capitalisme la mise en valeur économique du passé et ses effets », Les Temps Modernes, 
679 (3), 2014, p. 5-72. 
159 
 
 
to the market proposed by Michel Callon, the performativity of the economy26 
operates by training economic agents and more importantly through the 
proliferation of tools and measures for calculating that are produced by such 
technosciences of the economy as marketing, management or accounting.27 The 
price is considered as “a quality just like any other quality”, that is transformed and 
tested bit by bit whilst the process of qualification is going on, which also 
contributes to its form.28 Conversely, Lucien Karpik maintains a major division 
between two grammars (or economies) of coordination, with homogenous goods 
markets on one side (calculated and coordinated by price), and unique goods 
markets (judged and coordinated by qualities) on the other. 29 
We will close this brief overview of the scientific developments from 
which this research grows, by evoking a third branch, that of the anthropology of 
prices in non-Western societies. A few years after the very rich reflections shared 
in Marginal Gains,30 it is to Jane I. Guyer that we owe the beginnings of an 
ethnographic program on monetisation and price formation in contemporary 
societies.31 Its starting point is the historical observation that there is today on 
                                                     
26 Michel Callon (ed.), The Laws of the Markets, London: Blackwell, 1998.  
27 Michel Callon and Fabian Muniesa, ‘Economic Markets as Calculative Collective 
Devices,’ Organization Studies, 26 (8), 2003, p. 1229-50; Franck Cochoy, Une sociologie 
du packaging, ou l’âne de Buridan face au marché, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
2002; Anthony G. Hopwood and Peter Miller, Accounting as Social and Institutional 
Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.  
28 Michel Callon, « Postface : La formulation marchande des biens », in François Vatin, 
Evaluer et valoriser : une sociologie économique de la mesure, Toulouse: Presses 
Universitaires du Mirail, 2009, p. 247-69, p. 254 (quote). 
29 Lucien Karpik, Valuing the Unique, op. cit.;  
30 Jane I. Guyer, Marginal Gains. Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa, Chicago, IL 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
31 Jane I. Guyer, ‘Composites, Fictions and Risk: Toward an Ethnography of Price,’ in 
Chris Hann and Keith Hart (eds.), Market and Society: The Great Transformation Today, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 203-20. 
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increasingly open recognition that “prices are composites across the board.”32 
Consumers are trained by prices of plane tickets, for example, to know about added 
taxes, fees, and payments, which are often now itemised. For example, British 
Airways online booking service gives a flight price, and then adds: an online 
booking fee; a share of taxes and fees demanded by governments, authorities, or 
airport owners; an insurance and security surcharge (since 9/11); and a fuel 
surcharge. We are actually reminded that all prices are fictions—literally results of 
narratives of creation, addition, and subtraction. From a theoretical perspective, the 
result is a moral economy33 of transparently composite prices, which nevertheless 
retain the mystery of their components. The aim is, in line with the work of Karl 
Polanyi,34 to apprehend the classical factors (land, labour, capital, state) and more 
diffuse and difficult to identify components (risk, risk-mitigation instruments) that 
are incorporated into price.  
From this theoretical background, price ethnography compels the 
capitalisation of a series of empirical case studies of concrete markets,35 thereby 
joining a certain section of contemporary economic sociology of prices.36 Price 
ethnography engages in the tradition of on-the-ground and localised observations 
                                                     
32 Jane I. Guyer, ibid, p. 204. 
33 Edward P. Thompson, ‘The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth 
century,’ Past & Present, 50, 1971, p. 76-136. 
34 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]. 
35 In addition to the work of Jane I. Guyer, I have to mention, for example, Paul Alexander’s 
series of articles on Java: Jennifer Alexander and Paul Alexander, ‘What's a Fair Price? 
Price-Setting and Trading Partnerships in Javanese Markets,’ Man, 26 (3), 1991, p. 493-
512; Paul Alexander, ‘What’s in a price? Trading Practices in Peasant (and other) Markets,’ 
in Roy Dilley (ed.), Contesting Markets. Analyses of Ideology, Discourse and Practice, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992, p. 79-96. 
36 Here I think of the sociological studies respectively conducted by Sandrine Barrey on 
large retailers, of Mark J. Zbaracki on manufactured parts, or that of Olav Velthuis on the 
contemporary art market. Sandrine Barrey, « Formation et calcul des prix », art. cit.; Mark 
J. Zbaracki, ‘Pricing Structure and Structuring Price,’ art. cit.; Olav Velthuis, Talking 
Prices, op. cit.. 
161 
 
 
so that it can use a reflexive empiricism that describes and gives voice to 
professional practices and indigenous theories at work in price determination, as 
well as the way in which prices are produced by the socio-technical organisation 
or by all actors in a market or in a given organisation.   
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2. Revenue Management at American Airlines: Electronic Pricing 
Systems, the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, and the Making of an 
Industry 
 
The Deregulation of American Skies 
For a long time, a one-fare system was the traditional form of pricing in the airline 
industry. Fares remained broadly steady: each route and origin-destination was 
offered to the market by a given airline at a price set by the regulator. Bookings 
from passengers were carried out by phone or mail or through the intervention of 
travel agencies and were entered in the reservations systems on a space-available 
basis. Although at first the booking process could be very costly and time-
consuming, airlines had rapidly adopted computerized systems to store and retrieve 
information and efficiently process bookings since as long ago as the 1960s. Thus, 
with the advent of computerised reservations systems, the airline industry became 
the first industry to be fully equipped with computers.37 At the time of booking, 
operators were able to track virtually in real time the remaining capacity for each 
flight operated by the airline, and steer customers to a given direct or transit flight 
at a specific time and date of departure. If applicable, the reservations systems also 
enabled operators to edit or cancel bookings. Some fare adjustments were soon 
undertaken by airlines for a number of flights in international markets.38 
                                                     
37 On the history of reservations and distribution systems in the airline industry, see Duncan 
C. Copeland, Richard O. Mason, and James L. McKenney, ‘Sabre: The development of 
information-based competence and execution of information-based competition,’ IEEE 
Annals of the History of Computing, 17 (3), 1995, p. 30-57; Richard O. Mason and James 
L. McKenney, Waves of Change: Business Evolution through Information Technology, 
Cambridge MA, Harvard Business School Press, 1995; Duncan C. Copeland and James L. 
McKenney, ‘Airline Reservations Systems: Lessons from History,’ MIS Quarterly, 12 (3), 
1988, p. 353-370; Jon Eklund, ‘The Reservisor Automated Airline Reservation System: 
Combining Communications and Computing,’ IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 
16 (1), 1994, p. 62-69. 
38 The introduction of advance purchase excursion (APEX) fares in international markets 
enabled any passenger, regardless of age or group affiliation, to purchase air travel at a 
reduced price. These fares required advance purchase of a round-trip ticket and a minimum 
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Nevertheless, in this regulated context, customers navigated their way through the 
range of offers based on service convenience, and fares, albeit high, played a 
relatively minor role.  
Prior to deregulation in 1978, prices of plane tickets were subject to 
government control in the United States.39 All domestic interstate routes were 
regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), setting fares but also routes, 
schedules as well as market entrance of a new airline. The market was governed by 
a handful of large carriers, the so-called ‘majors.’ They benefited from legal 
monopoly on given routes. Profits were virtually guaranteed: fares were set by the 
CAB such that they ensured a reasonable rate of return for the carriers (the board 
applied the simple following formula: costs + reasonable return on investment = 
revenue requirement).40 Although increasing criticism arose over the excessive 
bureaucracy of the Board, even connivance between the Board and airlines, the 
trigger for authorities to act was the upheaval in the economic environment: the 
1973 oil crisis, leading to a rapid increase in prices of plane tickets. Given that this 
was clearly in the public eye, the ‘democratisation of air travel’ became a matter of 
concern for the federal government. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter appointed 
Alfred E. Kahn, professor of Political Economy at Cornell University, to be the 
chair of the CAB and undertake the deregulation of the airline industry—a feat that 
                                                     
length of stay at the destination point. This type of fare spread to North American markets 
in 1975 when American Airlines introduced its first ‘super-saver’ fares. Peter P. Belobaba, 
Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management, Doctoral Thesis, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1987, p. 13. 
It is these moves in fare policy that led, in the early 1970s, Kenneth Littlewood and other 
operational researchers at British Airways to start developing models to control ‘early bird’ 
discounts. Kenneth Littlewood, ‘Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings,’ Journal 
of Revenue and Pricing Management, 4 (2), 2005 [1972], p. 111-23.  
39 Stephen Paul Dempsey and Andrew R. Goetz, Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire 
Mythology, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992. 
40 Stephen Paul Dempsey and Andrew R. Goetz, ibid., p. 174. On the ‘full cost’ principle 
for price setting, see Robert L. Hall, and Charles J. Hitch, ‘Price Theory and Business 
Behaviour,’ Oxford Economic Papers, 2, 1939, p. 12-45. 
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earned him the title of the ‘Father of Airline Deregulation’. Contrary to 1938, when 
state intervention was meant to protect consumers from unbridled competition with 
a particular focus on security requirements, the purpose of the new bill, that was 
highly influenced by the neoliberal ideology of the time41, was to benefit the interest 
of consumers by advocating free and fair competition. The Airline Deregulation 
Act was passed on October 24, 1978. In particular it enabled airlines to set their 
fares and routes in utter freedom.42 
Revenue management, or yield management as it was often called at the 
time, emerged in the context of radical uncertainty elicited by airline deregulation.43 
The incumbents were rapidly faced with stiff competition from low-cost invaders 
creeping up everywhere.44 With the load factor (the percentage of seats filled by 
paying passengers and a key to measuring profit) decreasing, the majors went on 
                                                     
41 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
42 It is noteworthy that, in Europe, no significant measure of deregulation was taken before 
the mid-1980s. The first step towards airline deregulation was British Airways’s 
privatisation in 1986. A spate of total or partial denationalisations of several airlines then 
followed: Alitalia, KLM, Lufthansa, Sabena. In 1987, the European Commission issued a 
directive to accentuate liberalisation of European skies. In particular, it gave companies 
relative freedom to set their fares within a given price range. In 1997, the European airline 
industry was fully opened to competition.  
43 This brief history of revenue management systems essentially rests on the following two 
books written by veterans of the post-deregulation period: Robert G. Cross, Revenue 
Management, op. cit.; E. Andrew Boyd, The Future of Pricing, op. cit. 
44 The terminology ‘incumbents versus invaders’ is borrowed from the economic sociology 
of Neil Fligstein. In his work, Fligstein has sought to highlight the stabilisation or re-
stabilisation mechanisms of markets through which the actors will create or re-create stable 
worlds to avoid the devastating consequences of undue competition on prices. And it would 
certainly be of interest to look at the case of revenue management as a product of 
deregulation from the ‘conception of control’ perspective. See, for example, Neil Fligstein, 
The Transformation of Corporate Control, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1990; and, Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-
first-century Capitalist Societies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
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the offensive by cutting ticket prices. Yet, things did not improve: the load factor 
was up but yields (the amount of money the airline computes per passenger mile) 
were down, and revenues stagnated. With the low-fare airlines entering the market, 
the majors did not appeal anymore to a substantial price-sensitive segment of 
demand that slipped out of their control to the benefit of the low-cost companies. 
Even more serious was the threat of seeing their own clientele siphoned off by the 
invaders. The deflection came from the realisation that, although the low-cost 
companies had a permanent cost advantage, the additional seat sold on a given flight 
(or the marginal cost) was almost exactly zero both for major and low-cost airlines. 
This means the majors would have benefited from exhausting the remaining stock 
of empty seats at lower prices, while continuing to sell tickets at the same price to 
regular customers. The way to achieve this consisted in creating customer 
segmentation—typically ‘business’ and ‘leisure’ categories—and allocating a 
given number of priced seats for each of these segments.45 
Although other airlines were experimenting with similar ideas at the time, it 
is probably at American Airlines that the first technical solution to this problem was 
developed: the DINAMO (Dynamic Inventory Allocation and Maintenance 
Optimizer) system. In 1977, a limited number of low fares with restrictions for 
purchase—advanced purchase requirements, cancellation penalties, and so forth—
were offered by the company. In 1988, when the revenue management system was 
implemented in full, all flights were subjected to an electronic control of the 
availability of these special fares. The development of this system, of which the key 
stages have been detailed in Smith, Leimkuhler and Darrow (1992),46 articulates a 
series of arguments to justify this technical choice: the new system generates, 
                                                     
45 On the other hand, to ‘recapture’ business customers, or if one prefers to make them 
loyal, most majors launched at the same time frequent flyer programmes. Thus, these 
companies could control the market demand at both ends. Frank Cochoy, « Les Sciences 
du social et leur demande : le cas du marketing », Sciences de la Société, 49, 2000, p. 47-
61; Lucien Karpik, Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities, Nora Scott 
(trans.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010 [2007]. 
46 Barry C. Smith, John F. Leimkuhler and Ross M. Darrow, ‘Yield Management at 
American Airlines,’ art. cit. 
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according to the authors, quantifiable benefits in incremental revenue, increase 
airlines’ ability to survive price wars, and allows them to compete and succeed in 
an environment of stiff price competition.  
 
American Airlines versus People Express 
Many actors agree on the redoubtable capacity of revenue management systems and 
on the efficiency of their subversive action against competitors. Immediately after 
deregulation, many new airlines appeared, although most were small commuter 
lines. But even as early as the mid-1980s there had been a series of bankruptcies 
and mergers, and only a handful of large carriers remained.47 Revenue management 
played a part in this turnaround—at least it did if you believe the managerial 
literature. Revenue management referred not only to a pricing technology for 
enhancing revenue and profit; when used by the majors, it was seen as a 
comprehensive strategy for bypassing competition to dominate the market, rather 
than being ruled by it. 
This is best illustrated by the confrontation between American Airlines and 
People Express.48 Founded in 1980, People Express was a low-cost company which 
had expanded very rapidly by offering prices up to 70 percent lower than those of 
the major airlines. In 1986, it had become the fifth largest airlines in the United 
States, with nearly 160 airports served, 1 million passengers transported every 
month, and an annual revenue above 1.2 billion euros. By bringing air 
transportation to the masses and by making money in doing it, People Express had 
essentially fulfilled the mission of the promoters of deregulation. So Alfred Kahn 
trumpeted in the Business column of the Time, dated 13 January 1986: ‘People 
Express is clearly the archetypical deregulation success story and the most 
                                                     
47 On the phenomenon of concentration following the deregulation of airlines in the United 
States, see Stephen Paul Dempsey, Andrew R. Goetz, Airline Deregulation and Laissez-
Faire Mythology, op. cit., p. 221-42. 
48 ‘Case Study: The Attack of the Laser Fares,’ in Robert G. Cross, Revenue Management, 
op. cit., p. 99-130. 
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spectacular of my babies. It is the case that makes me the proudest.’49 Nevertheless, 
by the end of 1986, People Express was taken over by one of its competitors, after 
having suffered record losses of 345 million dollars during the year.  
We were a vibrant, profitable company from 1981 to 1985, and then we tipped right 
over into losing $50 million a month. We were still the same company. …  What 
changed was American’s ability to do widespread yield management in every one 
of our markets. We had been profitable from the day we started until American 
came at us with Ultimate Super Savers [the new pricing strategy introduced by 
American Airlines in 1984]. That was the end of our run because they were able to 
underprice us at will, and surreptitiously. 
Obviously People Express failed. … We did a lot of things right. But we didn’t get 
our hands around Yield Management and automation issues. … [If I were to do it 
again,] the number one priority on my list every day would be to see that my people 
got the best information technology tools. In my view, that’s what drives airline 
revenues today more than any other factor—more than service, more than planes, 
more than routes.50 
This is how Donald Burr, founder and ex-president of People Express, famously 
explained the reason for the demise of the company. For him, it was because of 
these sophisticated computer programmes, which allowed the large airlines such as 
American Airlines to manage yield to fill empty seats at People Express ticket 
                                                     
49 Charles P. Alexander, ‘Super Savings in the Skies,’ Time, 127, January 13, 1986, at 40, 
41 (Kahn quote). Six months later, when People Express was on the verge of bankruptcy, 
a reporter of the New York Times quoted Kahn as expressing a rather different view: 
‘United, American and other major, full service airlines’ … ‘developed very sophisticated, 
computerized scheduling programs, which have enabled them to determine how many seats 
on each flight are likely to go unsold at normal fares but might be filled if they offer a steep 
discount.’ … ‘Thus, it appears the People Express model of offering uniform, low fares 
with no restrictions cannot survive. And I am pessimistic about new companies being able 
to compete successfully by offering uniform low fares to everybody without discriminating 
among different travellers and without imposing such restrictions as advance purchase or 
cancellation penalties.’ Steven Prokesch, ‘People Express: A Case Study,’ New York Times, 
July 6, 1986, at 3-1, col. 3. 
50 Robert G. Cross, Revenue Management, op. cit., p. 125 and 129. 
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prices. Although this explanation has little basis in fact,51 it has been a mainstay of 
revenue management history textbooks for generations.  
The ‘People Express versus American Airlines’ episode represents a sort of 
‘mythological fight between Good and Evil.’52 His quasi-messianic mission to 
‘democratise’ air travel by offering cheaper-than-driving tickets and his heterodox 
practices in management reminiscent of those of today’s digital start-ups had 
contributed to Donald Burr’s public image as a hero of the drama. Against him, 
Robert L. Crandall, then president of American’s parent, the AMR Corporation, 
had been cast in the role of the perfect villain. ‘His tough stance on union wages, 
his bare-knuckled price-cutting and his proclivity for salty phrases,’ as one 
journalist of the New York Times noted, added to a murky affair of price-fixing in 
1982, had indeed earned him a sulphurous reputation.53 One can easily see the moral 
effects that such an account can imply and how the revenue management systems 
are invested with a sort of diabolical efficacy in a story like this. Here is an example 
that, according to some actors, constituted a real scandal in the eyes of carriers: 
charging different prices to different people for the same service. At People 
Express, and at most of its competitors for this matter, a certain conception required 
that ‘in an attempt to be fair with all passengers,’ airlines had to offer ‘the same 
price to everybody on the plane’54 (although almost all also applied peak and off-
                                                     
51 Stephen P. Demsey and Andrew R. Goetz have critically assessed airline deregulation. 
In particular, they have pointed out that People Express’s primitive yield and capacity 
management system was but one of many reasons behind the company’s failure. Other 
factors include: a flagrant undercapitalisation, immoderate and hasty expansion, ‘cultlike 
corporate culture,’ inexperienced staff and chaotic management systems, and poor and 
undependable service. Stephen Paul Dempsey, Andrew R. Goetz, Airline Deregulation and 
Laissez-Faire Mythology, op. cit., p. 92. 
52 Roland Barthes, ‘The World of Wrestling,’ in Mythologies, Annette Lavers (trans.), New 
York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1972 [1957], p. 15-25, p. 23 (quote). 
53 Thomas C. Hayes, ‘American Joins the Low-Cost Ranks,’ New York Times, December 
8, 1985, at 8F. 
54 Robert G. Cross, Revenue Management, op. cit., p. 103. 
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peak fares at the time). With revenue management, ‘the $1,000 passenger’ could be 
‘sitting next to the $100 passenger on the same airplane,’55 which implies a quite 
different understanding of what is acceptable and what is not.56 For all that it offers 
a gripping illustration of the efficacy of this pricing technology, it should also be 
noted the first days of revenue management systems are invariably told by people 
who have an objective interest in telling the story in these terms. They are 
professionals and other consultants working for or academics maintaining strong 
ties with the industry, in particular companies providing revenue and pricing 
software. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
55 Robert G. Cross, ibid., p. 121-2. 
56 As in all such accounts, it is recognised, in spite of their fallibility, the moral capacities 
of the different actors involved in organisational decision-making, unlike for the passengers 
whose behaviours are reduced to mere consumption: ‘[The People Express’s managers] 
hoped that there would be backlash from the public. They mistakenly believed that the 
public would not tolerate variables prices on the same plane. “We kept saying that the 
customers won’t put up with this,” recalls Burr. “They will revolt. American’s not going to 
be able to do it”.’ … ‘They just couldn’t believe that the $1,000 passenger would tolerate 
sitting next to the $100 passenger on the same airplane. They were wrong.’ Robert G. 
Cross, ibid., p. 121-2. 
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Figure II.1.1. People Express President, Donald Burr, was Time’s cover on January 13, 
1986. 
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Technologies of Pricing: The Making of an Industry  
The technology of American Airlines has evolved since the 1980s, at the pace of 
institutional change. In 1988, AADT (American Airlines Decision Technologies) 
was formed with a clear commercial purpose: it was even considered from 1996 as 
a legal entity, whose activities were focused on developing, managing, promoting, 
and exporting its technology, and in particular its DINAMO system.57 By the mid-
1990s, AADT joined The SABRE Group and SABRE Development Services 
(which provided all applications development), AMR Information Services (which 
marketed SABRE and American Airlines legacy systems externally), SABRE 
Computer Services (which provided the data centre, communications network, and 
desktop support for American Airlines and the travel distribution business), and 
AADT merged into one organisation, which became known as SABRE Technology 
Solutions, creating a comprehensive information technology solutions division. 
DINAMO became a product per se, which could be marketed. It was exported to 
other airlines (contracts with, among others, Qantas Airways in Australia and 
Lufthansa in Germany) and versions were devised for other industries: for railways, 
such as Amtrak in the United States and SNCF in France, hotels, with Hyatt Hotels 
in the United States and Club Med in France, and cruise lines such as Royal 
Caribbean International in Norway. A market for revenue management systems 
emerged, characterised either by technological competition or strategic 
cooperation.58 
Pricing became, in this new environment, a strategic issue. It was a question 
of allowing much greater flexibility in offering a variety of products for sale, 
maintaining market share by offering low fares that stimulate additional traffic, 
limiting revenue dilution by restricting the availability of these fares on flights that 
                                                     
57 Thomas M. Cook, ‘SABRE soars,’ OR/MS Today, 25 (3), 1998, p. 26-31; Peter Horner, 
‘The Sabre Story: the Making of OR Magic at AMR,’ OR/MS Today, June 2000, p. 46-7. 
58 A good example of such cooperative efforts is the MIT/PODS Revenue Management 
Research Consortium (see later on in this essay). For a review of technical solutions that 
were available at the turn of the 1990s, see Sylvain Daudel and Georges Vialle, Yield 
management: Applications to Air Transport and Other Service Industries, Paris: Presses 
de l’Institut du Transport Aérien, 1994. 
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have substantial high-value demand, and, ultimately, enhancing revenue, and thus 
profits, by optimising the price and availability of products. These objectives were 
addressed through numerous technical innovations and adjustments, giving each 
system its own character. 
In the following, I will not deal with all the many and varied technical 
elements devised to determine the optimal price in the case of the American 
Airlines’ system: overbooking levels (to compensate for passenger cancellations 
and no-shows), virtual nesting (to cluster the market/fare classes into a small 
number of similarly valued groupings called buckets, reducing the inventory 
controls to a manageable number), booking valuation (to determine an effective 
revenue for each market/fare class based on the fare and the probability that a 
connecting passenger will displace local traffic on each segment of the routing; 
default indexing to optimally determine the default table items), passenger 
preferences modelling (to estimate a passenger utility function), demand forecast 
monitoring (to flag biased forecast), critical flight identification (to identify flights 
requiring manual review, either because the input data are in error or because of 
special circumstances, such as a major sporting event or public holiday), index 
monitoring (to report on virtual nesting and to flag market/fare classes that should 
be re-indexed), revenue opportunity modelling (to measure overall yield-
management performance), etc. Instead, I have chosen to focus on one particular 
aspect of the revenue management system, namely: the very mechanism governing 
the search for the right price, the process of determining the number of discount 
fares to offer on a flight.59 
 
Adjusting Seat Inventory and Prices: Ascendant or Unrestricted 
To find the price that maximises revenue, American Airlines’ algorithm was 
required to solve two separate problems: that of determining the number of discount 
fares to offer on a flight; and that of controlling the availability of these discount 
fares. With only two fares available—full and discount—and when discount fares 
                                                     
59 Barry C. Smith, John F. Leimkuhler, Ross M. Darrow, ‘Yield Management at American 
Airlines,’ op. cit., p. 13-6. 
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are first offered,60 the solution of the first problem is simple: the decision to accept 
or reject the next (or marginal) request for a discount seat determines the number 
of discount fares offered for sale. If the company accepts a discount request, the 
revenue it earns is the discount fare. If it rejects the discount request, two outcomes 
are possible: it may result either in an additional empty seat and no additional 
revenue or in a sale of the remaining seat to a full-fare passenger. In other words, 
the decision to accept or reject a discount request depends on the probability p of 
getting the full fare when a discount is rejected, a probability which is determined 
by several factors including the number of remaining available seats and the 
distribution of demand. The algorithm compared the value of p to the ratio of the 
discount fare to the full fare: a discount seat request was rejected if (p) ($full fare) 
> ($discount fare). This algorithmic expression is known as ‘Littlewood’s rule’.61 
Although it becomes more complicated, the problem of determining 
discount allocation for more than two fare classes is similar. American’s approach 
was still to weigh the marginal value of a fare request against the marginal value of 
all other fares. It considers the same variables discussed above, but includes the 
                                                     
60 It is indeed a general idea in the airline industry that the low-revenue passengers tend to 
book earlier than high-revenue passengers. This idea—which, as I have noted first-hand, is 
not self-evident—is assumed in the algorithm.   
61 Kenneth Littlewood, ‘Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings,’ art. cit., p. 118-
21.  
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values for each fare type.62 This problem is formulated in the literature as a dynamic 
programme.63 
Once the number of discount fares had been determined, the algorithm was 
required to solve the second problem: the control of the availability for each 
discount class through a process known as nesting. Nesting is used to make subsets 
of the seats available to various levels of discount, where each nested fare class is 
a subset of the next higher fare class. Indeed, if the fare classes are controlled 
independently, it would be possible to sell a low-revenue booking and 
simultaneously turn away a high-revenue passenger. In this process of discount 
allocation, the algorithm observes a fundamental priority: ensuring that a low-value 
seat is never available when a higher-valued fare is closed. This means that 
forecasting too much demand in a higher-revenue class causes poor discount 
allocation only for lower-revenue classes. If all of the high-value demand does not 
occur, a second priority can intervene: minimising the number of empty seats on a 
given flight (bookings protected for high-value customers can be made available to 
lower-value customers). Other ancillary priorities can come into play if ever, for 
example, the company faces a large number of cancellations. 
Because future expected demand depends on the length of time until 
departure, the discount allocation decision is updated at regular intervals. Yet, it is 
likely that a fare that has been closed to additional sales may need to be reopened 
                                                     
62 A separate marginal expected revenue function existed for each fare class. (These 
functions were shaped as logistic curves, which means that the incremental revenue from 
one additional seat decreases as the number of reservations offered increases.) The point at 
which the marginal value of the full fare is equal to the marginal value of the moderately 
discounted fare is the optimal number of reservations to protect for full-fare passengers and 
withhold from any discount passengers. If there are three fare-types only (full, moderate 
discount, and deep discount), then the point at which the marginal value of the marginal 
value of the moderately discounted fare is equal to the marginal value of the deeply 
discounted fare represents the total number of reservations to allocate to full-fare and 
moderate-discount passengers and withhold from sale to deep-discount passengers.  
63 Kalyan T. Talluri, Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue 
Management, Berlin: Springer Science + Business Media, 2004, p. 36-7. 
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due to a sudden change in demand: a price decrease would follow a price increase 
(and so forth). The algorithm then needs to solve a problem of fairness. Indeed, I 
have identified two possibilities that seem to bring into opposition two different 
ideas of fairness. One of the differences between the DINAMO system and its 
railway version, the SOCRATE (Système offrant à la clientèle des réservations 
d'affaires et de tourisme en Europe) system, as it was implemented at the SNCF in 
France,64 is precisely the logic of this algorithm for discount seat allocation.  
The SNCF’s system applies the principle of ‘ascendant revenue 
management’: the amount of time before departure then plays a crucial role and the 
bookings are sold in strict order of revenue generated by each fare class (the lower-
valued discount classes are closed first, and cannot be reopened). The same did not 
apply for the DINAMO system, of which the discount allocation algorithm could 
be rather described as ‘unrestricted revenue management’: the fare classes could be 
closed and reopened at will, and in any order, independently of the length of time 
before departure. The system allowed, for example, the possibility of making deep-
discount seats available for sale a few days before departure to sell off the remaining 
seats on a flight. The ascendant revenue management at the SNCF was programmed 
in this way, according to people in charge, for ‘political reasons’: the aim was to 
maintain a certain coherence between the marketing communication actions and the 
group’s pricing strategy. The often abstruse and confusing nature of the new 
revenue management strategy allowed a deviation from the self-imposed rule 
                                                     
64 Jean Finez, « La construction des prix à la SNCF, une socio-histoire de la tarification. 
De la péréquation au yield management (1938-2012) », Revue française de sociologie, 55 
(1), 2014, p. 5-39. See also, Gilles Dumont, Innovation organisationnelle et résistance au 
changement : l'introduction du système Socrate à la SNCF, Master Thesis in 
Administrative Sciences, Paris, Université Panthéon-Assas—Paris II, 1996; Nathalie N. 
Mitev, ‘The globalisation of transport? Computerised reservation systems at American 
Airlines and French Railways,’ in Peter Lyth and Helmuth Trischler (eds.), Wiring 
Prometheus: Globalisation, History and Technology, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 
2004, p. 187-210; Nathalie N. Mitev, ‘Trains, planes and computers: from high-speed trains 
to computerised reservation systems at French railways,’ Journal of transport history, 25 
(2), 2004, p.101-23. 
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whereby the fairness of pricing is achieved by the direction of price changes: ‘The 
earlier you book, the more you save,’65 the advertisements said. The new system 
had been subject, since its full implementation in 1993, to criticism by the public, 
politicians, and in the press. This culminated in an information report submitted to 
the French parliament in 2008, which enjoined the national railway to clarify its 
pricing policy.66 It was around this time that the ‘the earlier the cheaper’ rule was 
incorporated in the SNCF’s algorithm. ‘It is a commitment; incidentally the 
computer system is programmed to block any low-fare re-openings,’ assured the 
director of the SNCF’s revenue management department to the reporters of Le 
Monde in April 2011.67 Moreover, the absence of restrictions in the movement of 
prices acted as an incentive for customers to postpone their purchases until the last 
moment of the booking period, with the adverse consequences which this entails in 
terms of demand forecasting (lack of visibility) and discount control (high 
volatility).  
It is easy to recognise, beyond the mere function, the moral effects that a 
technical device can imply by what it authorises. It is clear, for example, how 
certain practices in price setting have ceased to exist in an environment such as the 
SNCF. Here is an example that, according to some actors, marked the transition in 
the minds of revenue management analysts: ‘going back’ was no longer possible 
after a fare class had been closed. With the DINAMO system, due to the absence 
of limitations in price changes, if a mistake had been made (too many seats had 
been protected for higher-valued fare classes), there was nothing that could prevent 
                                                     
65 SNCF, « SNCF découverte : rêve Prem’s », Partizan Midi Minuit, 19 May 2003 [online]. 
http://www.ina.fr/video/PUB2416360067/sncf-decouverte-reve-prem-s-video.html 
[consulted on 5 May 2017] 
66 Assemblée Nationale, 2008, Rapport d’information sur la politique tarifaire de la SNCF, 
1161, Hervé Mariton, Paris, Assemblée Nationale, 15 October 2008. 
67 Jean-Michel Normand, « Voyager à tous prix : la fabrique des tarifs », Le Monde 
Magazine, 8 April 2011. In other instances, however, the SNCF admitted that deep-
discount seats could be made available for sales again when faced with a large number of 
cancellations.  
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the revenue management analyst from correcting the discount allocation decision. 
At the SNCF, a fare class closed was a fare class closed, which implies a quite 
different form of exposure to errors. It is now easy to see how the algorithm 
represents an orderly disposition of the market, a computing configuration with 
some moral properties that ensure the fairness of pricing. There are, as I have 
pointed out, two conceptions of fairness which correspond to two algorithmic 
solutions for determining discount seat allocation—namely, the ascendant revenue 
management and the unrestricted revenue management. The first focuses on the 
scope in price changes, the rational nexus between the service offered and its price 
in order to re-establish trust between the public company and its users. The second 
conception, devoid of any social ambition, makes no statement about equity, but 
rather seems to be the result of the application of Pareto efficiency to the discount 
allocation decision.  
The American Airlines approach was not optimal, as the authors themselves 
recognise.68 This property is of central concern to many actors in the industry. And 
the notion of optimality does not refer here only to the benefits in terms of revenue 
or cost savings to companies. It is understood above all as a mathematical 
property.69 For lack of finding the right price, what a heuristic allows compared to 
an optimal solution is at once a temporal reduction and a spatial enlargement. In 
terms of time, the use of a heuristic for determining discount allocation has two 
aspects. First, where there is no optimal solution readily available—which was the 
case at the time when American Airlines began to develop its revenue management 
system—it may be profitable to use a heuristic. Such an approximate solution is 
indeed often used in situations, such as a business setting, where time constraints 
                                                     
68 Barry C. Smith, John F. Leimkuhler, Ross M. Darrow, ‘Yield Management at American 
Airlines,’ op. cit., p. 16. 
69 It seems to me that the issue of optimality and its application in the economic sphere and 
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in the case of telecommunication traffic in France, see Alexandra Bidet, « Quatre mesures 
du téléphone : L'invention d'une gestion téléphonique », Economies et sociétés, série AB 
« économie du travail », ISMEA, 25, 2005, p. 601-24.  
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force an approach in which faster application development is given priority over 
full functionality and performance. Second, by reducing the overall complexity of 
a problem, a heuristic can result in execution time gain over the optimal solution. 
This is of particular importance in this context, and given the limitations of 
computational performance at the time, where the discount allocation decision is 
updated on a regular basis (along with the overbooking level). In terms of space, 
now, AADT may want to use a heuristic because other aspects of the problem, 
specific to an organisation or an industry, can easily be incorporated while 
maintaining computational efficiency. By effectively reducing a large problem into 
smaller and more manageable sub-problems, the marginal revenue approach for 
determining seat allocation makes the American Airlines system more flexible and 
thus more adaptable to other business settings. Nevertheless, I will now show how 
central the notion of optimality remains and how the technical device expresses a 
certain utopia of accuracy. 
I have focused on a specific case: that of American Airlines. We have seen 
the circumstances that allowed the company to establish itself as a key figure in the 
field of revenue management, and thus to position itself favourably in the nascent 
industry of dynamic pricing systems. We have seen, in the case of the SNCF, some 
moral issues involved by these tools when it comes to solving the problem of 
determining the number of discount seats and that of allocating these fares. We have 
seen how the pricing process characteristic of revenue management articulates in a 
pragmatic way a series of arguments on price optimality: prices now require to be 
subject to a whole work of adjustment and technical compromises. I propose to 
pursue this exploration further in two directions. First of all, by analysing the 
theoretical arguments which are mobilised to promote the methods of revenue 
management. Second of all, by examining the way in which these arguments are 
summoned in a concrete situation: the development of a revenue and pricing 
management system for hotel properties.  
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3. The Economic Representations of Price Setting: Scientific Rhetoric 
and Optimality of Prices  
 
To understand the economic representations surrounding these pricing tools, I have 
chosen to delve into a number of texts, taken from the vast literature in operational 
research, which have directly addressed the issue of revenue and pricing 
management. Operational research—also called management science—has its 
origins in the Second World War period, in the planning activities of the Allied 
armed forces requiring the integration of multiple capacities (equipment, tactics, 
and logistics) into combat.70 It started to constitute a distinct discipline in the 1950s 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, the main applications being in 
transportation management, inter-industry exchange modelling (input-output 
analysis) and resource allocation (activity analysis), and has evolved since then in 
parallel with the computerisation of the economy. Close to the concerns of game 
theory and industrial economics—although more empirically oriented—operational 
research represents a vast field of theories and practices, which explicitly aims at 
mathematizing social issues, rationalising organisational processes, and 
rationalising human behaviours too. The major notion is that of ‘optimality’: 
optimising defence by making the best use of available means had been the concern 
of operational research and logistics in wartime; maximising utilities and profits, 
minimising risks and costs, optimising resource allocations were the objectives of 
the post-war years. Optimality was already a major element of the programme of 
the marginalists in economics, but it was exclusively based on an analytical and 
variational form. It takes on a new form here, more algorithmic and combinatorial.  
In past decades, revenue management has established itself as one of the 
central research subjects in the field of operational research. The Institute for 
Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), an international 
society for practitioners and specialists in operational research and a key actor in 
                                                     
70 William Thomas, Rational Action: The Science of Policy in Britain and America, 1940-
1960, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015. On the post-war economics and the birth of game 
theory, see also Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science, 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
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knowledge dissemination in operational research, played a decisive role in this 
process.71 In 1998, it formed a specific body within it to promote revenue 
management, by the organisation of a two-day annual conference on the topics of 
revenue management and pricing and via the creation of a number of prizes to 
reward critical contributions to the field, and to disseminate revenue management 
principles and methods to students in higher education, business schools in 
particular.72 In 2002, INFORMS started, as a result of the growing appreciation of 
the subject, the publication of the Journal of Pricing and Revenue Management 
and, in 2004, it awarded its first annual section prize, the INFORMS Revenue 
Management and Pricing Section Prize, to the reference handbook on The Theory 
and Practice of Revenue Management, which provides a comprehensive overview 
of nearly 600 references on the topic.73 I will now examine successively the content 
of two of the best known contributions in this academic field that directly address 
the issue of revenue management: the seminal paper of Kenneth Littlewood and the 
proposition of Peter P. Belobaba for the seat inventory control problem.74 
 
First Concept: Littlewood’s Rule 
The paper of Littlewood on the discount seat allocation problem was presented at 
the 12th AGIFORS (Airline Group of the International Federation of Operational 
                                                     
71 https://www.informs.org/ [consulted on 5 May 2017] 
72 Robert L. Phillips, ‘Teaching Pricing and Revenue Optimization,’ INFORMS 
Transactions on Education, 4 (1), 2006, p. 1-10. 
73 Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue 
Management, op. cit. 
74 Both contributions received the Revenue Management and Pricing Section Historical 
Prize awarded of INFORMS, in 2004 and 2006 respectively. Kenneth Littlewood, 
‘Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings,’ art. cit.; Peter P. Belobaba, Air Travel 
Demand and Airline Inventory Seat Inventory Management, op. cit.; Peter P. Belobaba, 
‘Airline Yield Management: An Overview of Seat Inventory Control,’ Transportation 
Science, 21 (2), 1987, p. 63-73; Peter P. Belobaba, ‘Application of a Probabilistic Decision 
Model to Airline Seat Inventory Control,’ Operations Research, 37 (2), 1989, p. 183-97. 
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Research Societies) Symposium in October 1972. At the time, the deregulation of 
the airline industry was not on the agenda yet, which gives to this text a certain 
precursory status. The starting point is the recognition that reservations systems are 
not only record-keeping devices but that the data collected by them can be used to 
make for-profit decisions (in accountancy terms, they can be considered as a profit 
centre rather than a cost centre):   
The introduction of sophisticated computer reservations systems provides an 
important source of data for various operational research studies. This paper will 
demonstrate how the Operational Research Branch in BOAC [British Overseas 
Airways Corporation] has used the information from the BOADICEA reservations 
system to help in maximising yield by flight.75 
The main argument is simple. It refers to the control and management of the 
reservations inventory and how to increase (to maximise, if possible) company 
profitability. When all passengers on an airplane are paying the same fare, 
overbooking provides the complete booking control policy. In the early 1970s, 
airlines, like BOAC, began offering advance purchase excursion (APEX) fares in 
international markets—Littlewood also mentions the use of discount fares when 
dealing with categories such as groups or staff. Because fares differ, airlines should 
now control availability according to the fare paid. The basic principle is that of 
maximising the revenue received on a particular flight rather than maximising the 
number of passengers carried. This innovation is justified by the idea that price 
adjustments ensure a certain economic efficiency: 
Surveys indicate that there is a strong tendency for low-yield passengers to book 
earlier than high-yield passengers. If reservations are accepted on a ‘first come first 
served’ basis, the low-yield passenger will therefore get a higher standard of 
service [defined as the probability that a passenger gets a reservation on the first 
flight of her choice] than will the high-yield passenger. This situation is probably 
neither in the airlines’ nor the passengers’ interest. If the acceptance of a low-yield 
passenger results in the subsequent rejections of a high-yield passenger, the airline 
loses revenue. There is evidence also that standard of service is more important to 
the high-yield passenger. The low-yield passenger is probably much more prepared 
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to be directed towards those flights on which the airline would prefer him to fly. 
All these arguments demonstrate the desirability of having a method of controlling 
low-yield fares.76 
It is easy to recognise here some of the basic elements of welfare economics. 
It is noteworthy how simplified this argument is: in spite of some empirical 
allusions, Littlewood uses no technical explanations nor authoritative references. In 
fact, Littlewood expresses an intuition that is self-evident as long as one considers 
the market from a neoclassical perspective: the allocation thus determined 
approaches a Pareto optimal allocation since it has been possible to improve the 
situation of certain actors (airline and low-revenue passengers) without causing a 
deterioration in that of the others (high-revenue passengers).  
Littlewood acknowledges that significant obstacles associated with the 
implementation of the presented methods of passenger forecasting and revenue 
control remained—particularly the fact that very few fare types were actually 
recognised at reservation time and that the revenue improvement observed was not 
so great. Nevertheless, his paper is considered a seminal work in the field of revenue 
management and it established the foundations for many of the yield control models 
which have been subsequently developed.  
 
Second Concept: Expected Marginal Seat Revenue 
The proposition of Belobaba was formulated after airline deregulation, at a time 
when the practice of charging different prices for identical seats on the same aircraft 
flight was widespread in airlines. It first appeared in a doctoral thesis, written in the 
mid-1980s within the Flight Transportation Laboratory and the Department of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics of MIT77 and submitted in 1987, which then led to 
the publication of two distinct articles in 1987 and 1989. 
The first paper can be reviewed more quickly. It gives an indication of the 
development of the mathematical models in terms of accuracy and in terms of what 
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had been made possible by the advances in computer technology. In particular, the 
findings of a survey conducted between August and December 1984 of 
representatives of eight North American airlines are discussed. Here is what the 
author concludes about the seat inventory control practices of the time:  
The least advanced aspect of yield management and seat inventory control at all of 
the airlines surveyed is that of booking limit adjustment to maximise flight 
revenues. This task is the most important component of seat inventory control, yet 
it remains dependent on human judgment rather than systemic analysis. When an 
airline’s reservations monitoring system flags a flight for which actual bookings 
approach any one of the limits or the threshold set for that flight, a decision must 
be made either to increase the availability of seats in the relevant fare class or to 
allow the system to close it down to additional reservations. This decision is 
currently being made by individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of 
experience and judgment at every airline surveyed, although the ongoing 
development of decision support tools is designed to reduce the amount of 
guesswork involved.78 
What is of interest here is the link between the argument of optimal booking 
limits and that of the demotion of human judgment. From the practitioners’ point 
of view, the argumentation of Belobaba may not appear very sensible—in particular 
for the seat inventory controllers, because it amounts to denying their expertise. 
From an economic perspective, however, it is very clear. This issue is optimality, 
that is, the ability to set and adjust fare class booking limits so that supply equates 
demand. The automation of the seat inventory control function is, according to the 
author, necessary to achieve this economic equilibrium: changes in the marketplace 
which can impact customer demand have to be immediately reflected on the 
company’s fares; sophisticated mathematical methods are used to determine the 
optimal seat allocation for a particular flight; the fare class booking limits are the 
outcome of a dynamic process in which decisions are made on a consistent basis 
through procedures established in the algorithm, which allows for evaluations and 
improvements. The machine is considered to be in a better position than the fickle 
contribution of human actors to reinforce these relationships. The proposition of 
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Belobaba remains moderate, despite everything, as it preserves a function for the 
human agents in the seat inventory control process:  
Such algorithms will not eliminate the need for human judgment in seat inventory 
control entirely since any optimal solution would be probabilistic in nature and 
would be derived from forecasts based on historical data. There will always be 
variables that cannot be accounted for in such algorithms, including rapid changes 
in the competitive environment of airline markets and the occurrence of unexpected 
events that affect flight bookings. The objective in developing optimization models 
for seat inventory control is to allow yield management agents to focus their efforts 
on these variables by making routine tasks more systematic.79  
At this stage in the development of revenue management systems—in 
1984—algorithms for finding the fare class booking limits were still in the planning 
phase. In the second half of the 1980s, airlines began implementing these tools. The 
device proposed in 1989 by Belobaba, the Automatic Booking Limit System 
(ABLS), is part and parcel of the debate on the automation of the seat inventory 
control function. It is a computerised system, which makes use of the famous 
Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) decision model, to set and revise 
booking limits periodically prior to flight departure. The objective is the same as in 
the previous proposition: developing a revenue management system which 
increases economic efficiency and minimises the allocation errors in finding the 
optimal seat protection levels. ABLS was developed and implemented at Western 
Airlines during 1986, and the revenue impact of this automated approach was tested 
during the first three months of 1987—the purchase of Western by Delta Air Lines 
that same year brought an end to the ABLS experience.  
As implemented at Western Airlines, ABLS established a division of work 
between the machine and its user. The computer provided the analysts with specific 
recommendations of what the fare class booking limits should be, based on a 
systematic evaluation of the input data (expected demand for each fare class and 
average revenue associated with each class). If the analyst agreed with the 
recommended limits, these were loaded into the reservations system. If not, the 
analyst could override the recommendations manually. Indeed, due to many 
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imperfections in the system by the end of 1986, ABLS was designed to allow 
analyst intervention where revenue potential was thought to be significant and 
where estimates of the future revenue or demand were not valid.  
 
Heuristics versus Optimal Models: A Rhetorical Partition 
The seat inventory control problem has become, since then, the subject of 
intense discussions among academics and practitioners, and Belobaba’s EMSR 
constitutes a fundamental reference point in this debate. ‘Interestingly, the 
deficiencies in that paper were part of the reason academics got involved in the 
topic,’ explains one of the authors of the reference handbook on revenue 
management. ‘It was clear that the kind of results Belobaba was publishing wasn’t 
the optimal policy, that wasn’t the optimal way to manage the system. So there was 
a flowering of papers that appeared after that, basically through more rigorist 
methods proving what the optimal policy for this particular problem was’ 
(Interview, 17 July 2012). 
What emerged was a ‘producers’ market,’ as understood by Harrison C. 
White, in which scholars will seek market niches to maximise reputation and 
minimise competition.80 The field of revenue management thus grew in new 
directions according to scholars’ own interests and sensitivities: basic or applied 
research, airlines or other industries, teaching or research activities, ‘knowledge for 
knowledge’ or consulting, positive or normative, etc. What we see is an 
enlargement as well as a scattering of the discipline, starting in the late 1980s. 
Somewhat schematically, it can be said that, since then, revenue management has 
been divided into two main areas of expertise: a more practical and organisation- 
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and industry-oriented approach developed by Belobaba at MIT (or Sheryl E. Kimes 
at Cornell on the hotel industry); and a more theoretical and normative approach, 
of which the models bloat the handbook of Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van 
Ryzin, and the aim is to find optimal solutions to the seat inventory control problem, 
rather than heuristics.81 Mise en avant par ces derniers auteurs, cette division 
théorique est, en réalité, une opération rhétorique.82  
The proposition of Belobaba falls into this first category, according to which 
solving the seat inventory control problem is a case of integrating and to ensuring 
consistency between distinct tools, rather than a unique optimal mechanism. Yet, 
despite not being mathematically optimal, the EMRS models have been widely used 
in practice. One actor in the field confirms: ‘Most airline, hotel, rental car and cruise 
line revenue management systems currently in use today utilise EMSRa, EMSRb 
or some variant thereof in determining booking limits.’83 I will briefly outline some 
of the main reasons for this state of affairs. I will borrow the first two from Talluri 
and van Ryzin. Here is what explains, according to them, the lack of success of 
exact optimisation models among practitioners: 
The first is simply a case of practice being one step ahead of the underlying theory. 
As mentioned, in the airline industry the practice of using capacity controls to 
manage multiple classes quickly gained popularity following deregulation in the 
mid-1970s. But this predates the theory of optimal controls by more than a decade. 
The only known optimal controls in the 1970s were Littlewood’s results for the 
two-class problem. As a result, heuristics were developed for the general n-class 
problem. During the decade following deregulation, RM software embedded these 
heuristics, and people grew accustomed to thinking in terms of them. The inertia 
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generated from this early use of the heuristics is one reason for their continued 
popularity today. 84 
What the authors highlight here is a well-known phenomenon to 
institutional economists, namely path dependency: decisions taken at the beginning 
of the period channel subsequent developments in a certain direction.85 The second 
reason is the received idea whereby the development and implementation of optimal 
models in the system represents significant costs (although, the authors claim, these 
costs are not as high as some would say): 
Heuristics are also widely used because they are simpler to code, quicker to run, 
and generate revenues that in many cases are close to optimal. Indeed, many 
practitioners in the airline industry simply believe that even the modest effort of 
computing optimal controls is not worth the benefit they provide in improved 
revenue performance. Proponents of heuristics argue that the potential 
improvement from getting better revenue data and improving demand forecasts 
swamps the gains from using optimal controls—reflecting the philosophy that it is 
better to be ‘approximately right’ than it is to be ‘precisely wrong.’ 
While these points are well taken, such criticisms are somewhat misdirected. For 
starters, using optimal controls does not mean one has to give up on improvements 
in other areas, such as forecasting. These activities are not mutually exclusive, 
though an understaffed development group might very well consider refining 
optimization modules a low-priority task. Yet given the very modest cost of coding 
and computing optimal controls, the strong objections to the use of optimal controls 
are often not entirely rational.86 
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86 Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, ibid., p. 45. 
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The sociology of translation indicates a third factor for the success of EMSR 
models. To be successful, these models had to have a ‘good spokesman.’87 After 
his dissertation in 1987, Belobaba continued at the Flight Transportation Laboratory 
of MIT concurrently with his consulting activities: first at Delta Air Lines, which 
purchased Western Airlines; then at other carriers and some software companies.88 
It is noteworthy that, beyond this classic form of consulting, he could rely on what 
became to be known as the MIT/PODS Revenue Management Research 
Consortium.89 With an initial membership of Continental, Northwest, KLM, SAS, 
Lufthansa and Swissair, this research consortium was launched in 1999 to make 
airlines benefit from the insights and experience gained through the development 
of the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator, or PODS. PODS began to be 
developed at Boeing and MIT (with Belobaba) in the mid-1990s and has evolved 
in parallel with technology in revenue management. The objective of this integrated 
simulation is to simulate and test the impact of revenue management systems on 
some airlines’ key performance indicators (such as market shares, load factors, and 
revenues).90 It is likely that the singular position Belobaba occupies, midway 
                                                     
87 Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, « À quoi tient le succès des 
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between the academic and business worlds, with what this entails in terms of 
interpersonal networking, has fostered the dissemination and implementation of 
EMSR models in organisations. The automation of pricing decisions became a 
service industry: the actors could now choose between several available revenue 
management tools. As the automation was now taken for granted and it is the 
development of software, of particular features, which was highlighted. This 
implies that the modelling efforts on seat inventory control must focus on finer and 
finer details; a good example of this kind of refinement is the opposition between 
‘ascendant revenue management’ and ‘unrestricted revenue management.’  
 
Revenue Management as Price Discrimination Practice 
It is difficult not to consider the economic concepts of price discrimination and 
product differentiation as the underlying rationale for the evolution of current 
marketing practices in the airline industry: 
Pricing in airline markets, which are oligopolistic in most cases, is well-suited to 
this concept of differential pricing. … Differential pricing of identical seats on a 
flight departure can enable the airline to generate the additional revenue required 
to cover the total costs of the flight from those passengers using the reduced fare 
options. Airline efficiency can be enhanced, as better use of existing equipment 
with its sunk costs can be realized by filling otherwise empty seats. 
From the consumer's perspective, the practice of differential pricing by airlines can 
in theory benefit all passengers, resulting in a pareto optimal market situation. As 
long as the full-fare passengers do not pay more than they would have in the 
absence of differential pricing, they are no worse off. … Low-fare passengers 
                                                     
passengers, everybody benefits. That’s just fundamental economics.’ … ‘Another major 
contribution of PODS is that if one airline puts in a more sophisticated RM system, it 
definitely gains revenue, but the other airline can actually lose revenue. So the movement 
is: one airline goes up, the other airline goes down. These are things that shouldn’t be 
surprising anybody who knows anything about competition and economics but, back in the 
1990s, there was some uncertainty about whether all this RM science really did anything 
for the industry or whether that was just a market share exchange’ (Interview, 17 July 
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benefit from the availability of lower-priced air travel options, either by saving 
money on a planned trip or by being able to take a trip that would not otherwise 
have been taken.91 
Belobaba explains how mathematical models, such as the EMSR 
framework, can be used to determine recommended booking limits, dynamically 
revised during the booking process, to make sure that a maximum number of seats 
can be sold at the equilibrium price. Effective implementation of fare class booking 
limits allows airlines to generate incremental revenues without incurring 
corresponding increases in operating costs. More than this, the EMSR decision 
model also ensures the fairness of the allocation of fixed costs and resources. The 
market thus appears to us as more equitable, in particular for the low-revenue 
passengers given that remaining seats were deemed to be a surplus and made 
available to them. This apparatus takes on a number of economic representations, 
coming from, in particular, the strange, very peculiar world of microeconomics, 
populated with fictional characters who express their preferences according to their 
utility functions: 
Regardless of how rigidly we interpret the notion, utility maximization seems to be 
a reasonable basis for the development of an individual choice framework for air 
travel decisions. Several other components of the classical micro-economic model 
of consumer choice can also be incorporated into this framework, although 
modifications to account for the unique nature of transportation demand are 
required. Most important of these is the derived nature of transportation demand. 
That is, few individuals travel for the sake of travel itself. … A related 
characteristic of transportation is that it is purchased not for its quantity, but rather 
for its attributes.92  
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Given the derived nature of transportation demand, consumers will want to 
minimize travel time, cost, discomfort and inconvenience for a trip with a given 
level of perceived benefits. The concept of utility thus represents a generalized 
function that takes into account the pleasant and unpleasant components of making 
a trip and can form the basis of consumer choice.93 
Revenue management is one of the practical applications of the theory of 
price discrimination, as it was formulated by Jules Dupuit in the middle of the 
nineteenth century.94 The articles that I have presented here pursue the ideal of first-
degree price discrimination, already indicated by the French economist-engineer 
when he recommended, in order to extend the utilisation of certain services, that the 
entrepreneur attempt to ‘impose on each traveller, on each merchandise, only a 
price inferior to the one which would prevent them from using the road.’95 I will 
briefly describe what price discrimination is. To understand how price 
discrimination can be a viable strategy for a firm, it is necessary to assume that the 
firm has market power of some sort, either monopoly or oligopoly power. The firm 
under this market structure will typically seek to sell additional output at a price in 
excess of its marginal cost and if it can find a way to do so without lowering the 
price on the units it is currently selling. Price discrimination requires, among other 
conditions, that the firm also has a way to sort consumers, whether it be with respect 
to some exogenous category such as age, or on the basis of some endogenous 
category such as time of purchase. By multiplying these categories indefinitely, the 
consumers could be made to pay over all the utility they derive from the purchase 
of a particular unit.  
                                                     
93 Peter P. Belobaba, ibid., p. 38-9. 
94 Robert B. Ekelund, ‘Price Discrimination and Product Differentiation in Economic 
Theory: An Early Analysis,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (2), 1970, p. 268-78. 
95 Jules Dupuit, ‘On Tolls and Transport Charges,’ in The International Economic Papers, 
Elizabeth Henderson (trans.), London: Macmillan and Co., 1962 [1849], p. 21. For the 
formal taxonomy of the degrees of discrimination, see Arthur C. Pigou, Economics of 
Welfare, London: Macmillan and Co., 4th ed., 1962 [1920], p. 277. See also his earlier paper 
in which he found first-degree discrimination to be of only academic interest; Arthur C. 
Pigou, ‘Monopoly and Consumers’ Surplus,’ Economic Journal, XIV, 1904. 
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Perfect price discrimination, of course, is a very difficult matter in practice. 
Nevertheless, it constitutes a purely theoretical horizon towards which the 
conceptualisations of contemporary operational research are related. We know that 
instances of price discrimination of some degree can be found in economic life—
Jules Dupuit himself found in railways an empirical illustration of his idea.96 But 
what is of interest here, is to be able find both in the analytical abstractions of 
microeconomics and in the algorithmic models I have just reviewed the same 
arguments: demand can be segmented; price sensitivity varies across these 
segments; bundles of product/service features must be constructed to correlate 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay with their preferences and purchase behaviours; the 
prices at which these products are offered on the market must be determined by 
means of optimisation.  
We have seen how, in the case of American Airlines, a number of specialists 
tried to claim a monopoly on the techniques and know-hows of revenue and pricing 
management. Now we see how the conceptual and linguistic representations are the 
subject of a similar process of construction and appropriation, and the means of this 
process appears to be a particular form of rhetoric. It remains to me, however, to 
clarify, based on a concrete case, what seems to be a quasi-causal relationship 
between the politic and the performative, and to analyse, in this situation which is 
eminently political, the emergence of performative effects and arguments relating 
to the optimality of mathematical modelling. Saying that economic sciences have 
influence on the way the actors think about and build the markets is an assertion 
which is useful—while the attempts to naturalise market economy by its inscription 
                                                     
96 So he writes: ‘It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent 
to put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third-class seats that some 
company or other has open carriages with wooden benches.’ … ‘What the company is 
trying to do is to prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling 
third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich.’ … 
‘And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel to third-
class passengers and mean to second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class 
passengers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is 
superfluous.’ Jules Dupuit, ‘On Tolls and Transport Charges,’ art. cit., p. 20.  
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in human nature remain vivid and strong—but far too naïve. I prefer to insist on the 
complexity of processes of formation and diffusion of knowledge and, in particular, 
on this fundamental irresolution on the status of theoretical statements of 
economics: we do not truly know where the performative stops and where the 
predictive begins.  
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4. Making and Explaining Prices: A Case of Revenue Management in 
the Hotel Industry 
 
Selling Price versus Suggested Price 
I have tried to find a place and time where the justification of revenue management 
became a practical matter. It is the elaboration by a French start-up, PriceMatch, of 
what is called a SaaS (Software as a Service) solution for price setting in the hotel 
industry: the determination of price recommendations, by means of a software 
licensed on a subscription basis and centrally hosted, for the services—in particular 
hotel rooms—offered for sale by hotel properties. In practice, it is a secondary case 
study, at least in comparison with the examples mentioned hereinbefore in the 
airline and railways industries. Nevertheless, the case is interesting for several 
reasons. On the one hand, the solution under the SaaS model, appears as a 
‘disruptive’ innovation with regard to the commercial exploitation of revenue 
management systems. It is a method which leads to significant reduction in costs 
for the users, by transferring the expenditures of acquisition and maintenance to the 
software provider. On the other hand, the solution developed by PriceMatch can be 
understood as the realisation, in a certain form, of the theoretical constructs that I 
have mentioned it the second section of this presentation, and offers a convenient 
platform to question the performativity thesis. 
What is the particular story of this system? First it is important to understand 
the singularity of the service offered by revenue management software vendors: a 
price recommendation. A price recommendation or price suggestion is by definition 
discretionary: the hotel manager or any responsible of pricing matters in the 
property can decide to follow, or not, the price suggestion displayed on the platform 
and to upload this price on the website or any other sales channels, OTA97 in 
particular. This product has a sensitive status over which it is easy to sense the 
political implications, or more precisely the rhetorical significance.98 Indeed, the 
                                                     
97 Online Travel Agency. 
98 For a sociological approach to the tensions between the rhetorical and the technical, see 
Bruce G. Carruthers and Wendy N. Espeland, ‘Accounting for Rationality: Double-Entry 
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pricing algorithm is supposed to enable the execution of a technical operation of 
which the outcome is ordinarily seen as a neutral form of information. Yet price 
recommendation, often regarded with suspicion by the actors, means that this 
outcome is also important in order to establish the legitimacy of the tool. Many 
adjustments need to be sought and found to reduce the gap between the positive and 
the normative, between what is calculated and what is expected by the users so that 
this suggestion looks convincing. In the case in point, this adjustment is made 
through the practical application of ad hoc rules, which intervene after the 
optimisation calculation.  
Although the price suggestion is only one of the elements provided by the 
solution—already existing data stored in reservations systems, or PMSs99, but 
presented in a clear and readable form is considered by the actors as a significant 
advantage of the platform100―, it is easy to understand why it is a figure of crucial 
importance. It is the price that maximises the revenue and profit of a hotel property. 
It is used by the hotelier to determine the selling price of her rooms. And it is on its 
merits—its quality—that the hotelier will make the decision to extend, or not, her 
subscription. It entails the legitimacy of the expertise offered by PriceMatch. As we 
can see, this figure largely determines the success of the start-up. It is therefore easy 
to understand why many actors pay close attention to it. Members of the 
organisation may be interested in it for several reasons: engineers assess the 
performance of price suggestions made in the past to improve theses values; 
account managers control the prices recommended by the algorithm, and adjust the 
parameters (weight of completion, number of days used to determine the reference 
price value, volume strategy versus revenue strategy, etc.) to obtain ‘acceptable’ 
                                                     
Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality,’ The American Journal of 
Sociology, 97 (1), 1991, p. 31-69, on the case of double-entry bookkeeping.  
99 Property Management Systems. 
100 Occupancy rate, current price, median price of competitors, pick-up (i.e. the number of 
reservations picked up from a given point of time to a different point of time over the 
booking process), events that may influence local demand, for example, are all relevant 
information that users need to make their profit-maximising decisions. 
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suggestions but also to fix, on a case-by-case basis, some price suggestions they 
find ‘abnormal,’ when the setting would not provide any ‘satisfactory’ results.  
 
The ‘Democratisation’ of Revenue Management Systems 
Before the introduction of revenue management, room prices in the hotel industry 
were relatively fixed. Savvy customers could, however, get a discount on the 
displayed price for bookings made at the desk or over the phone. In France, a 
specific legal circumstance framed the direction of this negotiation: the obligation, 
to which hoteliers have been subjected since the end of the 1960s, to inform their 
clients about the prices charged in their properties.101 The maximum price, or rack 
(as it is called in the industry), is determined beforehand, often once a year, and 
displayed outside and inside the hotel. This means that a reservation can be made 
at a different price, at the discretion of the hotelier, as long as the price is lower than 
the rack price. We can recognise here the well-known practice of sales at sale prices 
or selloff, which characterised the retail industry. We can note that, in both cases, 
this is identical products that are sold at different prices. We also note that the 
former selling price is known to customers, as it is a legal obligation of retailers 
too,102 and that, in both cases, a stock or part of a stock is sold off at a reduced price. 
However, the reasons for discount are different: one, in the retail industry, is applied 
when a product is out of date, obsolete, or shows a lack of conformity; the other, in 
the hotel industry, intervenes to fill rooms that otherwise would remain empty and 
thus to improve the revenue of the property.  
For the middle of the 1980s several revenue management solutions 
appeared, which addressed primarily the needs of large hotel chains.103 A two-tier 
                                                     
101 See Arrêté du 18 décembre 2015 relatif à la publicité des prix des hébergements 
touristiques marchands autres que les meublés de tourisme et les établissements hôteliers 
de plein air, JORF n° 0299 du 26 décembre 2015, p. 24056, Texte n° 139. 
102 Sales in France are regulated by the following text: LOI n° 2008-776 du 4 août 2008 de 
modernisation de l'économie, Art. 98. 
103 Robert G. Cross have told that John W. Marriott Jr., president of the hotel chain of the 
same name,  heard about revenue management directly from American Airlines’ president, 
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technology diffusion seemed to occur: the most powerful actors could develop their 
revenue management systems, either internally or by engaging the costly services 
of a software vendor; while the least well-endowed coming from the so-called 
‘independent’ hotel industry had to settle for more rudimentary pricing 
technologies. ‘Most [vendors of revenue management systems] are not specifically 
addressing the needs of SMEs104,’ warns in the late 1990s the consultancy firm 
Arthur Andersen on the behalf of the European Commission.105 
For many actors, it is necessary to make the technology ‘more accessible.’ The term 
‘democracy’ is often used.106 In recent years, it is mainly so-called ‘innovative’ 
companies, such as PriceMatch in France or Duetto in the United States, which will 
                                                     
Robert L. Crandall at a chance meeting in the mid-1980’s, avant d’appliquer ses principes 
au secteur hôtelier. This shift in the sales operation strategy of Marriott International would 
be, for the author, the first adoption of revenue management beyond the airlines. See Robert 
G. Cross, Revenue Management, op. cit.; Robert G. Cross, Jon A. Higbie, Zachary N. 
Cross, ‘Milestones in the application of analytical pricing and revenue management,’ 
Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, 10 (1), 2011, p. 8-18. 
104 Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.  
105 For a survey of revenue management systems in 1990’s Europe, see European 
Commission, Directorate-General XXIII—Tourism Unit, Yield Management in Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises in the Tourist Industry: General Report, drawn up by Arthur 
Andersen, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
1997, p. 25 (quote). The case of the tourist industry in France is addresses in special section, 
see p. 129-42. 
106 This term remains problematic. It can be used in any case by a consultant or a revenue 
management software vendor to mean that a technology is made accessible to all hotels, 
regardless of their size. On the other hand, the phenomenon studied here cannot be confused 
with what some have called, advocating for it, a ‘technical democracy’ or ‘dialogical 
democracy.’ In the case in point, it is the very same specialists, whether they work for a 
software giant of the hotel industry or a start-up like PriceMatch, who take decisions on the 
technical aspects of the technology. Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe, 
Agir dans un monde incertain. Essai sur la démocratie technique, Paris: Le Seuil « La 
couleur des idées », 2001. 
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try to respond to this situation. It can be estimated that the recurrent cost of these 
new entrants is as much as twice as low as that of incumbent firms.107 For a long 
time, before the emergence of this type of SaaS software, other solutions, as we 
have seen, were contemplated, and that of consulting firms specialising in hotel 
pricing issues seemed the most relevant for the independent hotel sector. A sort of 
revenue management, however unsophisticated it was, had already been used by 
most hotel directors who will eventually engage the services offered by PriceMatch. 
On a one-off basis, the hotelier, working in tandem with the consultant, will 
determine a number of values that will serve as reference points for pricing. Based 
upon market surveys, they (hotelier and consultant) will set the maximum price or 
rack at which a given room can be sold. They will also build the ‘annual calendar,’ 
that is, the price for each day of the year given the characteristics of the date. The 
day of the week, the month of the year,  the presence of a holiday, or that of local 
events, are some factors that will impact demand, and thus price levels. More 
frequently, every day or every week, these prices will be looked at again and will 
be adjusted if need be according to the actual load factor of the property. For 
example, for an occupancy rate higher (or lower) than the expected rate, the hotelier 
will revise upwards (or downwards) the selling price for each room. 
 
  
                                                     
107 The subscription amounts are between 250 and 400 euros for companies such as 
PriceMatch and Duetto and between 400 and 500 euros to pay for the services of software 
firms like IDeaS and Easy RMS, to which must be added a significant saving on installation 
and setting up costs estimated at 3,000 to 5,500 euros. 
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Figure II.3.1. Calendar view, June 2012. 
Note: On the right hand side, two distinct tables—one for each room type—show the list 
of the actual prices and that of the price recommendations made by the algorithm for the 
coming thirty days and. On the left hand side, corresponding graphs represent the variations 
of the actual price (in red) and of the recommendation (in green). Also highlighted in the 
tables are the dates for which the gap between the actual price and the recommendation is 
relatively significant: cells turned yellow if the difference is less than five per cent and red 
if it is more than that.  
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Figure II.3.2. Detailed view, June 2012. 
Note: In addition to the information on price and recommendation given in the overview 
tab, other factors such as competitor prices and local events that may affect the demand are 
shown here. A graph also gives the evolution of the actual prices for each room type and 
reservations taken over the booking period for a given date. 
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The solution developed at PriceMatch follows a very similar pattern: 
aggregating all available information which may impact the local demand, then 
determining the price suggestion according to an optimisation model. From an 
algorithmic point of view, it is only a matter of applying the pricing principles 
which were already used by the hoteliers. But the solution is not self-evident. Each 
day, the hotelier receives via the platform a price suggestion for a given room and 
date, nothing less and nothing more. The service provided by the specialist is 
therefore reduced to its simplest form: a number (expressed in euros or national 
currency). The solution could not effectively be adopted without some work of 
explanation.108 With the prototype or MVP109, for example, the principle of price 
suggestion was difficult to read and still little developed in terms of transmission of 
information (see Figure 2). In response to several early users’ questions concerning 
reliability of the result, PriceMatch tended to support its recommendations by 
providing a range of other quantitative data, such as the number of bookings made 
and prices of rival properties (see Figure 3). Moreover, as soon as the product was 
launched onto the market, some investors expressed their concern that hotel 
managers may not be ready to use the technology. ‘Hoteliers are not engineers’: it 
was thus necessary to ‘educate’ them so that they would understand that it is in their 
best interests to extend their subscription (Interview, 31 March 2016). At 
PriceMatch, this explanation work is carried out by the account managers whose 
job is precisely to provide ad hoc justification for the prices suggested by the 
platform. We will now see that the engineers and the algorithm also play their part 
in this. 
 
                                                     
108 For a critical view on explanation, see Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: 
Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, Kristin Ross (trans.), Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1991 [1987]. For an English introduction and review, see Charles 
Bingham and Gert Biesta, Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation, New York, 
NY: Continuum, 2010. 
109 Minimum Viable Product. 
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Another Solution vis-à-vis the Suggestion ‘to the Nearest Euro’: Fare 
Classes 
PriceMatch solution has very little to do with the promotions and destocking 
operations of the retail industry. For many actors, this revenue management system 
presents itself as the best way to rationalise pricing practices—and not a way to 
salvage the structure of sales at sale prices, which consists of selling off products in 
stock at a discounted price. To understand the specificity of this solution, it may be 
useful to compare it to another system also used to solve the hotel pricing problem. 
PROS, an North American provider of pricing software, and Walt Disney World 
Resort, introduced at the turn of the 2000s a revenue management system was later 
took by the other theme parks of the group.110 The aim was to set a selling price for 
the rooms of the hotel complex. The calculation is carried out, as it is almost always 
the case, on the basis of the history of past bookings. However, and this is precisely 
where this solution differs from the one devised by PriceMatch, the calculation is 
made using five predefined fare classes: first the rack, then four levels of discount 
corresponding respectively to 85, 70, 60, and 50 per cent of this maximum price.111 
With the solution chosen by PROS, it is quite clear that the price thus 
calculated cannot rigorously be optimal. The main reason is that the price jumps 
from one discount level to the next (in fact the algorithm allocates for each fare 
class a number of rooms that maximises the revenue; but other segments of demand 
can well be reached by introducing intermediate fare classes). The price is 
characterised by a certain ‘rigidity.’ A revenue management at Disneyland Paris 
considers this price structure too ‘restrictive’ because it does not allow to precisely 
target ‘all the sensitivities’ with regard to price of the clientele of the park. 
Engineers are the ones who choose the calculation parameters and who decide when 
the price difference is significant enough to justify the introduction of an additional 
fare category. This decision is not arbitrary at all: the larger the fare class, the more 
                                                     
110 E. Andrew Boyd, The Future of Pricing, op. cit. p. 94-102.  
111 In fact, PROS solution counts six fare classes, if we take into account the additional 
category for special offers, and twelve, the sales channel—direct via the call centre or the 
website, or indirectly through the travel agencies that collaborate with the hotel group—on 
which a reservation is made.  
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it contains price values, and the more robust the optimisation model. PROS did try 
to mitigate this extreme integration constraint, in particular by introducing a 
category with no predefined prices for special offers; however, they cannot multiply 
the number of fare classes ad infinitum (at the risk of creating categories devoid of 
any substance, empty shells, and thus impairing the performance of the model). 
If we put the solution of PriceMatch and that of PROS side by side, we find 
one of the structuring oppositions in the scientific literature between revenue 
management models known as ‘quantity-based’ and ‘price-based’.112 We can note 
that, in both cases, it is an algorithm that determines the price in accordance with a 
set of rules and priorities. We note as well that the notion of optimisation remains 
central, and that, in both cases, it is a question of maximising the revenue, and thus 
the profit of the property or the group. Still, the choice of the maximisation 
constraint seems to oppose two distinct ways of solving the problem of revenue 
management: one, at Disneyland, is ‘quantity based,’ that is, the primary demand-
management decisions concern product rationing and availability control (how 
much to sell to whom, whether to accept or reject requests for products, and so on); 
the other, at PriceMatch, is ‘price based,’ i.e. the primary demand decisions are 
prices (how to price to various customer groups or how to vary prices over time). 
This theoretical distinction between these two categories of models is essentially a 
‘semantic’ one for the actors.113 ‘Many hotels were already doing some sort of 
dynamic pricing,’ explains one founder of the start-up who has played a major role 
                                                     
112 Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue 
Management, op. cit., p. 20-2. 
113 ‘To me revenue management is essentially about controlling either the availability of 
the product or the price of the product, in response to market conditions, to try to maximise 
revenue. So in the book the way we split it up is between quantity control and price control.’ 
… ‘But the objectives in both cases are sort of the same in that you want to respond to 
market conditions and you want to consider whatever constraints you have on the 
availability of the product or how much time you have to sell the product to generate as 
much revenue as possible. It’s just the nature of what it is that you’re controlling in the two 
cases.’ … ‘So I think it’s kind of just a semantic thing really’ (Interview, 14 September 
2011). 
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in the design of the tool. ‘The approach we had was to propose an optimal price of 
sale. This was a bit new, unexpected.’ … ‘The idea of giving a price 
recommendation, and somehow of pretending that we know the optimal price of 
sale, is something intriguing114 to the hoteliers. There is something magical in it’ 
[Interview, 24 September 2014]. Although the price suggestion is the result of some 
mysterious process, it slips out of the simplifying categorisation of an inexhaustible 
reality. In this sense, it is a right price.  
We recognise as well the distinction between heuristics and optimal 
solutions that is used as an argument to promote the models expounded in the 
publication of Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin.115 But the idea here is not 
to act so the pricing algorithm would replace the ‘pricing scripts’116 used by 
hoteliers to set room prices in their properties. This kind of rationalisation—some 
would describe it as a form of nudging117—takes place in the context of a specific 
problem: a matter, altogether rather prosaic, of the commercialisation of a 
technology. In the business model chosen by PROS, the possibility that customers 
                                                     
114 It is noteworthy, for the issue at hand, the double meaning of the term ‘intriguing,’ which 
refers to something that arouses curiosity or interest, that fascinates, but also that has an 
element of secret, something that is illicit or detrimental to someone.  
115 For introductions and reviews on methods for hotel revenue management, and in 
addition to the texts that I have explored above, see, e.g., Sheryl E. Kimes, ‘Pricing and 
revenue management,’ in Vithala R. Rao (ed.), Handbook of pricing research in marketing, 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009, p. 477-87; Larry R. Weatherford and 
Sheryl E. Kimes, ‘A comparison of forecasting methods for hotel revenue management,’ 
International Journal of Forecasting, 19 (3), 2003, p. 401-15. 
116 The notion of ‘script’ has been applied in quite a meaningful way to price setting in 
contemporary art, see Olav Velthuis, Talking Prices, op. cit., p. 116-31.  
117See James Wilk, ‘Mind, Nature and the Emerging Science of Change: An Introduction 
to Metamorphology,’ in Gustaaf C. Cornelis, Sonja Smets, and Jean Paul van Bendegem 
(eds.), Metadebates on Science: The Blue Book of ‘Einstein Meets Magritte’, Boston, MA: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, p. 71-87; Richard H. Thaler, and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2008.  
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would terminate their contract at any time is suspended: the hotel group cannot turn 
to a competitor without exposing itself to the threat of losing the specific assets 
invested in its collaboration with the software provider. On the contrary, the start-
up offers a so-called ‘non-binding’ contract, that is, the decision to extend the 
collaboration, or not, arises every month (although the start-up has tried to 
encourage more permanent contracts by offering significant discounts for annual 
subscription, to improve its cash position). The challenge at PriceMatch therefore 
is to ensure that the hoteliers ‘buy it’, that is, they concur with each and every price 
suggested by the revenue management system (or rather this problem takes on a 
greater acuity than does the case previously considered).  
The pricing algorithm, and especially the control rules that it incorporates, 
redistributes the agency in the production of prices from the analyst, without for all 
that ruling it out entirely. As seen, the rationalisation at work in the case of revenue 
management allows some degree of flexibility: the algorithm does not abolish the 
possibility of a role for what Peter Belobaba calls ‘human judgment’, but it allows 
revenue managers to focus their efforts on critical dates. But there is more. The idea 
of PriceMatch engineers is precisely to integrate this judgment in the algorithm so 
to speak, to address ‘not only the optimisation problem but also the concerns of the 
hotelier.’ Thus questioned on the algorithm’s rules of priority, one of the start-up 
cofounders explains: ‘We have to respect constraints which are not necessarily 
aligned with the optimisation interests of the hotelier. If we provide a hotelier with 
a recommendation that seems absurd to her, it is the whole tool that is being put 
into question. So you need to find the right balance between actually optimising the 
selling price and reassuring the hotelier.’ [Interview, 24 September 2014]. We can 
follow through the interviewee’s assertion: the algorithm is a rhetorical device 
because its purpose is not simply to inform but also to convince. In that, the price 
thus calculated cannot be considered a neutral, technical information; instead one 
must see it as a powerful argument in favour of the legitimacy of the start-up and 
the services it provides.118  
                                                     
118 Bruce G. Carruthers and Wendy N. Espeland, ‘Accounting for Rationality,’ art. cit., p. 
35.  
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How to ‘Perform’ a Price? 
I have identified two types of rules that come into play, subsequent to the 
optimisation calculation of the suggested price: the algorithm include rules that are 
‘technical’, on the one hand, and ‘rhetorical’ on the other. First, ‘technical rules’ 
ensure that the suggested price is between the minimum price and the rack set by 
the hotelier; that it matches the property’s price grid, if applicable; that a double 
room is always more expensive than a single room; that a n+1-night stay is also 
always charged more than a n-night stay; etc. It is noteworthy that the algorithm 
also contains a variation of what I have called ‘ascendant revenue management.’ 
We have seen that, in the case of the French national railway, a rule made it 
technically impossible for revenue managers to reopen lower-value discount 
classes—that is, to make prices go down. Instead, the revenue management system 
developed by the start-up permits such downward changes in prices but only up to 
a certain limit. ‘Rhetorical rules’ deserve some more detailed attention. Again a 
distinction has to be made between rules that have to do with movements in 
suggested prices, their performance, and those that refer to local conditions of the 
property.  
To attend to the issue of price performance, it seems useful to briefly return 
to PROS solution and note that, contrary to the users of PriceMatch online platform, 
revenue managers of Disneyland Paris could not observe directly the evolution of 
the suggested price over the booking period, nor that of the actual selling price. 
According to the engineers of PROS the revenue manager does not need to know 
of this: all that is significant for her is whether a change in prices is likely to yield 
additional revenue for the firm and, if so, how much this change has to be. The way 
the user interface was designed in the start-up may explain why the following rule 
was subsequently implemented: it ensures that the suggested price at day d cannot 
be ‘too’ far apart from its initial value at day d-1. In the case of PROS solution, 
erratic changes in prices is beyond the control of the analyst because, with this 
particular user interface, the price evolution is not displayed, it has not been made 
visible—although it is possible to obtain it at the cost of several operations of data 
retrieval and processing. With PriceMatch, on the contrary, excessive volatility 
(some sudden downward and upward adjustments in pricing) can immediately and 
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directly be detected by the user on her control panel. Changes in recommended 
prices thus become a strategic issue. One may respond that the distinction 
established between technical and rhetorical rules is very much artificial: the effect 
of a negative price, or a price above the legal limit set by the rack, would be just as 
harmful to PriceMatch’s credibility and impact of their advice. In this specific 
sense, then, technical rules attempt to persuade and can therefore be analysed as 
rhetoric. Yet there is a fundamental difference between technical and rhetorical 
rules: that the latter cannot be revealed to the platform’s users (unless PriceMatch 
would want to deliberately shoot itself in the foot).  
It is easy to understand why the rhetorical rule I have given as an example—
that embeds the suggested price in that of the night before—is inconvenient. 
Contrary to its technical counterparts, this rule is purely rhetorical in nature, as it is 
not based on any economic justification whatsoever. The price thus calculated is 
merely a self-referent utterance. And it seems to me that what we have here is some 
variation of what David Graeber has called the paradox of performativity. We can 
understand that the real function of the rhetorical rules is to convince the hoteliers 
of the legitimacy of the start-up’s expertise. We understand as well that it is a 
function that cannot be fulfilled if the hoteliers are aware of this.  
Several contemporary sociologists have made the observation that prices are 
set on the basis of others: behind every price there is a network of prices.119 In the 
present case, it is the control rules incorporated in the algorithm that weave the links 
of the network around the suggested price. The latter is calculated not only in 
relation to the prices reviewed (such as the minimum price, the rack, or that of the 
night before) but also by reference to the price actually applied by the user as well 
as its competitors’ prices. I will therefore add to those already mentioned two 
control rules: one makes the recommendation be more or less in the price range of 
comparable hotels in the same area; the other ensures that the recommended price 
                                                     
119 Sandrine Barrey, « Formation et calcul des prix », art. cit.; Koray Çalışkan, ‘Price as a 
Market Device: Cotton Trading in Izmir Mercantile Exchange,’ in Michel Callon, Yuval 
Millo, and Fabian Muniesa (eds.), Market devices, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, p. 241-60; 
Koray Çalışkan, ‘The Meaning of Price in World Markets,’ Journal of Cultural Economy, 
2 (3), 2009, p. 239-268. 
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does not deviate ‘too far’ from the actual price applied by the hotelier. I have 
decided to deal with these rhetorical rules separately because, contrary to the self-
referential case previously examined, it is indeed possible to build them upon an 
economic reasoning—although, of course, a reasoning that is quite different from 
the normal economics of revenue management. Anchoring the price suggestion to 
the median price of competing properties—properties that are selected by the 
hotelier herself—‘makes sense’ to the extent that, this way, ‘the hotel is correlated 
with its market to some degree,’ an engineer of PriceMatch explains. Likewise does 
a suggestion based on the actual price set by the hotelier because, and given that the 
algorithm cannot take into account all market variables as admitted by the 
developers themselves, no one knows better than the ‘man on the spot’ (as Friedrich 
Hayek would say) the ‘particular circumstances of time and place.’120 
This combination of optimisation algorithms and seemingly unsophisticated 
user-defined rules and strategies is noting less than puzzling. We have seen how 
theoretical approaches on pricing, and especially on seat inventory control, pertain 
to a peculiar representation of the market, substantiated by concepts from the 
operational research, and of which the justification conjures the frameworks of 
neoclassical economics. We now also see that the way the problem is solved at 
PriceMatch returns to a familiar theme of liberalism, especially in Ludwig von 
Mises’s and Friedrich Hayek’s thought.121 The idea that the optimum price cannot 
be the result of central planning—that is, an economic calculus that would attempt 
to integrate all the knowledge that ought to be used—is dear to the followers of this 
school of thought. Any calculation that is done centrally crashes into market 
incompleteness, due to inherent deficiencies with acquired knowledge and 
limitations in human cognitive capacity, and therefore creates biased depictions of 
the market. The only solution therefore is, according to these authors, to allow 
                                                     
120 Friedrich Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society,’ The American Economic Review, 
35 (4), 1945, p. 519-30, p. 524 (quote). 
121 Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, S. Adler 
(trans.), Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1990 [1920]; Friedrich Hayek, ‘The Use 
of Knowledge in Society,’ art. cit.  
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‘some form of decentralisation’ … ‘because only thus can we ensure that the 
knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used.’122  
What is more, it is possible that this is precisely the recognition of the 
limitations of the algorithm by the same people who developed it that explain the 
success of a company like PriceMatch or, in the words of James C. Scott, why the 
‘start-up did not fail.’123 PriceMatch revenue management system is quite 
remarkable in that it blends into one algorithmic solution the two types of 
knowledge Scott has discussed in Seeing Like a State—that is, the top-know 
knowledge of state planners and the ‘metis’, or tacit knowledge, of local actors. The 
result is contradictory in essence, but it produces a ‘real’ price (at least from the 
users’ point of view). We can even say that PriceMatch solution relies on its users 
in two ways, as the price thus calculated is only a suggested price that the hotelier 
is free to choose or not.  
What is important here, however, is not so much the theoretical success of 
a certain economic representation but the fact that this cannot be said. And it is 
obvious why. With the last two rules I have mentioned, PriceMatch solution 
confines itself to following the hotelier in her analysis: the price suggested by the 
platform repeats, to some degree, the price chosen by the user (or that of 
competitors) and can therefore by analysed as tautology. Revealing and publicising 
this would be fatal to PriceMatch, as it would be to deny their own expertise on 
pricing and to say that in fine the hoteliers are well capable of setting their prices 
all by themselves, and especially without the help of an algorithm. Here, once again, 
                                                     
122 Friedrich Hayek, ibid., p. 524.  
123 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1998. It is 
noteworthy that, surprising as this may seem, Scott’s theory of knowledge is not that 
different from Hayek’s (although, of course, the political implications that these authors 
draw from it are at the opposite ends). I am grateful to Mitya Zhikharevich who pointed 
this out to me. See also, on this, the review by American economist J. Bradford DeLong, 
‘James Scott and Friedrich Hayek,’ Grasping Reality with Both Hands: bradford-
delong.com, 24 October 2007 [online]. http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2007/10/james-
scott-and.html [Last consulted on 3 March 2018] 
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the paradox of performativity, or a variant of it, intervenes. ‘I think that he’s the 
biggest crook ever,’ explains an engineer of PriceMatch about his boss. ‘Because 
he knows perfectly well how it works but he manages to sell a thing that is different 
from what he knows it is. And he’s gifted for that because I myself wouldn’t be 
able to lie on the reality of the algorithm. He’s a crook but that’s a quality here.’ 
[Interview, 20 August 2014] When the start-up members explain to customers and 
other external stakeholders what is in the algorithm, they are very careful not to 
detail the rhetorical rules that we have been discussing (at the risk of losing all 
credibility in the eyes of their customers and of seeing the latter go elsewhere). To 
paraphrase Graeber: they have to insist that there is something else, something 
proper scientific behind their price suggestions, what matters is that it is not seen 
as sheer performativity. As a result, the technology of revenue management is often 
surrounded by a certain air of buncombe, hypocrisy, and lies.124  
Finally it is never entirely clear to what degree any given price is the result 
of supply and demand or institutions (broadly defined): almost always there is an 
element of both.125 Certainly, this is the case at PriceMatch, where price suggestions 
are based so much on the knowledge and capabilities of the users, on the norms and 
regulations in the hotel industry, and the sense of fairness (what hoteliers mean 
when they say ‘customers would object’), despite of claims that revenue 
management purely is the practical application of price discrimination. What I have 
examined here is not how economic representations play some role in shaping 
markets and the economy in practice but rather the way certain arguments that we 
find in a purely logical form in political economy can be expressed in the structure 
of a concrete pricing algorithm but that the parameters of the algorithm cannot be 
revealed if we want to apply the logic in question. To this, I have shown the 
                                                     
124 David Graeber, ‘The Sword, the Sponge, and the Paradox of Performativity,’ art. cit., 
p. 29. 
125 Jane I. Guyer, Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa, Chicago, IL, 
and London: Chicago University Press, 2004; Jane I. Guyer, ‘Composites, fictions, and 
risk: Toward an Ethnography of Price,’ in Chris Hann and Keith Hart (eds.), Market and 
Society: The Great Transformation Today, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
p. 203-20.   
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importance of seemingly trivial little schemes and rhetoric used by certain pricing 
specialists who pretend to be able to predict the occupancy rate on a given date and 
the price to charge to maximise the revenue of a property, in a situation that is 
insofar as it is political can be analysed as performativity.  
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5. Conclusion: Pricing as Technology of the Future 
 
This essay has studied some of the social and political properties that come into 
play in price formation by means of a revenue management system: I have dwelled 
on a particular function of these systems that should make it possible in principle 
to determine discount allocation and produce a vector of prices, which in economic 
theory corresponds to the optimal solution under conditions of perfect price 
discrimination. A first section has focused on the airline case and on the revenue 
management system developed at American Airlines in the years following the 
1978 Airline Deregulation Act. A second section has analysed the theoretical 
representations, which, in economics in general and in operational research in 
particular, justified the use of revenue management techniques, and interpreted its 
principles in terms of fairness. A third and last section has explored in practice how 
the rationalisation of a revenue management system for hotels could not rely 
explicitly on a theory of performativity.  
The purpose of this essay was not to give an exhaustive account of all the 
many technical elements of revenue management systems, nor was it to analyse the 
social consequences of computerisation on professional practices. Instead I have 
sought to draw some relationships between rationalisations and tools by looking at 
a specific detail of the problem. I have described the way in which the algorithm 
integrate many economic justifications, and remarkably varied for that matter, 
according to a particular dialectics. Solving the problem of revenue management 
involve, in the case studied, the use of a theoretical artifice in the setting of price 
suggestions, which prevents the price from getting to far to the users’ expectations. 
But this stratagem has to meet, in a way, the users’ intelligence and judgment. It 
has to be built on something else, more real, and it cannot be produced in a strictly 
performative manner. 
We thus could, by plunging into the intricacies of the algorithm developed 
by PriceMatch, unveil the tricks and ruses to which the start-up members give way 
to legitimise their expertise on the issue of hotel pricing. We have seen that revenue 
management, in its computing form, transfers agency from actors naturally limited 
in their cognitive capacities to a technology whose calculation power should make 
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it possible to obtain a price for a given room that maximises the revenue and profit 
of a particular property. This ideal of automation, that we can found in the scientific 
literature in particular in operational research, is also present at PriceMatch where 
the following contradiction appears clearly: on the one hand, the ‘industrialisation’ 
of revenue management is a proclaimed objective of the start-up; on the other hand, 
the solution in question reinvest by the back the user with her ability to act, through 
the rhetorical and algorithmic rules that I have described above. Thus this essay, 
ultimately, is a contribution to an anthropology of the limits of human knowledge 
in a field, that of operational research, where the technologies of the futures seem 
to combine some of the most sophisticated and the most scientifically-based 
mathematical formulae and computing techniques.  
It belongs to the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to have forcefully reminded 
us that markets and their main products—prices—but also economic theories are 
social constructs.126 In the case presented here, we can even consider that it is not 
enough simply to create markets but to maintain them constantly by the actors’ 
intervention: critical situations, such as the construction of a market or the 
development of a pricing tool, where the economic theory plays a crucial role,127 
conceal the seemingly trivial work of maintenance and continuous production of 
beliefs, which takes place, in an unseen and convoluted way, by the very mediation 
of the technology. We cannot, however, limit ourselves to marvelling at the extent 
of the power of economics and, in particular, at approaches which the functionalist 
biases have long been expressly criticised. One of the advantages of describing 
price making as if it was a performance is precisely to insist on the political—and 
thus magical—dimension of economics: to try to understand, in other words, why 
the explanations and prescriptions of these experts always seem to be surrounded 
                                                     
126 Certainly, ANT as developed by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon constitutes a notable 
continuation in the long debate about ‘embeddedness’ initiated by Karl Polanyi. Karl 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]. 
127 See, for example, Marie-France Garcia, « La construction sociale d'un marché parfait », 
art. cit.; Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo, ‘Constructing a Market, Performing Theory,’ 
art. cit. 
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by an aura of fraud. And, in the case of hotel pricing, it seems to me that the 
rhetorical rules that I have described above allow us to get a practical grasp of it. 
The market for revenue management technologies would thus by an ideal place to 
subject the social utopias of microeconomics, and the scope of their metaphors, to 
sociological analysis. The issue of the power of economists can thus be dealt with 
in several ways: by observing how the always more complex and comprehensive 
mathematical formulae of economist-engineers enable the advent of a sort of 
superior reality, or by examining, for example, how it is as much a ‘social effect,’ 
which means in some cases to realise that the creations of economists are in a way 
scams, whose consequences are still no less real and significant. I have sought to 
contribute here to this questioning through the social effects that come into play in 
a revenue management system: this kind of tool seems indeed particularly well 
suited to a social theory which aims at the study of technologies of the future and 
to an aspect of human condition such that our knowledge of events and history is 
fundamentally limited.  
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Appendix A: Interviews 
 
Name Affiliation Date Duration 
Peter P. BELOBABA 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
24 April 2012  
and 17 July 2012 
63 min.  
and 40 
min. 
E. Andrew BOYD PROS 11 July 2012 45 min. 
Duncan C. COPELAND Harvard University December 2013 - 
Robert G. CROSS Revenue Analytics 
22 June 2012  
and 3 July 2012 
25 min. 
and 95 
min. 
Kenneth LITTLEWOOD British Airways 8 February 2013 68 min. 
Robert L. PHILIPS Columbia University 26 June 2012 65 min. 
Barry C. SMITH American Airlines January 2014 - 
Garrett J. VAN RYZIN Columbia University 14 September 2011 98 min. 
 
Table A.1. List of interviews, academics and other pratitionners. 
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Name Occupation Date Duration 
    
Basile Human resources manager 29 September, 2014 116 min. 
Adriane Account manager 21 August, 2014 89 min. 
Cédric Developer 11 September, 2014 193 min. 
Augustine Marketing manager 30 July, 2014 115 min. 
Baptiste President 21 August, 2014 88 min. 
Alexandre Head of sales 1 September, 2014 105 min. 
Arnaud IT technician 23 April, 2015 84 min. 
Bastien Account manager 27 March, 2015 112 min. 
Alexis Account manager 27 March, 2015 85 min. 
Alex Account manager 21 August, 2014 121 min. 
Christine Head of Telemarketing 3 April, 2015 66 min. 
Erwann Account manager 30 March, 2015 82 min. 
Hervé Developer 26 March, 2015 59 min. 
Antonin Account manager 28 March, 2015 75 min. 
Karim Salesperson 7 April, 2015 73 min. 
Philippe Marketing manager 30 March, 2015 78 min. 
Alban Human resources manager 7 April, 2015 69 min. 
Yoan Head of Partnership 1 August, 2014 126 min. 
Cyril  Developer 6 April, 2015 76 min. 
Christian Account manager 20 August, 2014 139 min. 
André IT technician 27 April, 2015 85 min. 
Ilan Developer 6 April, 2015 91 min. 
Feriel Co-director of Account Management 22 August, 2014 191 min. 
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Bryan Developer 6 April, 2015 77 min. 
Adil Director of Sales 22 September, 2014 100 min. 
Helios Co-director of Account Management 8 April, 2015 76 min. 
Aurélien Developer 10 September, 2014 92 min. 
Guillaume Telemarketer 29 July, 2014 108 min. 
Antoine Developer 24 April, 2015 67 min. 
Julien Co-director of Development 18 September, 2014 92 min. 
Léo Vice-president 24 September, 2014 87 min. 
Sébastien Developer 21 August, 2014 137 min. 
Maxime Developer 20 August, 2014 99 min. 
Karen Office manager 30 March, 2015 62 min. 
Carine Account manager 4 August, 2014 120 min. 
Elias Co-director of Development 20 August, 2014 108 min. 
Sofia Account manager 2 April, 2015 66 min. 
Romaric Developer 10 September, 2014 127 min. 
Hugo Head of Algorithm 27 March, 2015 69 min. 
Théo Salesperson 8 April, 2015 70 min. 
Lucas Account manager 5 August, 2014 75 min. 
Arjun Director of Operations 1 April, 2015 105 min. 
    
Table A.2. List of interviews, PriceMatch members. 
 
  
219 
 
 
Name Occupation Date Duration 
PM1 Receptionist 15, April, 2015 66 min. 
PM2 Hotel manager 17 April, 2015 52 min. 
PM3 Hotel manager 14 April, 2015 26 min. 
PM4 Management assistant 14 April, 2015 99 min. 
PM5 Hotel manager 8 December, 2015 74 min. 
PM6 Hotel manager 13 April, 2015 33 min. 
PM7 Investor 13 May, 2016 52 min. 
 
Table A.3. List of interviews, other staheholders at PriceMatch. 
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Appendix B: Survey 
 
Data 
A questionnaire survey was conducted in the start-up during the summer of 2014. It 
provided standardised responses which can be subject to quantitative analysis: 34 people 
replied to the questionnaire (of the 38 members of PriceMatch at the time), that is, a 
response rate of 89 percent. In the spring of 2015, I launched a second survey among the 
new team members, and thus doubled the number of responses received. However, I will 
not use these data in this thesis. 
Table of 34 rows (individuals) and 50 columns (variables). 
Variables: function 6 [variables]: occupation, tasks, previous occupation in the start-up, 
status, command responsibility, member of Comex; recruitment 3: modality recruitment, 
arrival date, probation; previous working experience 4: previous occupation, reasons for 
leaving previous occupation, experience in the hotel industry, experience in revenue 
management; working conditions 18: salary, bonus, view on bonus scheme, effort vis-à-vis 
wage, hours worked, evening work, weekend work, work pace, holidays taken, satisfaction 
at work, stress at work, atmosphere, relations with colleagues, causes of tensions, 
friendship, meetings outside of work, desire to leave the start-up, reasons for leaving it; 
views on revenue management 5: ‘last minute’ pricing, ‘early bird’ pricing, ‘ascendant 
yield,’ price volatility level, ethics of revenue management; knowledge in revenue 
management 4: ‘Littlewood’s rule,’ EMSR, dynamic programming, readings; social 
properties 10: age, sex, date of degree completion, diploma, subject, university or grande 
école, father’s diploma, father’s occupation, mother’s diploma, mother’s occupation. 
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Selected Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.1. Occupations in the start-up by sex. 
 
  
 
 
 
Occupations Female Male Total 
Developer - algorithm  4 4 
Developer - back end  2 2 
Developer - front end  2 2 
IT  2 2 
Account manager 4 3 7 
Salesperson 2 6 8 
Country manager  2 2 
Cold caller 1 1 2 
Director (HR/marketing/partnership/etc.)  4 4 
Admin 1   1 
Total 8 26 34 
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Source—Excerpt from the comprehensive staff register (in French, Registre unique du 
personnel), February 2013 to October 2014. 
Graph B.1. Change in team size over time, employees only.  
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Table B.2. ‘How far did you go in school?’ 
  
Two-year degree 15% 
Three-year degree 15% 
Four-year degree 0% 
Five-year degree 3% 
Minor business school 12% 
Major business school 6% 
Minor engineering school 6% 
Major engineering school 9% 
Sciences Po 15% 
Ecole Polytechnique 21% 
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Source—INSEE, Enquête emploi en continu 2014. 
Table B.3. Fathers’ socio-occupational status. 
  
 
In the 
start-up 
Engineers, executives and 
intermediate occupations in the 
private sector under 36 years 
Learned professions (doctors, lawyers, 
etc.) 
9% 
3% 
Private executives 28% 15% 
Public executives 22% 9% 
Engineers 6% 6% 
Intermediate occupations (teacher, 
service, etc.) 
3% 
34% 
Sole traders, craft and related trades 
workers 
22% 
7% 
Clerical workers 
16% 
37% 
Blue-collar workers 17% 
Farmers, clerical and blue-collar 
workers 1% 
 3% 0% 
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Table B.4. Mothers’ socio-occupational status. 
  
Learned professions (doctors, lawyers, etc.) 12% 
Private executives 18% 
Public executives 9% 
Engineers 0% 
Intermediate occupations (teacher, service, etc.) 32% 
Craft and related trades workers 9% 
Farmers, clerical and blue-collar workers 6% 
Non working 6% 
N/A 9% 
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Table B.5. Percent wage distribution by occupation. 
  
Salary 
Director 
(partner/HR/ 
marketing/etc.) 
Developer 
Account 
manager 
Salesperson 
Trainee, or other 
provisional 
contractor 
Total 
< 18k€ 100% 20% 33% 10% 75% 44% 
18 to 
24k€ 0% 20% 33% 40% 25% 26% 
> 24k€ 0% 60% 33% 50% 0% 29% 
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Table B.6. Average weekly working hours by occupation. 
  
Account manager 40.7 
Developer 42.4 
Director (partner/HR/partnership) 53.0 
Salesperson 47.1 
Trainee, or other provisional contractor 38.3 
Total 44.1 
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Appendix C: Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
 
Data and Results 
The multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) shows the distinguishing features of 
positions held in the company (active variables), and the social characteristics as 
supplementary. Active variables include: team, occupation, status, location, hierarchical 
position, participation on the executive committee, number of hours worked, salary 
received, bonus received, seniority, and experience in hospitality and in revenue 
management. Supplementary variables include: age, sex, degree, and father’s occupation. 
Table of 34 rows (individuals) and 16 columns (variables) including 4 illustrative variables. 
Variables: team 6 [levels]; occupation 12; status/type of contract 7; location of office 4; 
hierarchical position 2; ExCo member 2; number of hours worked 4; remuneration 5; bonus 
2; length of service in the company 5; experience in hospitality 2; experience in RM 2. 
Illustrative levels: age 3; sex 2; degree 10; social class 7. 
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Graph C.1. Eigenvalues histogram. 
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Table C.1. Eigenvalues. 
 Eigenvalue Percentage of Variance 
Dim 1 0.4866 14.24 
Dim 2 0.3318 9.71 
Dim 3 0.3136 9.18 
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Strongest Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.2. Levels contributions, individuals. 
  
Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 
Baptiste 12.1 Tristan 14.5 Hanna 17.9 
Léo 12.1 Aymeric 10.6 Arnaud 12.9 
Alex 7.1 Christine 9.2 Carine 7.3 
Elias 6.7 Léa 7 Alex 6.8 
Julien 6.7 Fatih 5.7 Aymeric 6.7 
Aymeric 6.5 Théo 4.1 Tristan 6.5 
Carine 5.7 Guillaume 4 Cédric 5.4 
Tristan 5.6 Baptiste 3.5 Feriel 5.2 
Christian 4.9 Léo 3.5 Lucas 3.9 
Adil 4.8 Karim 3.2 Sébastien 3.6 
Samantha 4.7 Robin 2.9   
Basile 3.8 Alex 2.8   
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Table C.3. Levels contributions, variables.  
Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 
> 45h. 8.9 SALES 12.5 < 35h. 10.2 
ExCo 8.3 Count.Mgr. 6.3 Appshp. 8.1 
Partner 7 VIE 6.3 AM 7.4 
Resp. 6 LesHalles 6.3 Acc.Mgr. 7.4 
Hosp.Exp. 5.4 Bonus 6.2 Admin. 4.8 
> 1 yr. 4.9 < 2 mo. 5.8 RMExp. 4.4 
RMExp. 4.2 Sentier 5.3 Hosp.Exp. 4.1 
AM 4.1 Salesperson 5.1 < 12k€ 3.7 
Acc.Mgr. 4.1 24 to 30k€ 5 IT 3.6 
Dir. 4.1 San.Fran. 3.6 Count.Mgr. 3.5 
no ExCo 3.5 DEV. 3.5 VIE 3.5 
12 to 18k€ 3.5 12 to 18k€ 3.1 DEV. 3.5 
no Resp. 2.9 Rome 2.7 < 2 mo. 3.1 
< 12k€ 2.6 C.Caller 2.7 Support 3 
35 to 40h. 2.3 AM 2.6 ExCo 2.8 
40 to 45h. 2.3 Acc.Mgr. 2.6 Indep.Contr. 2.4 
CEO 2.1 Partner 2 Algo. 2.2 
COO 2.1   Rome 1.8 
Count.Mgr. 2.1   San.Fran. 1.8 
VIE 2.1     
no Hosp.Exp. 1.9     
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Appendix D: User Interface 
 
Prototype 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.1. Calendar view, June 2012. 
Note—On the right-hand side, two distinct tables, one for each room type, show the list of 
the actual prices and that of the price recommendations made by the algorithm for the 
coming thirty days. On the left-hand side, corresponding graphs represent the variations of 
the actual price (in red) and of the recommendation (in green). Also highlighted in the 
tables are the dates for which the gap between the actual price and the recommendation is 
relatively significant: cells turned yellow if the difference is less than five per cent and red 
if it is more than that. 
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Figure D.2. Detailed view, June 2012. 
Note—In addition to the information on price and recommendation given in the overview 
tab, other factors such as competitor prices and local events that may affect the demand are 
shown here. A graph also gives the evolution of the actual prices for each room type and 
reservations taken over the booking period for a given date. 
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Final Production 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.3. Calendar view, July 2015. 
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Figure D.4. Detailed view, July 2015. 
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Appendix E: Heuristics versus Optimal Models 
 
Kenneth Littlewood introduced the idea that, in a deregulated environment, airlines 
should better maximise the revenue received on a particular flight rather than the 
number of passengers carried.1 He proposed a model of controlling low-yield fares 
when two fare classes are involved. Based on surveys it is assumed that the low-
yield passengers book first, followed by the high-yield passengers. To maximise 
revenue, low-yield passengers should continue to be accepted until: 
𝑓2 ≥ (1 − 𝑃)𝑓1   
Where 𝑓1 is average revenue obtained from a high-yield passenger and 𝑓2 
from a low-yield passenger, and 𝑃 the maximum risk that the acceptance of a low-
yield passenger will result in the subsequent rejection of a high-yield passenger. 
This has come to be known as ‘Littlewood’s rule.’ 
Peter Belobaba proposed a generalisation of this equation to more than two 
fare classes called the EMSR method.2 Most importantly, he took into account the 
way in which inventory is structured in practice: reservations systems are ‘nested,’ 
that is, the fare class inventories are structured such that a high fare request will not 
be refused as long as any seats remain available in the lower fare classes. In a nested 
fare class reservation system, each booking limit is the maximum number of seats 
that may be sold to a fare class. Several other assumptions are made: 
1. Demand for each fare class is separate and independent of demand in other 
classes; 
                                                     
1 Kenneth Littlewood, ‘Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings,’ Journal of 
Revenue and Pricing Management, 4, 2005 [1972], p. 111-23. 
2 Peter P. Belobaba, Air Travel Demand and Airline Inventory Seat Inventory Management, 
Doctoral Thesis, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Aeronautics 
and Astronautics, 1987; Peter P. Belobaba, ‘Application of a Probabilistic Decision Model 
to Airline Seat Inventory Control,’ Operations Research, 37, 1989, p. 183-97. 
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2. Demand for each class is stochastic and can be represented by a probability 
distribution (usually normal); 
3. The lowest fare class books first, followed by the next lowest class, etc. 
Belobaba defines 𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑖 to be the expected marginal seat revenue for class 
when the number of seats available to that class is increased by one:  
𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑆𝑖) =  𝑓𝑖 .  𝑃(𝑆𝑖)  
Where, 𝑓𝑖  the average fare level for class 𝑖, 𝑃(𝑆𝑖) the probability that another 
request for class 𝑖 will be received given 𝑆𝑖, the number of seats allocated to that 
fare class. 
Shortly afterwards, the non-optimality of the EMSR approach was reported 
independently by several operational researchers. For example, Jeffrey I. McGill 
and Shelby L. Brumelle noted that the EMSR method determines the optimal 
protection level for the full-fare class but is not optimal for the remaining fare 
classes (either over- or underestimating the optimal protection levels).3 
Alternatively they show that, under certain continuity conditions, an optimal set of 
protection levels 𝑝1
∗, 𝑝2
∗, … can be obtained via sub-differential optimisation 
calculation within a stochastic dynamic programming framework. The following 
conditions must be satisfied: 
𝛿+𝐸𝑅𝑘(𝑝𝑘
∗ ) ≤ 𝑓𝑘+1 ≤ 𝛿−𝐸𝑅𝑘(𝑝𝑘
∗ ) 
And: 
𝑓2 = 𝑓1𝑃(𝑋1 > 𝑝1
∗) 
𝑓3 = 𝑓1𝑃(𝑋1 > 𝑝1
∗ ∩ 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 > 𝑝2
∗) 
⋮ 
𝑓𝑘+1 = 𝑓1𝑃(𝑋1 > 𝑝1
∗ ∩ 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 > 𝑝2
∗ ∩ … ∩ 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 … +  𝑋𝑘 > 𝑝𝑘
∗ ) 
Where 𝐸𝑅𝑘(𝑝𝑘) is the expected revenue form the highest fare classes when 
𝑝𝑘seats are protected for those classes, and 𝛿+ and 𝛿− denote the right and left 
derivative with respect to, respectively.  
                                                     
3 Jeffrey I. McGill and Shelby L. Brumelle, ‘Airline Seat Allocation with Multiple Nested 
Fare Classes,’ Operations Research, 41(1), 1993, p. 127-37. 
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Largely in response to this criticism, Belobaba coined the EMSRb model 
that avoids the statistical averaging effect produced by aggregating demand across 
classes in the previous version of EMSR (relabelled EMSRa).4 However the 
proposed solution using the weighted-average has in turn been deemed to be ‘a 
somewhat crude approximation.’5 
  
                                                     
4 Peter P. Belobaba, ‘Optimal vs. Heuristic Methods for Nested Seat Allocation,’ 
Presentation at ORSA/TIMS Joint National Meeting, November 1992; Peter P. Belobaba 
and Larry R. Weatherford, ‘Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer 
Diversion in Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations,’ Decision Sciences, 27, 
1996, p. 343-63. 
5 Kalyan T. Talluri, Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, 
Berlin, Springer Science + Business Media, 2004, p. 36-7. 
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